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The Pilots BEGGED Them To Land... | The Full Story of Ethiopia 961

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    - Imagine being a professional pilot
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    with responsibility
    for hundreds of passengers
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    being told how to fly your aircraft
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    by desperate, uninformed madmen.
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    And knowing that if
    you do what they ask,
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    it will kill you and everyone on board.
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    How would you react?
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    Stay tuned.
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    It all started on
    a beautiful autumn morning
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    in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
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    where Ethiopian Airlines
    Flight 961 was scheduled
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    as a short hop over to Nairobi in Kenya,
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    and then it was scheduled
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    to continue onwards towards
    Brassaville, Lagos and Abidjan.
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    On November 23rd 1996,
    the aircraft scheduled
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    to operate this route
    was a Boeing 767-260ER
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    with registration Echo
    Tango Alpha India Zulu.
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    And this is a wide-body
    twin-engine airliner
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    which had joined Ethiopian
    Airlines back in 1987.
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    It was powered by two Pratt & Whitney
    JT9D turbofan engines
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    and configured with
    18 business class seats
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    and 174 in economy.
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    So in total, the aircraft
    could carry a maximum
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    of 192 passengers,
    though it wasn't scheduled
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    to be full on this particular day.
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    But the fact that this
    767 was a long-haul aircraft,
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    often used for much
    longer routes than this,
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    will come to play an
    important part of this story.
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    Very early in the morning,
    the ground crew had been advised
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    by the dispatcher to fuel the aircraft up
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    with about three and
    a half hours worth of fuel.
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    That should have been
    more than enough
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    for the first roughly two-hour
    long flight over to Nairobi,
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    that's even when counting
    things like potential holding fuel
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    and a diversion to their alternate airport.
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    But obviously this was also way less
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    than the maximum fuel quantity
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    that the 767 could hold,
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    which would give it
    a range of around 11 hours.
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    And that's worth keeping in mind.
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    Anyway, as the boarding started,
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    the flight had been booked
    with 163 passengers,
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    so if we include the 12 crew members,
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    the total figure of souls on board
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    would eventually become 175.
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    Most of the passengers
    were of Ethiopian origin,
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    but there were also travelers
    from 35 different countries,
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    including tourists,
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    business class travelers
    and foreign nationals working
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    with NGOs and embassies in the region.
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    So as always, in modern aviation,
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    this was a mix of lives,
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    all brought together by circumstance.
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    Now the flight crew
    that had been scheduled
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    to fly together on this particular day
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    was both seasoned professionals.
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    In command was Captain Leul Abate,
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    one of the most experienced pilots
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    in Ethiopian Airlines at the time.
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    He was 42 years old and
    had amassed more than 11,500 hours
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    of total flying time,
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    including over 4,000
    hours on the Boeing 767
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    that they were now about to operate.
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    His first officer,
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    Yonas Mekuria, was 34 years
    old and was also well qualified.
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    He had slightly more
    than 6,000 hours in total,
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    including nearly 2,500 on the type,
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    and together, they formed
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    a skilled and respected cockpit team.
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    In fact, Captain Leul was considered one
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    of the airline's top instructors
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    and had even been training
    pilots over in the United States.
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    The cabin crew consisted
    of 10 flight attendants,
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    most of whom were young,
    fluent in multiple languages
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    and trained in hospitality
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    and in emergency evacuation procedures.
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    And they carried out their duties
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    that morning as they always did,
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    welcoming passengers,
    helping with boarding
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    and completing the standard
    pre-departure safety checks.
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    The pre-flight preparation
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    in the crew room
    earlier had been standard,
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    with no particular threats noted,
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    so the crew had eventually
    just walked straight out
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    to the aircraft and
    started preparing it for departure.
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    And while they were doing that,
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    the passengers had all gone through
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    the standard security checks,
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    where nothing strange or
    suspicious had been found.
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    The pushback from the gate at Bole
    International Airport occurred
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    just before 8 o'clock local time,
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    and the weather conditions were great,
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    with only light winds
    and a good visibility.
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    The aircraft taxied out
    with the captain at the controls,
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    and at time 08:09,
    the Bole Tower Controller,
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    cleared Flight 961 for
    takeoff from Runway 07R.
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    The mighty aircraft soon
    soared into the sky,
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    beginning its short southward
    journey down towards Nairobi.
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    Everything was looking great so far.
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    The pilots were initially cleared
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    to climb to 35,000 feet,
    or flight level 350,
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    following the standard
    international airway,
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    tracking south over
    The Great Rift Valley.
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    The early part of the flight
    was completely uneventful,
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    with the pilots in the cockpit setting up
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    their navigational systems,
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    logging flight times and
    doing all of the routine tasks
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    that we pilots do on every flight.
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    But that feeling of normality
    would very soon change.
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    15 minutes after takeoff
    at time 08:24,
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    the drink service began in the cabin,
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    with the passengers settling in,
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    some dozing off, others reading
    or enjoying the view
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    of the rugged Ethiopian
    landscape below them.
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    But seated in the economy cabin,
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    were three men who were now
    looking around impatiently,
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    and they had no intention
    of ever making it to Nairobi.
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    At time 08:29, as the aircraft
    leveled off at 39,000 feet,
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    their final cruising level,
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    these three men, all Ethiopian citizens,
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    suddenly made their move.
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    They stood up from their seats
    at the rear of the aircraft,
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    with one of them shouting,
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    "Everybody should be seated,
    I have a bomb!"
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    And they then quickly moved up
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    through the business class
    cabin towards the cockpit.
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    These were not trained hijackers.
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    In fact, it would later turn out
    that they had no ties
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    to any organized militant
    group or similar at all.
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    They were just
    three desperate individuals,
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    which actually makes them
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    quite unusual hijackers for the time.
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    They all spoke primarily in French,
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    even though French is not
    widely spoken in Ethiopia,
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    and it seems like they
    had no clear motive either.
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    Even today, it's not clear if their goal
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    was to escape political persecution,
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    starting a new life,
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    or just to do something huge
    and eye-catching
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    that would make them famous.
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    And when we're on
    the subject of intent,
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    over the last few weeks,
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    I have noticed a completely new trend.
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    I wonder if you've seen it as well.
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    Several of my friends and contacts
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    have started sending me what
    looks like official documents,
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    including interim reports
    about recent serious accidents.
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    While these look really
    convincing at a first glance,
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    so convincing actually
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    that industry professionals
    are sharing them,
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    you don't have to
    dig very deep to realize
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    that they are AI generated,
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    and you can see that
    due to unrealistic dates,
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    made-up technical information, et cetera.
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    I don't know the full intent
    behind these fake documents,
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    but you can be absolutely sure
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    that they are a goldmine
    for hackers and bad actors
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    out to steal your information.
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    Now let's get back to those hijackers.
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    Anyway, without any visible weapons,
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    the hijackers had soon made
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    their way into the front galley,
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    where they now burst into the cockpit,
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    which, remember, had no
    security barriers at the time,
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    and it seems like surprise and speed
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    were their greatest
    assets to achieve this.
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    As soon as they entered the cockpit,
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    they screamed out
    that there were 11 of them,
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    likely to make the pilots
    worry about something
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    known as sleepers in the cabin.
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    These are silent
    members of a hijacking team
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    who doesn't make
    themselves known at first,
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    in order to provide help
    to the main hijackers
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    or stop potential
    passenger rebellions.
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    But in this case,
    there were no indications
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    that there were any more hijackers
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    than just these three
    initial ones on board.
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    Anyway, the first thing they then did
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    was to beat up first officer Yonas
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    and then drag him out of the cockpit.
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    They then quickly grabbed
    an on-board fire extinguisher
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    as well as the crash axe
    which is stored in the cockpit,
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    thereby likely accessing
    their first real weapons.
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    Captain Leul Abate was now
    left alone at the controls,
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    and at this point, his assumption
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    was that the hijackers
    would just tell him where to go,
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    as that was normally what happened
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    in hijack situations back then.
