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WANNACRY: The World's Largest Ransomware Attack (Documentary)

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    [Music]
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    A small note before we start,
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    as much as this video is meant to be a
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    storytelling experience,
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    I have also intended it to be
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    educational,
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    and so, I have coupled the story along
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    with how some of these attacks and
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    technologies work.
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    This is my first documentary style video,
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    and so I appreciate any and all feedback
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    in the comments below.
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    I really hope you enjoy, and hopefully,
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    learn a few new things.
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    Right now, a crippling cyberattack has
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    businesses around the world
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    on high alert. The ransomware known as
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    WannaCry-
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    We want to move on to the other developing
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    story this morning, the global cyberattack-
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    The national security agency
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    developed this software and it's now
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    being used by criminals
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    around the world to demand ransom.
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    Security experts say this is one
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    of the worst and most
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    widespread pieces of malware they've
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    ever seen-
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    [Music]
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    [Typing]
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    In May of 2017, a worldwide cyberattack
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    by the name of WannaCry
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    shot for WannaCryptor, impacted over 150
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    countries,
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    and hit around 230,000 computers
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    globally.
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    Needless to say it became known as one
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    of the biggest ransomware attacks in
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    history.
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    Let's start at the very beginning. On the
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    morning of the 12th of May, 2017,
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    according to Akamai, the content delivery
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    network,
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    this was the timeline. Reportedly the
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    first case identified originated from a
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    Southeast Asian ISP which was detected
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    at 7:44 am UTC.
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    Over the next hour, there were cases
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    seen from Latin America,
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    then the Continental Europe and UK, then
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    Brazil and Argentinian ISPs until at 12:39 pm
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    UTC, 74%
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    of all ISPs in Asia were affected. And by
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    3:28 pm UTC,
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    the ransomware had taken hold of 65%
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    of Latin American ISPs.
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    WannaCry was spreading and at an
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    incredible rate.
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    Prior to this, such a quick and
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    widespread ransomware was unheard of.
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    A lot of organizations, unable to recover
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    their losses,
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    were forced to permanently shut down.
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    Some had to put a pause on their
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    networks and services, and reported huge
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    losses,
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    some in millions of dollars. The attack
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    did not discriminate. Small to
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    medium-sized businesses,
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    large enterprises, the private sector, the
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    public sector,
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    railways, healthcare, banks, malls,
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    ministries,
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    police, energy companies, ISPs, and there
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    just seemed to be
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    no end to the victims. Within few hours,
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    it had spread to over 11 countries,
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    and by the end of the first day of the
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    attack, the ransomware had been
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    encountered in 74 countries
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    within thousands and thousands of
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    organizations.
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    And so it begged the question, how much
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    damage will this really cause over the
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    next few days
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    or weeks or months if no solution
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    presents itself?
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    Your service has been temporarily disconnected.
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    [Typing]
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    [Music]
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    Ransomware works in a very simple manner.
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    It is a type of malware most commonly
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    spread through phishing attacks,
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    which are essentially emails used to
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    trick a user into clicking a link that
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    leads them to a website
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    where they enter sensitive data, or to
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    download attachments which if executed
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    will infect the computer.
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    Although initially suspected, WannaCry
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    did not originate from a phishing attack,
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    but we'll get to that later.
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    Once a computer is infected,
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    the ransomware runs an encryption
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    process, and usually in less than a
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    minute,
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    some or all the files depending on what
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    the ransomware is meant to affect in the
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    user's computer
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    is converted from plain text to
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    ciphertext.
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    Plain text is readable or comprehensible
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    data,
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    and ciphertext is unintelligible
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    gibberish.
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    In order to turn this back into plain
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    text, the user will need what is known as
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    a decryption key,
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    which the attacker promises to provide
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    if the user were to pay the ransom.
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    What makes ransomware so dreadful is
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    that once your files have been encrypted,
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    you can't exactly decrypt it and
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    retrieve your data.
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    Well, you can, but with the current
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    technology we have, to break common
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    encryption algorithms used in ransomware
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    attacks
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    such as the RSA, it would take millions
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    to billions to trillions of years.
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    [Music]
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    [Typing]
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    This is what you'd see if you were to
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    become infected with the WannaCry
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    ransomware.
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    In addition to this intimidating
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    wallpaper, your documents,
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    spreadsheets, images, videos,
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    music, and most everyday productivity and
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    multimedia files become encrypted,
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    essentially being held hostage till the
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    ransom payment has been made.
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    The Wanna Decryptor 2.0 comes with a set
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    of instructions
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    and in 28 different languages for
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    victims to follow in order to recover
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    their files.
