Galen Strawson - Mysteries of Free Will

>> Galen, free will baffles me.

Every time I think about, "What's free will?"

I turn myself in circles.

I studied brain science and understand
the closedness of the physical world,

which seems to say everything is determined,
and yet we have this internal feeling that I'm

in control of everything, anything I
want to do, I can always do the opposite.

So how do you see free will?

>> I would say there's a fundamental
sense in which free will is impossible,

and it doesn't make any difference
whether the world is determined or not.

It's impossible either way.

At the same time, I think we
can't help believing we've got it,

so it's perhaps the most dramatic,
irresolvable clash in the whole

of philosophy, or indeed, [inaudible].

>> Okay, I really want to explore
that, because I think that,

as crazy as that sounds,
I think that may be right.

So why do you think that, because we certainly
can agree on one side of the equation?

We all feel like we have free will.

If I want to move my finger this way
or this way, and you tell me one way,

I can do it the other, and I
have total control of things.

And you're saying it's fundamentally impossible.

Why?

>> Well, here's an argument.

You can tell me which premise -- you
tell me where you want to get off,

but I'm going to give you the
premises and then the conclusion.

So first premise is, look, when we act,

we do what we do because of the
way we are, all things considered.

Right, premise one.

Premise two, so to be truly
responsible for what we do when we act,

we need to be truly responsible for how
we are, because you've already allowed

that we do what we do because of the way we are.

Step three, well, but we cannot be
ultimately responsible for the way we are.

Conclusion, so we can't be free.

>> Okay, so I think the problem, if I would
identify a problem, is in the first premise.

>> Okay.

>> So let's go through the -- we are --
we do what we do because of what we are.

Now, we traditionally say that what we
are is a product of our genetic structure

and our experience, and that leads
to a process, but is not there a --

and so, if you just allow that,
if you just allow that premise,

"We do what we do because of what we are," then
you do have -- then your argument runs well.

But there's another piece, and that is,
it's not just what I am that makes me do.

It's my consciousness.

It's my experience.

It's this internal volition that
I feel that can vary my genetic

or experiential cultural pressures to do things.

So I have this overriding capability to do
whatever I want to do, this internal eye,

this unity that I feel, that can override,
can supersede my genetics or my upbringing.

>> Well, I think you're probably
right to get off at the first stop,

but when I say we do what we do because
of the way we are, I'm not just thinking

about the genetic basis, which everyone
agrees is pretty strongly influencing,

and then the early upbringing, which
is also pretty strongly influencing.

And so, here -- and here's one point.

Suppose you try to change the way
you are at some point in your life.

Well, the way you try to change
yourself, and the degree of your success

in changing yourself will be a function of how
you already are, so that's not going to work.

But when I say you do what you
do because of the way you are

in a particular situation, I
am factoring everything in.

I'm factoring in all the thoughts pro
and con that are going on in your mind,

the whole complexity, and
saying, but nonetheless,

what you do in the end will be the way -- will
be a function of how your total brain state is

at that moment, including all your
sense of being able to vary things.

>> So are you saying, therefore, that
mentality is a) entirely physical,

and then b) the physical world is an entirely
closed system, because if you have premise a)

and premise b), then that is a
conclusion to your first premise?

The mind is entirely material.

The material world is entirely closed in terms
of every event is caused by a prior event,

and therefore, everything we do is
determined by our prior history.

Is that your argument?

>> Nope.

>> Okay.

>> I don't need any of that.

I can give you -- and I'll
give you an immaterial soul.

I'll give you indeterminism.

It doesn't matter.

So, but you've just got to -- what I'm
going to say is that is not going to help.

So suppose you're about.

You've got a choice between A and
B, and you're tending towards A,

but you think maybe B would
be better, and you're about.

Suppose you're tending strongly towards
A now, but in the end, you do B. So,

and suppose that was because there
was an indeterministic event,

a little random event that happened somewhere.

Does that make you responsible for it?

>> No, I agree that indeterminism in
terms of randomness, is not free will.

Randomness is not free will, and
each event caused by prior events

in a strictly materialistic
way, is not free will.

Neither one [inaudible].

>> It doesn't have to be materialistic.

It could be -- you could even
have dualistic determinism.

It's -- anyway, but.

>> Well, yeah, I mean, that's how you define it.

If you bring something else into
mentality, a dualistic view,

something that has the experience of
consciousness, then, because you don't know what

that is, you can't restrict it in the
same way you can the material world,

and maybe that's cheating, but
that's, that's the reality.

So I would agree that if
materialism explains 100% the mind,

and if materialism is a closed system --

>> Yeah, but I gave you everything.

I gave you an immaterial soul, and --

>> Okay, now, if you've given
me an immaterial soul,

which I'm not saying I believe
in, but if you give it to me --

>> Just for the sake of argument.

>> Yeah, yeah, okay, that's fine.

I'm happy to have one.

I wish I did.

I don't think I do, but if
I do, I'm happy with it.

But if I have that, I don't even know
what it is, and if it's immaterial,

maybe it works by different principles
and it has some volitional aspect to it.

>> Sure, but I'm going to say, in the end,
what you do flows from the way you are,

and even in your deepest
spiritual characteristics.

You've somehow got to get to be responsible
for being the way you are, but you can't.

You can't get back behind yourself in such
a way as to be responsible for the kind

of person you are, therefore
you can't be responsible.

>> So I can't get out of that circle.

I can't --

>> Yeah.

>> I can't go back there.

But I think I can, if you give me at that back
part of your circle, the some other element

that is not caused by a prior condition.

>> Yeah, but then you've -- whichever way it
goes, you've got to somehow have chosen it,

but you can't choose it unless you already
exist as a creature who has preferences.

You just you can't.

There's a two-word phrase, Latin
phrase, you can't be causa sui.

You can't be the cause of yourself, but you'd
somehow have to get to be the cause of yourself

to take fundamental, ultimate
responsibility for yourself,

and therefore for your actions
that flow from the way you are.

>> And therefore, free will?

>> Indeed, moral responsibility and free will.

>> And therefore, we do not have free will.

>> Yes, that is my conclusion.

And remember that it's an orthodox conclusion
in in Calvinism and Dutch reform Protestantism.

>> But that may not -- you know,
that may not cut any ice for me.

>> No, but what I'm saying is it's not
necessarily an atheistic position at all.

>> No, sure, sure.

>> And, you know, even in Islam, you
know, "What is written will happen."

But having said all that, it is true,

and you can show why we can't help believing we
have free will in the strongest possible sense,

and that is our -- that is
the world we actually live in,

the world in which we cannot help
believing in it, and is it an illusion?

Well, in some sense, yes, but it's an illusion.

It just doesn't really touch us.

The reality is that we live in a world

where we experience having true
free will and moral responsibility.

>> When in reality, real reality, we do not.

>> I think you can't escape that conclusion.