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    The Sudan, Egypt and
    the entire Arab Peninsula
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    was within range
    and could safely be flown to,
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    so that's what the captain expected.
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    But unfortunately,
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    that was not what
    these hijackers had in mind.
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    No instead, they now issued a demand
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    so outrageous that Captain Leul
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    initially didn't even believe it.
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    "Fly to Australia," they shouted,
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    being completely
    and terrifyingly serious.
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    This was obviously complete lunacy.
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    Like I explained before,
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    the pilots had requested fuel amounting
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    to around three and a half hours
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    for their flight over to Nairobi,
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    which was entirely appropriate
    for such a short route,
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    but nowhere near sufficient
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    to cross thousands of miles of ocean.
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    So knowing this, Captain
    Leul now tried his best
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    to stay calm and began to try
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    to educate the hijackers on the difference
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    between the aircraft's maximum
    range and its actual range,
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    based on the amount of fuel loaded.
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    He even showed them
    the fuel quantity indicators,
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    and hoped that this
    would make sense to them,
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    but the hijackers were obviously
    convinced that he was lying.
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    As proof, one of them
    triumphantly pulled out a copy
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    of Ethiopian Airlines' inflight magazine,
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    which listed the 767's maximum
    range as well over 11 hours.
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    And based on that, they insisted
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    that this proved that
    the plane could make it.
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    The hijackers exclaimed
    that they would blow up
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    the plane if Leul didn't comply,
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    and then showed him a device
    that they claimed was a bomb,
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    but appeared to be just a large glove.
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    So Captain Leul seriously doubted
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    that the hijackers actually had a bomb,
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    but he also knew that they
    were ready to resort to violence,
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    since they had already
    beat up his first officer.
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    Now, they also had a
    fire axe and a fire extinguisher
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    which they could use to bludgeon people,
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    so the threat of violence
    was now very, very real.
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    On top of that, it was
    also obvious that he was dealing
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    with potentially deranged individuals,
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    and if they decided to also take him out,
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    well then there would be
    no one left to fly the plane.
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    So instead of antagonizing them,
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    Captain Leul now elected to just try
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    and keep them talking,
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    buying himself and the
    crew some more time.
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    This was a decision
    based on his own experience,
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    as, incredibly, this was not the first time
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    that he had been hijacked.
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    It was actually the third time.
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    He had previously been forced to fly to Sudan,
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    and in another hijacking to Kenya,
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    so I guess this was as routine to him
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    as something like this could ever be.
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    Now in both of those cases,
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    complying with the hijackers
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    and taking them where they were demanded,
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    had ended with the plane landing safely,
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    an experience that definitely formed
    Captain Leul's perspective
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    that the best way to deal with hijackers
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    was to calmly accept their demands.
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    So he now contacted air traffic control
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    and told them that the aircraft
    would be deviating,
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    and he then added that
    the plane had been hijacked
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    and that he had been
    demanded to fly to Australia.
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    Now at that time, the plane's
    transponder was set to 2000,
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    and according to the report,
    that never changed,
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    but generally speaking
    hijackings forms part
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    of the three different situations
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    when a specific emergency code
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    should be entered into the transponder
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    to automatically alert air traffic control
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    about what is going on.
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    Those codes include 7700
    for a general emergency,
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    7600 for a loss of communication,
    and 7500 for hijacking.
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    But by now telling
    air traffic control outright,
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    he likely achieved that same goal.
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    In any case, Captain Leul
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    was now faced with
    an impossible choice.
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    If he complied with
    the hijackers' demands,
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    they would definitely run out of fuel
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    in the middle of the Indian Ocean.
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    And since he was alone
    against these three assailants,
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    fighting back could
    pose another deadly risk
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    for everyone on board.
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    So he now had to come up
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    with some way of turning
    the aircraft out over the ocean
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    to convince the anxious hijackers
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    that he was doing as he was told,
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    while still staying in range of land
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    and some type of alternates.
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    Luckily it seemed like
    the hijackers were not familiar
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    with the cockpit
    and its navigational display,
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    so it was likely that the only way
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    that they could determine
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    if he was going towards Australia or not
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    was if they could see water
    out through the cockpit windows.
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    So that led Captain
    Leul to a fateful decision,
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    one that would eventually mean
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    the difference between life and death
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    for some of the people on board.
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    He now began a
    gradual turn towards the south,
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    still following the coast, flying southeast,
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    while still also maintaining
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    the appearance of
    complying with their demands.
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    As this was happening,
    two of the hijackers returned out
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    to the passenger cabin,
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    leaving their leader seated
    in the first officer's chair.
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    The ones who had left
    then commanded a flight attendant
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    to show them how the PA system worked,
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    followed by them making
    announcements in both English,
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    French and Amharic,
    telling the passengers
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    that they had control of the plane
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    and would be demanding a landing.
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    But they never told the passengers
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    that the place where they wanted
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    to land happened to be Australia.
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    Back in the cockpit,
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    the lead hijacker
    now ordered Captain Leul
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    to contact the
    Ethiopian Airlines sales office
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    in Australia using a phone number
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    that he had found
    listed in the timetable.
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    And when the captain responded
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    that there was no phone on board,
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    this really angered the hijacker,
  • 15:05 - 15:08
    who threatened to beat him
    up if he continued lying.
  • 15:09 - 15:11
    Captain Leul eventually
    managed to convince him
  • 15:11 - 15:14
    that he should
    instead relay any message
  • 15:14 - 15:16
    to Australia via air traffic control,
  • 15:16 - 15:18
    and the hijacker agreed,
  • 15:18 - 15:19
    which allowed Captain Leul
  • 15:19 - 15:21
    to now call up Nairobi Centre.
  • 15:22 - 15:24
    This control centre had luckily
  • 15:24 - 15:26
    already been alerted about the hijacking
  • 15:26 - 15:27
    by the controllers in Ethiopia,
  • 15:27 - 15:31
    which is otherwise where
    that transponder code
  • 15:31 - 15:32
    would have come in handy,
  • 15:32 - 15:33
    as everyone in the aviation knows
  • 15:33 - 15:36
    what the code 7500 means.
  • 15:36 - 15:39
    But anyway, the captain
    now calmly called up,
  • 15:39 - 15:41
    identifying the flight and asked
  • 15:41 - 15:44
    for help to relay a message
  • 15:44 - 15:46
    over to that number in Australia,
  • 15:46 - 15:49
    and he also now announced
    that they would be flying
  • 15:49 - 15:52
    to Australia by a
    point called Oscar Victor,
  • 15:52 - 15:55
    which must have really puzzled
  • 15:55 - 15:56
    the controller on the other end.
  • 15:57 - 16:00
    He now responded
    by asking for confirmation
  • 16:00 - 16:02
    of that number that they wanted to call,
  • 16:02 - 16:04
    which Captain Leul repeated,
  • 16:04 - 16:07
    and the captain then also
    added an important detail.
  • 16:07 - 16:10
    They were now cruising at 39,000 feet,
  • 16:10 - 16:12
    but had only two hours of fuel left,
  • 16:13 - 16:16
    which was obviously not
    nearly enough to reach Australia.
  • 16:18 - 16:19
    When subsequently asked
    by the controller
  • 16:19 - 16:22
    to confirm whether
    he really intended to go there,
  • 16:22 - 16:24
    Captain Leul admitted the obvious.
  • 16:24 - 16:27
    It wasn't possible,
    they didn't have the fuel,
  • 16:27 - 16:29
    so if things didn't change,
  • 16:29 - 16:31
    they would have to ditch in the ocean.
  • 16:33 - 16:35
    Captain Leul then also made a decision
  • 16:35 - 16:37
    to switch on the cockpit speaker
  • 16:37 - 16:39
    so that the hijacker could
    hear this conversation,
  • 16:39 - 16:41
    thinking that that might perhaps
  • 16:41 - 16:43
    bring them to their senses.