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    The attackers demanded for $300 worth of
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    bitcoin,
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    and after three days it would be updated to
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    $600.
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    If the payment were to be made seven
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    days after the infection, the files would
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    be recoverable.
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    However, despite this, they also go on to
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    state that they will return the files
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    for free to "Users who are so poor
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    that they couldn't pay"
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    after six months. The method of
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    payment,
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    bitcoin.
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    [Music]
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    The reason the attackers chose bitcoin
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    was because it is what we know
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    as a private cryptocurrency. This allows
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    the holder of the currency to remain
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    anonymous.
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    Though the money could be traced to a
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    cryptocurrency wallet, which is where the
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    currency itself is stored,
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    it would be exponentially difficult to
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    find the owner of the wallet without
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    extensive forensic analysis.
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    This is the reason that bitcoin is used
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    widely in the dark web
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    to purchase guns, drugs, and other illegal
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    goods and services that for obvious
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    reasons,
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    you would not be able to find on the
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    surface web.
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    [Typing]
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    The problem with WannaCry and what made it
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    exponentially more dangerous than your
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    average ransomware
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    was its propagating capabilities.
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    But to understand this fully, we need to
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    go back in time a little bit
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    to 2016. In August of 2016, the equation
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    group, suspected to have ties with the
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    National Security Agency's tailored
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    operations unit,
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    and described by Kaspersky as one of the
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    most sophisticated cyberattack groups
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    in the world,
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    was said to be hacked by a group called
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    the shadow brokers.
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    In this hack, disks full of the NSA's
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    secrets were stolen.
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    This was bad because the NSA houses what
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    we know as Nation State Attacks
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    which are exploits or hacking tools that
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    are used to carry out a hack for their
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    home country
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    against another country. The NSA would
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    essentially recruit a skilled hacker and
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    give them a license to hack
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    which means if they did carry it out, it
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    wouldn't be illegal
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    at least in that country, and the hacker
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    would not be charged.
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    The danger here is that the Nation State
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    Tools in itself are usually pretty
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    effective,
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    especially considering they are to be
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    used as weapons against entire states
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    and countries.
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    [Music]
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    The NSA is said to have discovered a
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    multitude of other vulnerabilities in
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    the Windows OS
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    as early as 2013, but was speculated to
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    have developed exploits secretly and
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    stockpile them,
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    rather than reporting it to Microsoft or
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    the InfoSec community,
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    so that they could weaponize it and
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    utilize them in their nation state and
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    other attacks.
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    The shadow brokers would go on to
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    auction off some of these tools that
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    were developed,
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    but due to skepticism online on whether
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    the hackers really did have files as
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    dangerous as they had claimed,
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    this would essentially go on to become a
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    catastrophic failure.
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    We can talk quite a bit about the shadow
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    brokers. The story is itself worth
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    examining individually and maybe even on
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    a separate video,
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    but let's narrow our focus down to the
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    leak that made WannaCry possible
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    which at that point was the fifth leak
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    by the group and was said to be the most
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    damaging one yet.
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    On April 14, 2017, the shadow brokers
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    would post a tweet that linked to their
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    Steem blockchain
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    on a post titled lost in translation.
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    This leak contained files from the
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    initial failed auction which they now
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    decided to release to the public
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    for free. The description accompanying
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    the leaked files doesn't really contain
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    much worth noting.
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    As always the shadow brokers would use
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    broken, but still somewhat comprehensible
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    English.
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    However, this is widely speculated not to
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    speak to their proficiency in the
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    language,
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    but rather an attempt to mislead
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    analysts and prevent them from yielding
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    any results regarding their identity
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    characterized by how they type.
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    The link, which has now been taken down,
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    takes you to an archive filled with a
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    number of Windows exploits developed by
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    the NSA.
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    It did contain many other valuable tools
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    worth examining,
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    but the ones relevant to our story and
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    what made a regular ransomware so
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    destructive
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    were the payload, Doublepulsar and the
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    now infamous exploit used in the
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    WannaCry attack,
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    Eternalblue.
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    [Music]
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    [Typing]
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    Server Message Block version 1 or SMBv1
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    is a network communication protocol
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    which was developed in 1983.
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    The function of this protocol would be
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    to allow one Windows computer to
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    communicate with another
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    and share files and printers on a local
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    network.
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    However, SMB version 1 had a critical
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    vulnerability
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    which allowed for what is known as a
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    Remote Arbitrary Code Execution
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    in which an attacker would be able to
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    execute whatever code that they'd like
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    on their target or victim's computer
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    over the Internet
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    usually with malicious intent. The
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    function of Eternalblue was to take
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    advantage of this vulnerability.
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    Essentially, and I'm going to try and strip
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    it down to simplify it as much as
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    possible,
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    when the shadow brokers first leaked the
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    NSA tools,
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    hackers took this opportunity to install
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    Doublepulsar
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    which is a tool which opens what we
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    commonly know in security
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    as a backdoor. Backdoors allows hackers
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    to create an entry point into the system
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    or a network of systems and gain easy
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    access later on.
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    The initial infection of WannaCry is not
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    known,
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    but it is speculated that the attackers
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    took advantage of the backdoor to
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    deliver the payload.
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    The payload in this case is the
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    ransomware WannaCry.
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    When a computer is infected with
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    WannaCry, oddly
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    it then tries to connect to the
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    following unregistered domain
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    which is basically a random string of
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    numbers and letters.
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    If it cannot establish a connection to
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    this domain, then the real damage begins.
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    It scans for port 445 on the network
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    which is the port that is used to host
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    SMB version 1,
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    and if the port is deemed to be open, it
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    would then proceed to spread to that
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    computer.
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    This is how it propagated so quickly.
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    Whether the other users in the network
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    actually downloaded or clicked on
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    anything malicious,
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    regardless, they would be infected, and in
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    seconds all their data would be
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    encrypted.
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    So the damage came in two parts, the
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    ransomware that encrypts the data
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    and the worm-like component that is used
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    to spread the ransomware to any
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    connected,
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    vulnerable devices in the network as a
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    result of Eternalblue and Doublepulsar.
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    The attack only affected Windows systems,
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    mainly targeting Windows XP,
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    Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, and Windows
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    10.
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    However, a month prior to the leak by the
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    shadow brokers on March 14, 2017,
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    Microsoft was made aware of this
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    vulnerability after it was publicly
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    reported
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    almost five years after its discovery.
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    Microsoft then released a critical patch
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    to fix this vulnerability,
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    MS17-010.
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    However, despite the release of the patch,
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    a significant number of organizations
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    never updated their systems,
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    and unfortunately there were still major
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    organizations running Windows XP
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    or Server 2003. These devices were at end
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    of support
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    which means that even if updates were
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    out, they would not receive them
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    and be completely vulnerable to the
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    exploit.
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    If you want to know more about the
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    vulnerability that the Eternalblue
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    exploited,
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    it is now logged in the national
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    vulnerability database
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    as CVE-2017-0144
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    [Music]
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    [Typing]
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    Marcus Hutchins, also known online by his
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    alias MalwareTech,
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    was a 23 year old British security
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    researcher at Kryptos Logic
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    in LA. After returning from lunch with a
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    friend on the afternoon of the attack,
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    he found himself scouring messaging
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    boards where he came across
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    news of a ransomware rapidly taking down
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    systems in the National Health Service
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    or NHS all over the UK.
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    Hutchins, who found it odd that the
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    ransomware was consistently affecting so
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    many devices,
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    concluded that the attack was probably a
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    computer worm and not just
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    a simple ransomware. He quickly requested
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    one of his friends to pass him a sample
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    of the malware
  • 14:28 - 14:30
    so that he could examine it and reverse
  • 14:30 - 14:32
    engineer it to analyze exactly how it
  • 14:32 - 14:33
    worked.
  • 14:33 - 14:35
    Once he had gotten his hands on the
  • 14:35 - 14:36
    malware sample,
  • 14:36 - 14:38
    he had run it using a virtual
  • 14:38 - 14:40
    environment with fake files
  • 14:40 - 14:42
    and found out that it was trying to
  • 14:42 - 14:44
    connect to an unregistered domain,
  • 14:44 - 14:48
    which we discussed earlier in Chapter 4.
  • 14:48 - 14:50
    Hutchins would go on to register this
  • 14:50 - 14:54
    domain for only $10.69,
  • 14:54 - 14:55
    which unbeknownst to him,
  • 14:55 - 14:57
    would actually halt the wannacry
  • 14:57 - 14:59
    infection.
  • 14:59 - 15:00
    He would later admit in a tweet that
  • 15:00 - 15:03
    same day that the domain registration
  • 15:03 - 15:04
    leading to a pause in the rapid
  • 15:04 - 15:05
    infection
  • 15:05 - 15:08
    was indeed an accident dubbing Marcus
  • 15:08 - 15:09
    Hutchins
  • 15:09 - 15:13
    as the accidental hero.
  • 15:13 - 15:17
    [Music]
  • 15:18 - 15:23
    [Music]
  • 15:23 - 15:26
    To Hutchins, taking control of
  • 15:26 - 15:28
    unregistered domains was just a part of
  • 15:28 - 15:29
    his workflow
  • 15:29 - 15:30
    when it came to stopping botnets and
  • 15:30 - 15:32
    tracking malware.