  • 16:45 - 16:46
    So he then called
    the controller back again,
  • 16:46 - 16:49
    saying, "Okay, I
    just wanted our hijackers
  • 16:49 - 16:51
    to hear what you're communicating,
  • 16:51 - 16:54
    and if you have anything to say,
    go ahead and tell them."
  • 16:55 - 16:58
    The controller now aware
    of his new audience said
  • 16:58 - 17:01
    as plainly as he possibly could,
  • 17:01 - 17:04
    "Okay, I'm advising you
    that with two hours of fuel,
  • 17:04 - 17:07
    you will be unable
    to reach your destination,
  • 17:07 - 17:10
    and probably you will have
    to land on the water.
  • 17:10 - 17:13
    The best solution is for
    you to land in Mombasa.
  • 17:13 - 17:14
    Go ahead."
  • 17:15 - 17:17
    But in the cockpit, this little gambit
  • 17:17 - 17:19
    unfortunately hadn't worked.
  • 17:19 - 17:22
    In fact, it just
    angered the hijacker further,
  • 17:22 - 17:25
    so Captain Leul now told Nairobi,
  • 17:25 - 17:27
    "Okay, they say they don't want to talk.
  • 17:27 - 17:30
    They are not willing
    to negotiate on any terms."
  • 17:31 - 17:33
    And to that,
    the controller just responded,
  • 17:33 - 17:35
    "Roger, Roger, Ethiopian 961,
  • 17:35 - 17:38
    Check Australia is more than six hours flight,
  • 17:38 - 17:40
    and you have only two hours fuel.
  • 17:40 - 17:43
    You will most probably
    ditch in the ocean.
  • 17:43 - 17:46
    Why don't you land in Mombasa
    and pick up some more fuel?"
  • 17:47 - 17:50
    But there was nothing really
    that the captain could do here.
  • 17:50 - 17:52
    He just responded,
  • 17:52 - 17:55
    "There is no alternate other
    than Australia, no alternate."
  • 17:56 - 17:59
    The controller now realizing
    there was nothing more
  • 17:59 - 18:01
    that he could do, simply replied,
  • 18:01 - 18:05
    advise us when you expect
    to reach Australia, ETA Australia."
  • 18:06 - 18:08
    And then perhaps in
    a moment of frustration
  • 18:08 - 18:11
    or in a futile attempt to get through
  • 18:11 - 18:13
    to the criminal standing behind the captain,
  • 18:13 - 18:16
    the controller also added,
    "Confirm they are ready
  • 18:16 - 18:18
    to land in the ocean and drown?"
  • 18:19 - 18:23
    Now, rather than bringing
    the hijackers to their senses here,
  • 18:23 - 18:26
    this last sentence just
    acted as the last straw,
  • 18:26 - 18:28
    and the lead hijacker decided
  • 18:28 - 18:29
    that he had now had enough.
  • 18:30 - 18:33
    He violently ripped
    off Leul's sunglasses
  • 18:33 - 18:36
    and headset, finally ending
    Flight 961's communication
  • 18:36 - 18:37
    with air traffic control.
  • 18:38 - 18:40
    Nairobi's center would keep trying
  • 18:40 - 18:42
    to contact Ethiopia 961,
  • 18:42 - 18:44
    but they would never
    hear from the flight again.
  • 18:45 - 18:48
    Back in the cockpit, the
    hijacker had now grown frustrated
  • 18:48 - 18:50
    with the captain's attempts
    to resolve the situation,
  • 18:50 - 18:54
    and once again he just ordered
    him to turn out to sea.
  • 18:55 - 18:58
    Now, we pilots are trained
    to constantly use our training
  • 18:58 - 19:00
    to evaluate and re-evaluate
  • 19:00 - 19:02
    any situation we find ourselves in,
  • 19:02 - 19:05
    and that means basically put our feelings
  • 19:05 - 19:07
    and emotions to the side
    and just act according
  • 19:07 - 19:11
    to what facts training and
    experience tells us to do.
  • 19:12 - 19:13
    In order to do that,
  • 19:13 - 19:15
    we often follow decision-making models
  • 19:15 - 19:17
    like FORDEC or PIOSEE,
  • 19:17 - 19:20
    which helps us to structure
    our decision-making
  • 19:20 - 19:24
    and clearly identify the problem,
    gather information,
  • 19:24 - 19:27
    choose and execute the
    best option and then evaluate.
  • 19:28 - 19:31
    But that's, of course,
    impossible when dealing
  • 19:31 - 19:33
    with a commanding force
    who isn't backed up
  • 19:33 - 19:37
    by any knowledge, reason
    or common sense, only violence.
  • 19:38 - 19:41
    These hijackers had chosen
    to operate from a place of fear
  • 19:41 - 19:44
    and never from a place of facts.
  • 19:44 - 19:47
    And in a situation like that,
    even the most professional pilots
  • 19:47 - 19:51
    would not be able to
    make much of a difference, really.
  • 19:51 - 19:54
    But that didn't stop
    Captain Leul from trying.
  • 19:55 - 19:57
    Now before we go on,
  • 19:57 - 19:59
    let me just stop here for
    a second to point something out.
  • 20:00 - 20:02
    Even though this is a horrible example
  • 20:02 - 20:04
    of a crime being committed,
  • 20:04 - 20:06
    I cannot keep myself
    from seeing parallels
  • 20:06 - 20:08
    to the world we live in today,
  • 20:08 - 20:11
    where far too many of us
    make important decisions
  • 20:11 - 20:13
    based on rumors, trends
  • 20:13 - 20:16
    or conspiracy theories
    instead of facts.
  • 20:17 - 20:20
    Actually, this cockpit is
    almost a perfect reflection
  • 20:20 - 20:23
    of where the scientific
    community finds itself today,
  • 20:23 - 20:26
    being told what to do
    by politicians with no background
  • 20:26 - 20:28
    in science or knowledge of their field.
  • 20:29 - 20:33
    As pilots, we live and die
    based on the rules of physics,
  • 20:33 - 20:34
    decades of experience
  • 20:34 - 20:37
    and correct application
    of leadership and procedures,
  • 20:37 - 20:39
    so we operate in a world
  • 20:39 - 20:42
    where it's still all
    about doing what is right,
  • 20:42 - 20:44
    not just follow who is speaking.
  • 20:44 - 20:46
    And I think that's one of the reasons
  • 20:46 - 20:49
    why I love this industry so much.
  • 20:49 - 20:52
    Anyway, Flight 961 had now flown past
  • 20:52 - 20:55
    its original destination and
    was still heading south.
  • 20:56 - 20:59
    When they passed abeam
    Dar es Salaam in Tanzania,
  • 20:59 - 21:01
    the hijackers asked the captain
  • 21:01 - 21:03
    to again try and contact Australia,
  • 21:03 - 21:07
    which gave him a rare chance
    to contact his company frequency
  • 21:07 - 21:08
    and advise them about their position,
  • 21:08 - 21:10
    heading and fuel endurance.
  • 21:11 - 21:13
    That was information
    that could be critical
  • 21:13 - 21:15
    for determining their final crash site
  • 21:15 - 21:17
    if it would come to that.
  • 21:18 - 21:19
    But when the hijackers realized
  • 21:19 - 21:22
    that this was what the
    captain was now doing,
  • 21:22 - 21:24
    he again snapped the
    captain's headset off
  • 21:24 - 21:25
    and ordered him to start
  • 21:25 - 21:27
    flying away from the coastline,
  • 21:28 - 21:31
    out towards the vast blue
    void of the Indian Ocean
  • 21:31 - 21:33
    and an almost certain death.
  • 21:34 - 21:36
    Captain Leul did as he was told.
  • 21:36 - 21:38
    He didn't really have a choice at this point,
  • 21:38 - 21:41
    but he didn't point the nose
    just randomly out to sea.
  • 21:41 - 21:44
    Instead, he started heading southeast
  • 21:44 - 21:46
    towards the tiny
    island nation of Comoros.