  • 15:32 - 15:34
    This was so that he could get further
  • 15:34 - 15:36
    insight into how the malware or botnets
  • 15:36 - 15:37
    were spreading.
  • 15:37 - 15:39
    For those of you unaware of what a
  • 15:39 - 15:41
    botnet is, it is essentially a group of
  • 15:41 - 15:43
    computers that have been hijacked by
  • 15:43 - 15:44
    malicious actors
  • 15:44 - 15:46
    or hackers in order to be used in their
  • 15:46 - 15:47
    attacks to drive
  • 15:47 - 15:51
    excess network traffic or steal data.
  • 15:51 - 15:52
    One computer that has been hijacked is
  • 15:52 - 15:55
    called a bot and a network of them
  • 15:55 - 15:58
    is called a botnet, however,
  • 15:58 - 16:00
    since, as we discussed earlier, the attack
  • 16:00 - 16:02
    only executes if it's unable to reach
  • 16:02 - 16:05
    the domains that it checks for.
  • 16:05 - 16:07
    Think of it as a simple if then
  • 16:07 - 16:08
    statement.
  • 16:08 - 16:10
    If the infection cannot connect to x
  • 16:10 - 16:13
    domain, then proceed with the infection.
  • 16:13 - 16:17
    If it can reach x domain, stop the attack.
  • 16:17 - 16:18
    And so the malware being able to connect
  • 16:18 - 16:20
    to the domain was known as the kill
  • 16:20 - 16:21
    switch,
  • 16:21 - 16:23
    the big red button that stops the attack
  • 16:23 - 16:26
    from spreading any further.
  • 16:26 - 16:28
    But why would the attackers implement a
  • 16:28 - 16:30
    kill switch at all?
  • 16:30 - 16:32
    The first theory is that the creators of
  • 16:32 - 16:34
    WannaCry wanted a way to stop the attack
  • 16:34 - 16:36
    if it ever got out of hand or had any
  • 16:36 - 16:39
    unintentional effects.
  • 16:39 - 16:40
    The second and the most likely theory
  • 16:40 - 16:42
    proposed by Hutchins and other security
  • 16:42 - 16:44
    researchers
  • 16:44 - 16:45
    was that the kill switch was present in
  • 16:45 - 16:47
    order to prevent researchers from
  • 16:47 - 16:49
    looking into the behavior of WannaCry
  • 16:49 - 16:51
    if it was being executed within what is
  • 16:51 - 16:52
    known in security
  • 16:52 - 16:56
    as a sandbox. A sandbox is usually a
  • 16:56 - 16:58
    virtual computer that is used to run
  • 16:58 - 16:59
    malware.
  • 16:59 - 17:00
    It is a contained environment with
  • 17:00 - 17:02
    measures that have been taken to not
  • 17:02 - 17:05
    infect any important files or spread to
  • 17:05 - 17:06
    other networks,
  • 17:06 - 17:08
    much like what I used in Chapter 2 to
  • 17:08 - 17:10
    demonstrate the WannaCry ransomware.
  • 17:12 - 17:14
    Researchers use these sandboxes to run
  • 17:14 - 17:16
    malware and then use tools to determine
  • 17:16 - 17:18
    the behavior of the attack.
  • 17:18 - 17:20
    This is what Hutchins did with fake
  • 17:20 - 17:23
    files as well.
  • 17:23 - 17:25
    So the intent behind this kill switch
  • 17:25 - 17:26
    was to destroy the ransomware if it
  • 17:26 - 17:29
    existed within a sandbox environment,
  • 17:29 - 17:31
    again, since they didn't want researchers
  • 17:31 - 17:32
    to be able to analyze exactly how it
  • 17:32 - 17:34
    worked.
  • 17:34 - 17:36
    However, since the attackers used a
  • 17:36 - 17:37
    static domain,
  • 17:37 - 17:39
    a domain name that did not change for
  • 17:39 - 17:41
    each infection, instead of using
  • 17:41 - 17:43
    dynamically generated domain names
  • 17:43 - 17:45
    like other renditions of this concept
  • 17:45 - 17:46
    would usually do,
  • 17:46 - 17:48
    the WannaCry infections around the world
  • 17:48 - 17:50
    believed that it was being analyzed in a
  • 17:50 - 17:52
    sandbox environment
  • 17:52 - 17:54
    and essentially killed itself since
  • 17:54 - 17:56
    every single infection was trying to reach
  • 17:56 - 17:59
    one single hard-coded domain, and now
  • 17:59 - 18:01
    they could after Hutchins had purchased
  • 18:01 - 18:03
    it and put it online.