  • 21:47 - 21:49
    He had personally never
    heard of this country before,
  • 21:49 - 21:53
    but he found the island chain in
    a map that he had with him.
  • 21:53 - 21:56
    And crucially, the Comoros
    capital city of Moroni
  • 21:56 - 22:00
    is home to Prince Said Ibrahim
    International Airport,
  • 22:00 - 22:03
    which has a single 2,900
    meter long runway, more than
  • 22:03 - 22:06
    long enough to land the Boeing 767.
  • 22:07 - 22:08
    And that could possibly be
  • 22:08 - 22:10
    the captain's last chance
  • 22:10 - 22:12
    to perform a controlled
    landing somewhere.
  • 22:13 - 22:16
    But for now, the flight just continued,
  • 22:16 - 22:18
    slowly depleting its
    last hours of fuel.
  • 22:20 - 22:22
    From about three hours into the flight,
  • 22:22 - 22:25
    we have the transcript from
    the cockpit voice recorder,
  • 22:25 - 22:28
    who back then only saved
    the last 30 minutes of flight.
  • 22:29 - 22:32
    The recording starts by
    capturing a truly chaotic scene,
  • 22:32 - 22:35
    with hijackers who had,
    by now stolen a couple
  • 22:35 - 22:37
    of bottles of whiskey
    from the forward galley
  • 22:37 - 22:40
    all sounding drunk, and
    with the lead hijacker
  • 22:40 - 22:43
    still in the first officer's chair
  • 22:43 - 22:45
    and another one standing
    in the cockpit with them.
  • 22:46 - 22:48
    The third was still out in the cabin,
  • 22:48 - 22:50
    on guard for attempts
    by the passengers
  • 22:50 - 22:52
    to try to retake the cockpit.
  • 22:53 - 22:55
    Captain Leul now
    asked the lead hijacker
  • 22:55 - 22:57
    if he could at least be allowed
  • 22:57 - 22:59
    to tell the passengers
    about what was going on,
  • 22:59 - 23:01
    but the answer from the hijacker
  • 23:01 - 23:03
    was short and concise, "No."
  • 23:04 - 23:06
    At this point, with
    less than 30 minutes left
  • 23:06 - 23:07
    of fuel on board,
  • 23:07 - 23:10
    Captain Leul knew
    that they were unlikely
  • 23:10 - 23:11
    to be able to land safely,
  • 23:11 - 23:14
    and he had therefore decided
    that the next best option
  • 23:14 - 23:16
    would be to prepare his passengers
  • 23:16 - 23:19
    for a landing in the sea,
    known as a ditching.
  • 23:20 - 23:21
    Under normal circumstances,
  • 23:21 - 23:23
    preparation for that would have been done
  • 23:23 - 23:25
    with the help of his cabin crew,
  • 23:25 - 23:26
    who would go through
  • 23:26 - 23:29
    what's known as time-
    available emergency drills,
  • 23:29 - 23:31
    explaining brace positions,
  • 23:31 - 23:34
    emergency exits and positions of rafts,
  • 23:34 - 23:35
    as well as assigning buddy systems
  • 23:35 - 23:38
    for children or passengers
    with special needs.
  • 23:39 - 23:42
    But now, none of that was being done.
  • 23:43 - 23:46
    He therefore calmly
    warned the hijackers
  • 23:46 - 23:47
    that the situation was starting
  • 23:47 - 23:49
    to become out of his control,
  • 23:49 - 23:53
    and when it did, the plane
    was likely going to crash.
  • 23:54 - 23:56
    One of the hijackers, angered by this,
  • 23:56 - 23:58
    asked if he wanted to die,
  • 23:58 - 24:00
    but to that, the captain
    just calmly replied
  • 24:00 - 24:03
    that death was inevitable at this point.
  • 24:05 - 24:06
    The hijacker then implied
  • 24:06 - 24:07
    that they had made a promise
  • 24:07 - 24:10
    to take the situation
    as far as it could go,
  • 24:10 - 24:13
    and now there was no turning back.
  • 24:13 - 24:15
    A chilling admission of their cause
  • 24:15 - 24:18
    now possibly turning
    into a suicide mission.
  • 24:19 - 24:21
    A few minutes later,
    the hijackers also decided
  • 24:21 - 24:24
    to remind Captain Leul
    of the threat they posed
  • 24:24 - 24:27
    when the lead hijacker
    looked at him and said,
  • 24:27 - 24:30
    "Don't worry, the axe is with me."
  • 24:31 - 24:34
    And he then, bizarrely,
    attempted to lighten the mood
  • 24:34 - 24:37
    by offering Captain Leul
    a drink of the whiskey they had,
  • 24:37 - 24:40
    calling it a bribe to calm his nerves.
  • 24:41 - 24:44
    When Captain Leul refused,
    saying that there wasn't time
  • 24:44 - 24:46
    and asking to be left alone,
  • 24:46 - 24:49
    the hijacker just insisted
    on getting him to drink.
  • 24:50 - 24:53
    But at that moment, the
    low fuel pressure warning activated,
  • 24:53 - 24:57
    with its chilling chime
    repeatedly now filling the cockpit,
  • 24:57 - 24:59
    telling anyone with
    knowledge that the pumps
  • 24:59 - 25:01
    now had no more fuel to pump.
  • 25:02 - 25:04
    Seconds later, the inevitable happened,
  • 25:04 - 25:08
    as the right engine exhausted
    its last few drops of fuel
  • 25:08 - 25:10
    and then just flamed out.
  • 25:11 - 25:13
    Now, a Boeing 767 at 39,000 feet
  • 25:13 - 25:17
    cannot maintain that altitude
    with only one remaining engine.
  • 25:17 - 25:21
    It would either start
    losing speed until it stalls,
  • 25:21 - 25:22
    or start descending down
  • 25:22 - 25:23
    towards an altitude
  • 25:23 - 25:26
    that can be maintained
    with only one engine,
  • 25:26 - 25:29
    something known as a single-
    engine service ceiling,
  • 25:29 - 25:32
    which is typically around 25,000 feet.
  • 25:33 - 25:35
    Captain Leul, of course, knew this,
  • 25:35 - 25:38
    and therefore, soon initiated the descent,
  • 25:38 - 25:40
    but the hijackers,
    who had previously told them
  • 25:40 - 25:44
    to not go below 39,000 feet
    under any circumstance,
  • 25:44 - 25:47
    now would not accept this reality.
  • 25:48 - 25:49
    Drunk, incoherent,
  • 25:49 - 25:51
    and with a childish
    understanding of flight,
  • 25:51 - 25:53
    the lead hijacker
    instead began to panic,
  • 25:53 - 25:56
    thinking that the captain
    was now disobeying him.
  • 25:56 - 26:00
    He pointed to the altimeter
    and exclaimed, "It is less!"
  • 26:00 - 26:02
    Captain Leul asked,
    "What is less?"
  • 26:02 - 26:05
    And the hijacker exclaimed,
    "The altitude!"
  • 26:06 - 26:08
    Trying to bring some
    sense to the situation,
  • 26:08 - 26:12
    Captain Leul explained
    that it will descend by itself,
  • 26:12 - 26:14
    "I am not making it descend."
  • 26:14 - 26:17
    He then pointed to the engine flame out
  • 26:17 - 26:18
    and master caution warnings,
  • 26:18 - 26:21
    and he told them,
    "As the engine stops, it descends.
  • 26:21 - 26:24
    Whether you like it
    or not, it is descending."
  • 26:25 - 26:27
    But the hijacker only
    responded by saying,
  • 26:27 - 26:29
    "Well, we will see about that."
  • 26:30 - 26:33
    By now it was clear
    that the situation was unraveling,
  • 26:33 - 26:35
    and the captain was
    losing his tenuous grip.