  • 18:03 - 18:05
    If it had been a randomly generated
  • 18:05 - 18:06
    domain name,
  • 18:06 - 18:08
    then the infection would only have
  • 18:08 - 18:10
    removed itself from Hutchins's sandbox
  • 18:10 - 18:11
    environment
  • 18:11 - 18:12
    because the domain he registered would
  • 18:12 - 18:14
    be unique to him and would not
  • 18:14 - 18:17
    affect anyone else. This
  • 18:17 - 18:20
    seems to be an amateur mistake. So
  • 18:20 - 18:22
    amateur in fact, that the researchers
  • 18:22 - 18:24
    have speculated that maybe the intent of
  • 18:24 - 18:25
    the attackers
  • 18:25 - 18:28
    was not monetary gain, but rather a more
  • 18:28 - 18:29
    political intention
  • 18:29 - 18:32
    such as to bring shame to the NSA.
  • 18:32 - 18:32
    However,
  • 18:32 - 18:34
    to this date, there is nothing that
  • 18:34 - 18:36
    confirms nor denies the motive
  • 18:36 - 18:38
    of the WannaCry attack.
  • 18:38 - 18:44
    [Music]
  • 18:46 - 18:51
    [Music]
  • 18:51 - 18:53
    The rapid infection had seemed to stop,
  • 18:53 - 18:55
    but for Hutchins or MalwareTech and his
  • 18:55 - 18:59
    team, the nightmare had only just begun.
  • 18:59 - 19:00
    Less than an hour from when he had
  • 19:00 - 19:03
    activated the domain, it was under attack.
  • 19:03 - 19:05
    The motive of the attackers were to use
  • 19:05 - 19:07
    the Mirai botnet to host a distributed
  • 19:07 - 19:09
    denial of service attack,
  • 19:09 - 19:11
    also known as DDoS, to shut down the
  • 19:11 - 19:13
    domain so that it would be unreachable
  • 19:13 - 19:16
    once again and all the halted infections
  • 19:16 - 19:18
    would resume.
  • 19:18 - 19:20
    A DDoS attack is usually performed to
  • 19:20 - 19:21
    flood a domain with
  • 19:21 - 19:23
    junk traffic 'till it can't handle
  • 19:23 - 19:26
    anymore and is driven offline.
  • 19:26 - 19:28
    The Mirai botnet that the attackers were
  • 19:28 - 19:30
    employing was previously used in one of
  • 19:30 - 19:32
    the largest ever DDoS attacks
  • 19:32 - 19:34
    and was comprised of hundreds and
  • 19:34 - 19:36
    thousands of devices.
  • 19:36 - 19:38
    The haunting realization that they were
  • 19:38 - 19:39
    the wall between a flood of infections
  • 19:39 - 19:41
    that was currently being blocked
  • 19:41 - 19:43
    slowly dawned on Hutchins and the other
  • 19:43 - 19:46
    researchers working on the case.
  • 19:46 - 19:48
    They eventually dealt with the issue by
  • 19:48 - 19:50
    taking the site to a cached version
  • 19:50 - 19:52
    which was capable of handling a much
  • 19:52 - 19:55
    higher traffic load than a live site.
  • 19:55 - 19:57
    Two days after the domain went live, the
  • 19:57 - 19:59
    data showed that two million infections
  • 19:59 - 20:00
    had been halted
  • 20:00 - 20:02
    showing us what the extent of the damage
  • 20:02 - 20:04
    could have been if it was not for the
  • 20:04 - 20:06
    discovery of the kill switch.
  • 20:20 - 20:25
    [Music]
  • 20:25 - 20:28
    Marcus Hutchins's story does not stop here.
  • 20:28 - 20:30
    He would go on to be named as a
  • 20:30 - 20:32
    cybercrime hero,
  • 20:32 - 20:34
    a title which he didn't enjoy as it
  • 20:34 - 20:37
    would bring to him unwanted attention,
  • 20:37 - 20:38
    people trying to piece together his
  • 20:38 - 20:40
    address, media camping outside of his
  • 20:40 - 20:41
    house,
  • 20:41 - 20:43
    and in addition to all of this, he was
  • 20:43 - 20:45
    still under the pressure of the domain
  • 20:45 - 20:47
    going offline any minute and wreaking
  • 20:47 - 20:48
    havoc.
  • 20:48 - 20:50
    However, he was able to get through these
  • 20:50 - 20:53
    weary days and sleepless nights
  • 20:53 - 20:57
    only to be thrown back into chaos.