  • 26:36 - 26:38
    The plane was now
    almost completely out of fuel
  • 26:38 - 26:41
    with one of its engines already flamed out,
  • 26:41 - 26:44
    so the hijackers, now perhaps realizing
  • 26:44 - 26:46
    the gravity of what was happening,
  • 26:46 - 26:48
    briefly stepped out
    of the cockpit to confer
  • 26:48 - 26:50
    amongst themselves about what to do.
  • 26:51 - 26:53
    Seizing this rare moment,
  • 26:53 - 26:55
    Captain Leul made
    a final desperate announcement
  • 26:55 - 26:58
    to the passengers
    with his voice broadcasting
  • 26:58 - 27:00
    over the cabin PA,
  • 27:00 - 27:02
    "Ladies and gentlemen,
    this is your pilot.
  • 27:02 - 27:03
    We have run out of fuel,
  • 27:03 - 27:06
    and we are losing
    one engine at this time.
  • 27:06 - 27:09
    We are expecting a crash landing,
  • 27:09 - 27:11
    and that is all I have to say.
  • 27:11 - 27:12
    We have already lost one engine,
  • 27:12 - 27:16
    and I ask all passengers
    to react to the hijackers.
  • 27:16 - 27:17
    Thank you."
  • 27:18 - 27:20
    This was an extraordinary
    act of courage.
  • 27:20 - 27:24
    By encouraging the passengers
    to resist the hijackers,
  • 27:24 - 27:26
    Captain Leul was now
    knowingly putting himself
  • 27:26 - 27:28
    at greater personal risk,
  • 27:28 - 27:30
    but it had become clear that unless
  • 27:30 - 27:33
    the hijackers could be subdued,
  • 27:33 - 27:35
    he wouldn't be permitted
    to make an emergency landing,
  • 27:35 - 27:38
    so this was really
    all that he could do.
  • 27:40 - 27:42
    But tragically, his call to action
  • 27:42 - 27:44
    didn't have the desired effect.
  • 27:45 - 27:48
    A few brave passengers
    actually started urging others
  • 27:48 - 27:51
    to help them in rising up
    and taking control back,
  • 27:51 - 27:52
    but their efforts were met
  • 27:52 - 27:55
    with a lot of hesitation and fear.
  • 27:55 - 27:57
    Some passengers worried
  • 27:57 - 27:59
    that any attempt
    to overpower the hijackers
  • 27:59 - 28:01
    might provoke them
    into detonating a bomb,
  • 28:01 - 28:03
    or even crashing the plane.
  • 28:03 - 28:07
    At this point, a lot of passengers
    still clung to the belief
  • 28:07 - 28:09
    that they would still land safely.
  • 28:10 - 28:12
    There had even been some discussions
  • 28:12 - 28:15
    among the passengers about
    opening the emergency exits
  • 28:15 - 28:17
    as soon as the plane touched down,
  • 28:17 - 28:19
    and they continued
    to believe in that plan,
  • 28:19 - 28:23
    unaware that a water landing
    at sea was now almost certain.
  • 28:24 - 28:26
    But there was also another problem.
  • 28:26 - 28:29
    The captain's announcement
    had only been made in English,
  • 28:29 - 28:30
    and with passengers
  • 28:30 - 28:32
    from more than 30 different
    countries on board,
  • 28:32 - 28:36
    it is likely that many just
    simply didn't understand it.
  • 28:37 - 28:39
    So the moment passed,
  • 28:39 - 28:42
    the uprising fizzled
    before it could even begin,
  • 28:42 - 28:45
    and the hijackers soon
    stormed back into the cockpit,
  • 28:45 - 28:48
    striking the microphone
    from the captain's hand.
  • 28:49 - 28:52
    In the cockpit of
    this descending Boeing 767,
  • 28:52 - 28:54
    the tension had now
    reached a breaking point.
  • 28:55 - 28:57
    The aircraft had
    already lost one engine,
  • 28:57 - 29:00
    and now another repetitive
    beeping could be heard,
  • 29:00 - 29:01
    a warning that the fuel pressure
  • 29:01 - 29:04
    was now also dropping
    in the second engine,
  • 29:04 - 29:06
    and the captain knew
    what would come next.
  • 29:07 - 29:10
    But the hijackers
    still remained in denial,
  • 29:10 - 29:12
    clinging to their fantasy
    about reaching Australia.
  • 29:13 - 29:16
    It is descending, the
    lead hijacker pointed out again,
  • 29:16 - 29:20
    as though it was due
    to some external phenomenon.
  • 29:21 - 29:23
    He then grasped for the controls,
  • 29:23 - 29:25
    suddenly pulling on
    the yoke hard enough
  • 29:25 - 29:27
    to disconnect the autopilot,
  • 29:27 - 29:29
    and he soon also
    reached for the thrust levers
  • 29:29 - 29:31
    and began pulling on the reversers,
  • 29:31 - 29:33
    which luckily couldn't be activated
  • 29:33 - 29:35
    since they were still clearly airborne.
  • 29:35 - 29:38
    Behind the cockpit, the
    cockpit voice recorder captured
  • 29:38 - 29:40
    the cabin crew doing their best
  • 29:40 - 29:42
    to try and maintain
    some semblance of order.
  • 29:43 - 29:45
    A flight attendant's voice
    came over the PA,
  • 29:45 - 29:46
    "ladies and gentlemen,
  • 29:46 - 29:49
    please sit down and
    fasten your seat belts.
  • 29:49 - 29:51
    Don't panic.
    Please fasten your seat belts."
  • 29:53 - 29:54
    But inside the cockpit,
  • 29:54 - 29:56
    things were now getting
    completely out of control.
  • 29:57 - 30:00
    The hijacker in the right seat
    was still making crazy inputs
  • 30:00 - 30:02
    on the controls, in the same way a child
  • 30:02 - 30:04
    could be expected to behave,
  • 30:04 - 30:07
    and without the autopilot,
    the 767 now pitched
  • 30:07 - 30:09
    and rolled erratically, climbing,
  • 30:09 - 30:12
    diving and banking hard to
    the right and then to the left.
  • 30:13 - 30:15
    Information from the flight
    data recorder later showed
  • 30:15 - 30:17
    that the aircraft moved rapidly
  • 30:17 - 30:20
    from pitch angles of 3.3 degrees nose up
  • 30:20 - 30:22
    to 8.3 degrees nose down,
  • 30:22 - 30:24
    and bank angles as high
    as 47 degrees right
  • 30:24 - 30:26
    and 35 degrees left,
  • 30:26 - 30:28
    something that must have been
  • 30:28 - 30:30
    truly terrifying for everyone on board.
  • 30:31 - 30:34
    Now as the hijacker
    pulled the nose back,
  • 30:34 - 30:35
    the plane began to climb briefly,
  • 30:35 - 30:39
    but without sufficient engine power,
  • 30:39 - 30:41
    it soon lost its airspeed and therefore,
  • 30:41 - 30:42
    began descending again.
  • 30:42 - 30:45
    So even though the hijacker
    at the controls was determined
  • 30:45 - 30:49
    to get the aircraft back up
    to 39,000 feet again,
  • 30:49 - 30:52
    it soon turned out that the
    laws of physics were stronger.
  • 30:53 - 30:56
    "Let us land on the water,"
    Captain Leul now pleaded,
  • 30:56 - 30:58
    with the plane descending and the island
  • 30:58 - 31:00
    of Grande Comore now in view.
  • 31:01 - 31:04
    He was determined to try
    and salvage whatever he could.
  • 31:05 - 31:08
    Moroni's airport, Prince
    Said Ibrahim International,
  • 31:08 - 31:10
    was positioned directly ahead of them,
  • 31:10 - 31:12
    so even before the hijacker had started
  • 31:12 - 31:14
    to interfere with the controls,
  • 31:14 - 31:17
    he had already started circling
    to the south of the island,
  • 31:17 - 31:20
    trying desperately to keep
    that airport available
  • 31:20 - 31:22
    as a last landing alternative.
  • 31:23 - 31:26
    By this point, the fuel gauges
    were all reading zero,
  • 31:26 - 31:28
    and Captain Leul was trying
  • 31:28 - 31:30
    to keep the aircraft as stable as possible
  • 31:30 - 31:32
    to maintain the airport in sight,
  • 31:32 - 31:34
    just in case he could
    get the plane down there.
  • 31:35 - 31:38
    But at the same time,
    the hijacker was still interfering
  • 31:38 - 31:40
    with the controls, refusing to accept
  • 31:40 - 31:42
    what was about to happen.
  • 31:42 - 31:45
    So the captain now
    tried one final appeal to reason,
  • 31:45 - 31:47
    hoping to buy himself enough time
  • 31:47 - 31:50
    to guide the plane down
    towards the coast of Grande Comore.
  • 31:51 - 31:54
    At least let me land
    on the water, he pleaded.
  • 31:55 - 31:56
    "Why? Get out of here!"
  • 31:56 - 31:59
    The hijacker snapped, once
    again grabbing at the controls.
  • 32:00 - 32:02
    He yanked back on the yoke,
  • 32:02 - 32:03
    trying to force the aircraft to climb,
  • 32:03 - 32:06
    trading the last of their
    speed for altitude.
  • 32:06 - 32:08
    "Let it descend by itself.
  • 32:08 - 32:10
    Don't touch it," the hijacker instructed.
  • 32:10 - 32:12
    And as he was saying that,
  • 32:12 - 32:14
    Grand Comore came back into the view,
  • 32:14 - 32:17
    prompting a new burst of
    suspicion from the hijacker.
  • 32:18 - 32:20
    Captain Leul tried to reassure him,
  • 32:20 - 32:21
    but the hijacker demanded
  • 32:21 - 32:23
    to know what country that was,
  • 32:23 - 32:25
    pointing towards the island below.
  • 32:26 - 32:28
    So the captain now
    bluffed a little bit.
  • 32:28 - 32:31
    "Look, I don't know,
    it's not on the chart," he said.
  • 32:32 - 32:35
    And he then asked one final
    time if they could please try
  • 32:35 - 32:37
    and land on the solid ground
  • 32:37 - 32:40
    as the plane descended
    through about 21,000 feet,
  • 32:40 - 32:44
    but the reply came
    as definitive as always, "No way!"
  • 32:46 - 32:48
    That prompted the captain
    to point at the empty fuel gauges,
  • 32:48 - 32:51
    and almost exactly at that moment,
  • 32:51 - 32:53
    a cockpit chime rang out again,
  • 32:53 - 32:56
    this time warning that the
    second engine was now failing.
  • 32:57 - 32:58
    Captain Leul called out,
  • 32:58 - 33:00
    "There you are, the
    second engine is also out.
  • 33:00 - 33:02
    You wanted that, didn't you?"
  • 33:03 - 33:06
    And the hijacker's grim reply
    came back almost immediately,
  • 33:06 - 33:07
    "Yes!"
  • 33:08 - 33:12
    In the background, a slow
    steady chime continued to sound.
  • 33:12 - 33:14
    Beep, beep, beep.
  • 33:14 - 33:16
    Like a cardiac monitor
    in a hospital room,
  • 33:16 - 33:18
    the aircraft itself was now confirming
  • 33:18 - 33:20
    what Captain Leul already knew.
  • 33:20 - 33:22
    Time had finally run out.
  • 33:22 - 33:26
    This aircraft was only going
    to continue down from here.
  • 33:27 - 33:29
    "For the sake of my responsibility,
  • 33:29 - 33:33
    at least let the passengers
    know about the condition,"
  • 33:33 - 33:36
    Captain Leul added,
    continuing to be laser-focused
  • 33:36 - 33:38
    on the passengers' well-being behind him.
  • 33:39 - 33:40
    By this point, the lead hijacker
  • 33:40 - 33:42
    had seemingly accepted the truth.
  • 33:42 - 33:44
    There would be no landing in Australia
  • 33:44 - 33:46
    or anywhere else for that matter,
  • 33:46 - 33:48
    so his voice now grew colder.
  • 33:49 - 33:51
    "Descend it, increase the speed further,"
  • 33:51 - 33:52
    he ordered,
  • 33:52 - 33:55
    apparently intent on taking
    everyone down with him.
  • 33:56 - 33:59
    Seconds later, with the last
    engine windmilling to a stop,
  • 33:59 - 34:03
    the Boeing 767 also lost all
    of its electrical power,
  • 34:03 - 34:04
    meaning that the flight data recorder
  • 34:04 - 34:07
    and cockpit voice
    recorder also seized recording.
  • 34:08 - 34:09
    Beneath the fuselage,
  • 34:09 - 34:12
    the ram air turbine
    deployed automatically,
  • 34:12 - 34:13
    spinning in the slipstream
  • 34:13 - 34:15
    to power only a few
    critical flight instruments
  • 34:15 - 34:17
    and hydraulic systems.
  • 34:17 - 34:20
    And at this point, it
    is believed that the airport
  • 34:20 - 34:22
    in Moroni was still technically
  • 34:22 - 34:23
    within gliding range,
  • 34:23 - 34:26
    but with the hijackers
    actively preventing a landing,
  • 34:26 - 34:29
    Captain Leul had very
    limited chances of reaching it.
  • 34:30 - 34:33
    He was now left with
    only two desperate options,
  • 34:33 - 34:35
    either wrestle control
    of the aircraft back
  • 34:35 - 34:37
    and attempt a high-stake
    approach into Moroni
  • 34:37 - 34:40
    or ditch the powerless plane
    into the Indian Ocean,
  • 34:40 - 34:42
    with the hijackers still at his back.
  • 34:44 - 34:46
    As the plane dropped
    through about 15,000 feet,
  • 34:46 - 34:48
    chaos erupted in the passenger cabin
  • 34:48 - 34:50
    as some passengers started realizing
  • 34:50 - 34:52
    that the aircraft was now descending
  • 34:52 - 34:54
    down towards the sea below them.
  • 34:55 - 34:57
    They now began pulling out life vests
  • 34:57 - 34:59
    and some of them also inflated them
  • 34:59 - 35:01
    while still seated in the cabin.
  • 35:02 - 35:04
    Flight attendants and passengers
    shouted at them to stop,
  • 35:04 - 35:07
    warning that a fully inflated
    vest inside the cabin
  • 35:07 - 35:09
    would prevent them
    from escaping after impact,
  • 35:09 - 35:12
    but those warnings were largely ignored.
  • 35:13 - 35:14
    First officer Yonas,
  • 35:14 - 35:16
    having recovered from
    his earlier beating,
  • 35:16 - 35:18
    now walked back through the cabin,
  • 35:18 - 35:21
    telling people not to
    inflate their life vests
  • 35:21 - 35:24
    and even helping the cabin crew
    to deflate the ones who had,
  • 35:24 - 35:25
    while simultaneously instructing
  • 35:25 - 35:28
    the passengers on how
    to re-inflate them later.
  • 35:29 - 35:31
    The same message was then
    repeated by the cabin crew
  • 35:31 - 35:33
    and concerned passengers,
  • 35:33 - 35:35
    but many on board
    simply didn't understand,
  • 35:35 - 35:38
    again because these warnings
    were only called out in English.
  • 35:39 - 35:41
    But even if that
    wouldn't have been the case,
  • 35:41 - 35:43
    panic had now taken hold
  • 35:43 - 35:46
    and the cabin was soon
    full of inflated life vests,
  • 35:46 - 35:47
    confusion and fear.
  • 35:48 - 35:50
    Captain Leul could hear that behind him
  • 35:50 - 35:52
    as he fought to turn the aircraft around
  • 35:52 - 35:54
    to try and align it with the runway at Moroni,
  • 35:54 - 35:58
    and finally his luck turned slightly,
  • 35:58 - 36:00
    when help arrived in the
    former First Officer Yonas,
  • 36:00 - 36:02
    who now pushed his way into the cockpit,
  • 36:02 - 36:04
    defying the hijackers.