  • 20:57 - 20:59
    Three months after the WannaCry attack,
  • 20:59 - 21:02
    in August of 2017,
  • 21:02 - 21:04
    Marcus Hutchins, after partying in Vegas
  • 21:04 - 21:05
    for a week and a half
  • 21:05 - 21:08
    during DEFCON, a hacker convention, was
  • 21:08 - 21:10
    arrested in the airport by the FBI on
  • 21:10 - 21:12
    his way back home.
  • 21:12 - 21:14
    It seemed that Hutchins in his teenage
  • 21:14 - 21:15
    years had developed a malware named
  • 21:15 - 21:16
    Kronos
  • 21:16 - 21:19
    that would steal banking credentials. He
  • 21:19 - 21:20
    would go on to sell this malware to
  • 21:20 - 21:22
    multiple individuals with the help of
  • 21:22 - 21:23
    someone he met online
  • 21:23 - 21:27
    named Vinny K. Kronos is still an
  • 21:27 - 21:31
    ongoing threat to banks around the world.
  • 21:31 - 21:33
    Hutchins initially battled the charges
  • 21:33 - 21:34
    with a non-guilty plea,
  • 21:34 - 21:36
    but after a long and exhausting ordeal
  • 21:36 - 21:38
    that lasted for years,
  • 21:38 - 21:41
    in April 2019, he took a plea deal that
  • 21:41 - 21:42
    would essentially dismiss
  • 21:42 - 21:45
    all but two counts set against him,
  • 21:45 - 21:48
    conspiracy to defraud the united states
  • 21:48 - 21:49
    and actively marketing the kronos
  • 21:49 - 21:51
    malware.
  • 21:51 - 21:53
    He faced the possibility of a maximum
  • 21:53 - 21:55
    prison sentence of ten years,
  • 21:55 - 21:57
    but because of his contribution towards
  • 21:57 - 21:59
    WannaCry and as the community had
  • 21:59 - 22:00
    constantly pointed out
  • 22:00 - 22:02
    his active involvement in defending the
  • 22:02 - 22:04
    world against cyber attacks,
  • 22:04 - 22:08
    the judge ruled in his favor. He was then
  • 22:08 - 22:08
    released
  • 22:08 - 22:11
    with zero jail time and is now a free
  • 22:11 - 22:11
    man.
  • 22:16 - 22:20
    [Typing]
  • 22:23 - 22:27
    [Music]
  • 22:27 - 22:29
    As stated before, the WannaCry attack
  • 22:29 - 22:31
    impacted over 150 countries
  • 22:31 - 22:34
    and approximately 230,000 computers
  • 22:34 - 22:35
    globally.
  • 22:35 - 22:38
    Russia was the most severely infected
  • 22:38 - 22:40
    with over half the affected computers.
  • 22:40 - 22:43
    India, Ukraine, and Taiwan also suffered
  • 22:43 - 22:45
    significant disruption.
  • 22:49 - 22:51
    The most popular victim to emerge out of
  • 22:51 - 22:52
    the attacks were the UK's National
  • 22:52 - 22:53
    Health Service
  • 22:53 - 22:57
    or the NHS. In the NHS, over 70,000
  • 22:57 - 22:59
    devices such as computers,
  • 22:59 - 23:02
    MRI scanners, devices used to test blood,
  • 23:02 - 23:05
    theater equipment, and over 1200 pieces
  • 23:05 - 23:10
    of diagnostic equipment were affected.
  • 23:10 - 23:12
    Approximately, the attack cost the NHS
  • 23:12 - 23:14
    over 92 million euros,
  • 23:14 - 23:16
    and globally, the cost amounted to
  • 23:16 - 23:18
    somewhere between four and eight billion
  • 23:18 - 23:20
    dollars.
  • 23:20 - 23:21
    You'd think that the attackers who
  • 23:21 - 23:23
    launched WannaCry would have made a
  • 23:23 - 23:24
    decent amount considering how many
  • 23:24 - 23:25
    countries
  • 23:25 - 23:28
    and devices were affected, however, as of
  • 23:28 - 23:30
    June 14, 2017,
  • 23:30 - 23:33
    when the attacks had begun to subside,
  • 23:33 - 23:39
    they had only made $130,634.77.
  • 23:39 - 23:41
    Victims were urged not to pay the ransom
  • 23:41 - 23:43
    since not only did it encourage the
  • 23:43 - 23:44
    hackers,
  • 23:44 - 23:45
    but it also did not guarantee the return
  • 23:45 - 23:48
    of their data due to skepticism of
  • 23:48 - 23:49
    whether the attackers could actually
  • 23:49 - 23:50
    place the paid ransom
  • 23:50 - 23:53
    to the correct victim. This was clearly
  • 23:53 - 23:54
    evident from the fact that a large
  • 23:54 - 23:55
    proportion,
  • 23:55 - 23:57
    almost all of the affected victims who
  • 23:57 - 23:58
    had paid the ransom
  • 23:58 - 24:01
    had still not been returned their data.