  • 36:04 - 36:06
    Let me help the captain,
  • 36:06 - 36:08
    he shouted and together
    the two pilots
  • 36:08 - 36:12
    now started fighting both the
    hijackers and the jet itself.
  • 36:13 - 36:14
    You see, with the autopilot dead
  • 36:14 - 36:16
    and control forces heavy due
  • 36:16 - 36:18
    to limited hydraulic power,
  • 36:18 - 36:21
    flying the plane was
    now physically exhausting.
  • 36:22 - 36:24
    And with the hijackers still lunging
  • 36:24 - 36:26
    for the controls,
    grabbing at the yokes,
  • 36:26 - 36:28
    trying to stop the pilots
    from reaching land,
  • 36:28 - 36:31
    this fight must have
    been truly monumental.
  • 36:32 - 36:33
    But even though that was the case,
  • 36:33 - 36:35
    Leul and Yonas finally managed
  • 36:35 - 36:38
    to get the 767 somewhat stabilized,
  • 36:38 - 36:41
    and as they did,
    they realized that Moroni's airport
  • 36:41 - 36:43
    was now no longer visible.
  • 36:44 - 36:46
    It is possible that at the time
  • 36:46 - 36:48
    that they had managed
    to wrestle back the controls,
  • 36:48 - 36:51
    the airport was simply out of reach.
  • 36:51 - 36:55
    So the two pilots now instead
    focused on what they could do,
  • 36:55 - 36:56
    tried to save as many lives as possible
  • 36:56 - 36:58
    by attempting a controlled ditching.
  • 36:58 - 37:02
    So they now initiated a turn
    of the enormous Boeing 767
  • 37:02 - 37:05
    to try and parallel the shoreline.
  • 37:05 - 37:07
    Now there are established procedures
  • 37:07 - 37:09
    for how to do a ditching.
  • 37:09 - 37:10
    There are even checklists
  • 37:10 - 37:12
    for it in a quick reference handbook,
  • 37:12 - 37:15
    but that procedure is
    created for a powered ditching,
  • 37:15 - 37:17
    meaning with both engines available,
  • 37:17 - 37:20
    and it also assumes
    that all instruments are working.
  • 37:21 - 37:24
    These two pilots were
    now going to attempt doing
  • 37:24 - 37:26
    the same with no engine power,
  • 37:26 - 37:28
    and with only their standby
    instruments working,
  • 37:28 - 37:32
    which didn't include an IVSI
    showing the descent rate,
  • 37:32 - 37:34
    so they would have to eyeball it.
  • 37:36 - 37:38
    At just 150 feet above the waves,
  • 37:38 - 37:40
    the hijackers finally gave up,
  • 37:40 - 37:41
    stepping back from the controls,
  • 37:41 - 37:43
    perhaps realizing too late
  • 37:43 - 37:45
    that they had now
    doomed themselves.
  • 37:46 - 37:47
    In the rear of the cabin,
    a few passengers
  • 37:47 - 37:50
    were now trying to
    organize a last ditch resistance,
  • 37:50 - 37:53
    but there was now
    nothing more to be done.
  • 37:53 - 37:56
    The flight was only
    seconds away from impact.
  • 37:57 - 38:00
    Coming in fast and low over
    the waters next to Grande Comore,
  • 38:00 - 38:02
    Ethiopian Airlines flight 961
  • 38:02 - 38:03
    now descended towards the coast
  • 38:03 - 38:06
    at an airspeed of roughly 200 knots.
  • 38:06 - 38:09
    With no engine power,
    not much instrumentation
  • 38:09 - 38:11
    and very little control authority,
  • 38:11 - 38:12
    Captain Leul and First Officer Yonas
  • 38:12 - 38:15
    were now flying entirely by feel,
  • 38:15 - 38:19
    gliding their 767-200ER
    towards one last desperate hope,
  • 38:19 - 38:21
    a controlled ditching just off the beach
  • 38:21 - 38:23
    near the town of Mitsamiouli.
  • 38:24 - 38:27
    Ahead lay Galawa Beach,
    a stretch of white sand
  • 38:27 - 38:30
    once considered the crown
    jewel of Comorrean tourism.
  • 38:30 - 38:34
    An inland from that beach
    was the only major tourist resort
  • 38:34 - 38:38
    in the entire country,
    the La Galawa Hotel.
  • 38:38 - 38:40
    This was a popular retreat
  • 38:40 - 38:42
    for mainly South African travelers,
  • 38:42 - 38:44
    and it was now a sunny afternoon,
  • 38:44 - 38:46
    with loads of people
    packed on the beach.
  • 38:47 - 38:49
    Among those was a
    couple from South Africa
  • 38:49 - 38:51
    with a camcorder,
    and they soon spotted
  • 38:51 - 38:54
    a low-flying plane
    approaching the shoreline,
  • 38:54 - 38:57
    assuming that it was part
    of some sort of airshow.
  • 38:57 - 39:00
    So they began to film, and that footage
  • 39:00 - 39:03
    would become one of
    the most dramatic recordings
  • 39:03 - 39:05
    of a crash landing ever captured.
  • 39:06 - 39:08
    As the 767 skimmed over the surf,
  • 39:08 - 39:11
    Captain Leul made a slight left turn,
  • 39:11 - 39:12
    trying to align with the waves
  • 39:12 - 39:14
    and thereby minimizing
    the forces on impact.
  • 39:15 - 39:17
    But despite his skill,
  • 39:17 - 39:19
    things now didn't go according to plan.
  • 39:20 - 39:23
    Just before he could
    bring the wings back to level,
  • 39:23 - 39:25
    the left wingtip struck the water,
  • 39:25 - 39:27
    and that one contact was enough.
  • 39:28 - 39:32
    The wingtip dug in, pulling
    the rest of the airframe down,
  • 39:32 - 39:34
    the left engine's massive cowling
  • 39:34 - 39:35
    then scooped into the sea,
  • 39:35 - 39:38
    decelerating and turning
    the aircraft with a violent jolt.
  • 39:39 - 39:42
    The plane then pivoted
    around the snagged engine,
  • 39:42 - 39:45
    and the right wing soared
    upward like a massive sail
  • 39:45 - 39:48
    as the fuselage whipped
    around in a dramatic cartwheel.
  • 39:49 - 39:52
    To stunned beachgoers,
    the splash alone was colossal,
  • 39:52 - 39:55
    a wall of sea spray fragments of fuselage
  • 39:55 - 39:59
    and glinting debris rising
    hundreds of feet into the air.
  • 40:00 - 40:02
    Almost immediately,
    the fuselage broke apart
  • 40:02 - 40:05
    as it also struck a shallow underwater reef
  • 40:05 - 40:07
    as part of the impact.
  • 40:07 - 40:10
    The nose sheared off,
    the center fuselage ruptured
  • 40:10 - 40:12
    and the tail was then torn away,
  • 40:12 - 40:14
    and the cabin continued
    to tumble through the sea
  • 40:14 - 40:15
    until it finally came to rest
  • 40:15 - 40:18
    roughly 500 meters away from shore.
  • 40:19 - 40:22
    And unfortunately,
    that impact killed several
  • 40:22 - 40:23
    of the passengers on board,
  • 40:23 - 40:25
    and that included all three hijackers
  • 40:25 - 40:27
    who had been standing
    in the rear of the cockpit
  • 40:27 - 40:29
    and in the galley as the aircraft hit.
  • 40:30 - 40:32
    Survivors described the chaos
  • 40:32 - 40:34
    that then followed as pure horror.
  • 40:34 - 40:37
    Some passengers had been
    ejected from the wreckage
  • 40:37 - 40:38
    and landed in the surf where they
  • 40:38 - 40:41
    were then able to swim or float to safety,
  • 40:41 - 40:43
    and others were trapped inside
  • 40:43 - 40:45
    of the disintegrating
    upside down fuselage,
  • 40:45 - 40:47
    rapidly filling with seawater.