  • 24:01 - 24:08
    [Music]
  • 24:09 - 24:14
    [Music]
  • 24:14 - 24:15
    Although initially the prime victims of
  • 24:15 - 24:17
    WannaCry were said to be Windows XP
  • 24:17 - 24:20
    clients, over 98% of the victims were
  • 24:20 - 24:22
    actually running unpatched versions of
  • 24:22 - 24:23
    Windows 7,
  • 24:23 - 24:26
    and less than 0.1% of the victims
  • 24:26 - 24:28
    were using Windows XP.
  • 24:28 - 24:30
    In the case of Russia, they believed
  • 24:30 - 24:32
    updates did more to break their devices
  • 24:32 - 24:34
    rather than fix them,
  • 24:34 - 24:36
    partly due to the fact that a majority
  • 24:36 - 24:38
    of people use cracked or pirated
  • 24:38 - 24:39
    versions of Windows
  • 24:39 - 24:40
    which means they wouldn't have received
  • 24:40 - 24:42
    the updates which were released by
  • 24:42 - 24:45
    Microsoft months prior to the attack.
  • 24:45 - 24:47
    Microsoft eventually released the
  • 24:47 - 24:48
    updates for systems that were at end of
  • 24:48 - 24:49
    support
  • 24:49 - 24:51
    including Windows XP and other older
  • 24:51 - 24:54
    versions of Windows.
  • 24:54 - 24:56
    To this day, if the domain that Marcus
  • 24:56 - 24:57
    Hutchins acquired were to go down,
  • 24:57 - 24:59
    the millions of infections that it has
  • 24:59 - 25:01
    at bay would be released,
  • 25:01 - 25:03
    but possibly ineffective if the
  • 25:03 - 25:05
    computers had already applied the patch
  • 25:05 - 25:08
    that microsoft released.
  • 25:08 - 25:10
    Eternalblue is still in the wild and
  • 25:10 - 25:11
    variants of WannaCry have since then
  • 25:11 - 25:13
    surfaced like Uiwix
  • 25:13 - 25:15
    which did not come with a kill switch
  • 25:15 - 25:17
    and addressed the bitcoin payment issue
  • 25:17 - 25:18
    by assigning a new address for each
  • 25:18 - 25:20
    victim to collect payment
  • 25:20 - 25:22
    therefore easily allowing to track the
  • 25:22 - 25:24
    payment back to the victim.
  • 25:24 - 25:26
    However, since it did not have an
  • 25:26 - 25:28
    automatic worm-like functionality that
  • 25:28 - 25:29
    WannaCry exhibited
  • 25:29 - 25:32
    it did not pose much of a threat. The
  • 25:32 - 25:35
    impact of WannaCry is still seen today.
  • 25:35 - 25:37
    Trend Micro's data clearly indicates that
  • 25:37 - 25:39
    WannaCry was the most detected malware
  • 25:39 - 25:40
    family in 2020
  • 25:40 - 25:42
    thanks to its vulnerable nature. And
  • 25:42 - 25:44
    F-Secure reports that the most seen type
  • 25:44 - 25:46
    of exploit is against the SMB version 1
  • 25:46 - 25:47
    vulnerability
  • 25:47 - 25:50
    using Eternalblue. The fact that
  • 25:50 - 25:51
    attackers still continue to try and
  • 25:51 - 25:52
    exploit this
  • 25:52 - 25:54
    must mean that there are organizations
  • 25:54 - 25:56
    out there who have not patched against
  • 25:56 - 25:58
    this vulnerability.
  • 25:58 - 26:00
    [Music]
  • 26:03 - 26:06
    [Typing]
  • 26:10 - 26:16
    [Music]
  • 26:16 - 26:18
    Four years after the attack, there is
  • 26:18 - 26:20
    still no confirmed identity of the
  • 26:20 - 26:22
    creators of the WannaCry.
  • 26:22 - 26:24
    There have been accusations towards the
  • 26:24 - 26:25
    Lazarus Group
  • 26:25 - 26:27
    who has strong links to North Korea.
  • 26:27 - 26:28
    However,
  • 26:28 - 26:32
    this is nothing more than hearsay. So
  • 26:32 - 26:34
    who is to blame for the catastrophic
  • 26:34 - 26:36
    damage of WannaCry?
  • 26:36 - 26:37
    Is it the NSHA who should not have
  • 26:37 - 26:39
    stockpiled exploits without alerting the
  • 26:39 - 26:41
    necessary entities about the
  • 26:41 - 26:42
    vulnerabilities?