  • 40:48 - 40:49
    Now the waters were shallow enough
  • 40:49 - 40:51
    for part of the overturned fuselage
  • 40:51 - 40:53
    to remain above the surface,
  • 40:53 - 40:54
    but some passengers
  • 40:54 - 40:57
    were still trapped by their
    upside down seats underwater.
  • 40:58 - 41:01
    And one factor that made
    survival even harder for some
  • 41:01 - 41:03
    was the fact that moments
    before ditching,
  • 41:03 - 41:05
    despite the warnings from the cabin crew,
  • 41:05 - 41:08
    many passengers had
    still inflated their life vests.
  • 41:09 - 41:12
    And now, floating in
    the upside down wreckage,
  • 41:12 - 41:14
    those inflated vests
    pinned them to the roof,
  • 41:14 - 41:16
    making it almost impossible
  • 41:16 - 41:18
    to swim downwards towards the exits.
  • 41:19 - 41:20
    Some managed to deflate
  • 41:20 - 41:23
    their vests or pull them off,
    but many didn't.
  • 41:25 - 41:26
    Now the official
    investigation made it clear
  • 41:26 - 41:29
    that traumatic injuries were
    the primary cause of death
  • 41:29 - 41:32
    in the majority of victims in this crash,
  • 41:32 - 41:35
    but it's still widely accepted
    that the inflated vests
  • 41:35 - 41:37
    also contributed to a significant number
  • 41:37 - 41:39
    of preventable fatalities.
  • 41:40 - 41:43
    But against all odds,
    some passengers did survive,
  • 41:43 - 41:46
    and their survival
    was due, in no small part,
  • 41:46 - 41:47
    to what happened next.
  • 41:48 - 41:51
    The crash had, like I mentioned,
    taken place just offshore
  • 41:51 - 41:52
    from the nation's largest resort,
  • 41:52 - 41:56
    and that meant that
    help was unusually close by.
  • 41:56 - 42:00
    Dozens of people now rushed
    to the water, some swimming,
  • 42:00 - 42:03
    others grabbing small boats
    or paddle boards to help.
  • 42:03 - 42:05
    Among them were scuba instructors
  • 42:05 - 42:06
    from a local dive school,
  • 42:06 - 42:08
    and a group of visiting French doctors.
  • 42:08 - 42:11
    And these impromptu first responders
  • 42:11 - 42:13
    were in the water within moments,
  • 42:13 - 42:16
    pulling dazed and injured
    passengers away to safety.
  • 42:16 - 42:18
    The local airport had also been advised
  • 42:18 - 42:19
    about the hijacked jet,
  • 42:19 - 42:22
    and had therefore put their
    rescue team on high alert.
  • 42:22 - 42:25
    So as soon as reports started coming in
  • 42:25 - 42:26
    about a plane crash nearby,
  • 42:26 - 42:28
    they dispatched and could support
  • 42:28 - 42:30
    the rescue efforts about 30 minutes
  • 42:30 - 42:32
    after the crash had occurred.
  • 42:33 - 42:34
    But even with that in mind,
  • 42:34 - 42:36
    in the end the death toll
    was truly heartbreaking.
  • 42:37 - 42:41
    Of the 175 people on board,
    only 50 had survived,
  • 42:41 - 42:44
    including First Officer Yonas
    and Captain Leul,
  • 42:44 - 42:47
    who Yonas heroically had
    pulled from the wreckage.
  • 42:48 - 42:51
    But that still meant that
    125 people had been killed,
  • 42:51 - 42:53
    including all of the
    three unbelted hijackers
  • 42:53 - 42:55
    and seven of the crew.
  • 42:56 - 42:59
    Now, what happened on board
    Ethiopian Airlines Flight 961
  • 42:59 - 43:01
    is, in many ways, unimaginable today.
  • 43:02 - 43:05
    The hardened cockpit door
    introduced after 9/11
  • 43:05 - 43:06
    would now prevent any intruder
  • 43:06 - 43:08
    from storming the flight deck,
  • 43:08 - 43:11
    and the mindset among
    passengers has also changed.
  • 43:11 - 43:14
    No one sits back and waits anymore,
  • 43:14 - 43:17
    so hijacking a plane
    with an axe and a fake bomb
  • 43:17 - 43:19
    is no longer a viable plan.
  • 43:19 - 43:22
    But that doesn't make
    this story any less extraordinary.
  • 43:23 - 43:26
    It remains one of the most
    harrowing and heroic episodes
  • 43:26 - 43:28
    in modern aviation history,
  • 43:28 - 43:31
    Captain Leul Abata faced
    a situation with no good options,
  • 43:31 - 43:33
    no real hope and no clear way out,
  • 43:33 - 43:35
    and still he never gave up,
  • 43:35 - 43:38
    which is a real testament
    of courage and dedication.
  • 43:39 - 43:41
    There were also quite
    a few important lessons
  • 43:41 - 43:43
    to take away from all of this.
  • 43:43 - 43:44
    The cockpit voice recorder
  • 43:44 - 43:46
    and the flight data
    recorder lost power
  • 43:46 - 43:48
    just when it mattered the most,
  • 43:48 - 43:51
    reminding us why accident
    investigators continue to push
  • 43:51 - 43:53
    for backup power supplies
  • 43:53 - 43:55
    and longer recording
    times on existing recorders.
  • 43:56 - 43:59
    Today, most airliners
    are therefore being fitted
  • 43:59 - 44:01
    with special batteries that can power
  • 44:01 - 44:02
    the recorders for a limited time
  • 44:02 - 44:04
    in case of a complete power loss,
  • 44:04 - 44:06
    which might prove really important.
  • 44:07 - 44:10
    This also highlighted
    how important it is
  • 44:10 - 44:13
    to never inflate your life vest
    whilst inside of the cabin,
  • 44:13 - 44:16
    and that's the reason
    this instruction forms part
  • 44:16 - 44:19
    of every single safety briefing today.
  • 44:19 - 44:22
    Again, an example of where
    a procedure is written in blood.
  • 44:23 - 44:26
    And then, of course, there
    are the more behavioral lessons.
  • 44:27 - 44:30
    Captain Leul's strategy of
    keeping the hijackers talking
  • 44:30 - 44:33
    and appearing to cooperate
    while subtly maneuvering
  • 44:33 - 44:35
    the aircraft towards a survivable outcome
  • 44:35 - 44:37
    offers a textbook example
  • 44:37 - 44:40
    of crisis de-escalation under duress.
  • 44:41 - 44:44
    Sometimes stalling is the
    only lifeline you have,
  • 44:44 - 44:46
    and when you're dealing
    with irrational demands
  • 44:46 - 44:50
    and real danger,
    small strategic concessions
  • 44:50 - 44:52
    can sometimes buy you precious minutes,
  • 44:52 - 44:54
    minutes that in this case meant
  • 44:54 - 44:57
    the difference between
    everyone dying in the cold sea
  • 44:57 - 44:59
    and 50 people walking away.
  • 45:00 - 45:02
    Thank you so much
    for watching this episode,
  • 45:02 - 45:05
    and I hope that we've
    earned a subscription and a like.
  • 45:06 - 45:08
    Now, if you want to see
    my next video
  • 45:08 - 45:10
    before everyone else,
    possibly even today,
  • 45:10 - 45:13
    well then scan this QR code or go
  • 45:13 - 45:16
    to patreon.com/join/mentourpilot
    and sign up.
  • 45:17 - 45:19
    My name is Petter Hörnfeldt,
  • 45:19 - 45:20
    and you're watching Mentour Pilot.
  • 45:20 - 45:22
    Have an absolutely fantastic day,
  • 45:22 - 45:23
    and we'll see you next time.
  • 45:23 - 45:25
    Bye-bye.
Title:
The Pilots BEGGED Them To Land... | The Full Story of Ethiopia 961
Description:

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Video Language:
English
Duration:
45:25

English subtitles

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