  • 26:42 - 26:44
    Is it the shadow brokers who took
  • 26:44 - 26:46
    advantage of this, stole, and released it
  • 26:46 - 26:48
    into the wild?
  • 26:48 - 26:50
    Is it the developers of WannaCry? Or is
  • 26:50 - 26:52
    it the fault of microsoft who did not
  • 26:52 - 26:54
    identify this vulnerability
  • 26:54 - 26:57
    sooner? While all of this might be true
  • 26:57 - 26:58
    to some extent,
  • 26:58 - 27:00
    at the end of the day, the actions these
  • 27:00 - 27:02
    organizations take are largely out of
  • 27:02 - 27:04
    the control of the public
  • 27:04 - 27:06
    and business owners who are usually the
  • 27:06 - 27:08
    victims of the attack.
  • 27:08 - 27:10
    Regardless of what we claim, the solution
  • 27:10 - 27:12
    is very simple.
  • 27:12 - 27:13
    Make sure we follow the guidelines to
  • 27:13 - 27:15
    have our data secured.
  • 27:15 - 27:17
    The most crucial of it is to have a
  • 27:17 - 27:19
    consistent schedule for updating our
  • 27:19 - 27:20
    devices,
  • 27:20 - 27:23
    and to obviously not use outdated
  • 27:23 - 27:25
    operating systems that put
  • 27:25 - 27:27
    employee and customer data and their
  • 27:27 - 27:29
    privacy at huge risks.
  • 27:29 - 27:31
    When it comes to ransomware, the most
  • 27:31 - 27:33
    crucial form of defense is frequent
  • 27:33 - 27:35
    backup. The more frequent it is,
  • 27:35 - 27:38
    the better. Less than 50% of ransomware
  • 27:38 - 27:40
    payments actually result in the data
  • 27:40 - 27:41
    being returned to the victims,
  • 27:41 - 27:43
    and so needless to say, payment should
  • 27:43 - 27:44
    not be an option
  • 27:44 - 27:46
    lest your goal is to lose money and your
  • 27:46 - 27:48
    data as well.
  • 27:48 - 27:50
    The biggest mistake that organizations
  • 27:50 - 27:52
    tend to make is refusing to believe that
  • 27:52 - 27:54
    they would be a target.
  • 27:54 - 27:55
    According to a study by Cloudwords in
  • 27:55 - 27:57
    2021,
  • 27:57 - 27:59
    every 11 seconds a company is hit by
  • 27:59 - 28:01
    ransomware, and a large proportion of
  • 28:01 - 28:02
    organizations are small
  • 28:02 - 28:04
    to medium-sized businesses that never
  • 28:04 - 28:06
    see it coming as they're often found to
  • 28:06 - 28:08
    have less than effective security
  • 28:08 - 28:09
    strategies in place
  • 28:09 - 28:10
    making them ideal targets for such
  • 28:10 - 28:12
    attacks.
  • 28:12 - 28:13
    Digital transformation during the
  • 28:13 - 28:15
    Coronavirus pandemic has started to move
  • 28:15 - 28:17
    businesses to the cloud,
  • 28:17 - 28:19
    and so cyber criminals have now shifted
  • 28:19 - 28:21
    their focus to the cloud as well
  • 28:21 - 28:22
    giving them an entirely new attack
  • 28:22 - 28:24
    surface to work with.
  • 28:24 - 28:26
    The cost of ransomware is said to top 20
  • 28:26 - 28:29
    billion dollars by the end of 2021
  • 28:29 - 28:32
    and that is ransomware alone. By 2025,
  • 28:32 - 28:34
    cybersecurity ventures estimates that
  • 28:34 - 28:36
    cybercrime will cost businesses
  • 28:36 - 28:39
    10.5 trillion dollars annually
  • 28:39 - 28:41
    which would amount to just 2 trillion
  • 28:41 - 28:43
    short of China's economy,
  • 28:43 - 28:46
    the second biggest economy in the world.
  • 28:46 - 28:48
    We are headed towards bigger and more
  • 28:48 - 28:51
    destructive attacks than WannaCry,
  • 28:51 - 28:53
    and our most reliable defense is our
  • 28:53 - 28:54
    awareness
  • 28:54 - 28:56
    and our action to better protect
  • 28:56 - 28:59
    ourselves. Thank you for watching.
  • 28:59 - 29:04
    [Music]
  • 29:06 - 29:31
    [Music]
  • 29:31 - 29:47
    [Music]
  • 29:47 - 29:51
    [Music]
Title:
WANNACRY: The World's Largest Ransomware Attack (Documentary)
Description:

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Video Language:
English
Duration:
29:52

English subtitles

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