Trump, Ukraine and the Myth of a Democratic EU | Jorge Tamames Interview

[Tiare] Hello and welcome
to the channel of DiEM25.

Today we are joined by Jorge Tamames.

He has a PhD from University College

Dublin and currently teaches European

Political Economy at the University

Carlos III of Madrid.

Jorge, thank you so much
for joining us today.

How are you doing?

[Jorge] My pleasure.

Thanks for having me.

All is good here.

Rainy day in Madrid.

Rainy month, actually.

[Tiare] Yeah, we're both
from Madrid, actually,

so we've had two madrileños in a row.

I want to start talking about the joint

press conference with President Volodymyr

Zelenskyy and President Donald Trump that

we recently saw because what we want to

touch upon today mainly is the

geopolitical tensions that are currently

happening, especially within Europe and

in relation to Ukraine.

And obviously we need to talk about this

joint press conference.

This event saw the Ukrainian and American

leaders confront each other in a blow-up

that ushers in a new phase of the

war in Ukraine, one under a Trump

presidency.

And I was wondering, what do you make

of the apparent antagonism between the

two leaders?

Well, the first thing that I'll say is

that I had to watch the clip several

times and this is not something that I

usually do.

My background is in foreign affairs.

I studied international relations.

I worked at a foreign policy journal in

the think tank for a while, so this

is sort of my bread and butter.

And I had never seen an exchange on

that level.

Just the humiliation of a guest who is

also a head of state in the White

House, in front of the press, with the

press participating in it.

I was shocked and I am not usually

one to be sort of shocked.

Trump has always generated this sort of

sometimes a bit prudish reaction

regarding, oh, he doesn't respect norms.

He doesn't respect due process.

He's like this vulgar guy.

And I usually don't have much patience

for that, but I was surprised.

I think on a formal level, it was

just something very different to watch.

And I think, I guess it goes to

the differences between his first

administration and the second one.

This is the kind of thing you would

have not seen in the first Trump White

House, because at the end of the day,

he had to rely on a lot of

people who were not Trump world

characters like he has around him now,

right?

These were more standard Republican

operators.

Rex Tillerson, the guy who first ran his

department of state, was a guy who came

from the big oil industry.

So like the more standard profiles you

would see in a normal Republican

administration.

So in a way, I had this feeling

that this was new ground.

This entire concern with Trump in the way

that he doesn't respect the way things

are usually done and so forth, I found

myself taking it a bit more seriously in

the last two months than I did in

the past.

Now, the question, what do I think it

represented in terms of the substance?

I'm not sure to what extent this style

is going to work for this administration

or not.

And what I mean by that is that

I think it was very counterproductive in

terms of, I mean, I think Trump has

been extraordinarily successful in

galvanising the EU to sort of become

independent or become more autonomous

from the U.S. with events like this

one or like J.D. Vance's visit in

the Munich Security Conference.

And this is something that was not on

the menu two months ago.

So the future German Chancellor Merz,

when he was running for office, his whole

deal was, oh no, we're going to get

along pretty well with Trump.

We'll be able to reach some deals.

He's not our favourite guy, but we can

actually live with this guy.

We'll be pragmatic.

And on election night, he said, my first

concern is to become independent from the

U.S. So I think this has been

the first effect of this change in forms

rather than substance, because in terms

of the substance, this is the stuff he

ran on.

Well, the UK stuff, not other stuff that

he's actually pushing and we can talk

about it.

But yeah, that's sort of my reading of

the whole scene.

At first I was shocked.

And then looking at the reaction, I

think, well, maybe they're not reading

the room correctly.

And I don't mean the room of the

meeting in which it took place, but like

the broader room of the way Europeans are

going to react, public opinion in Ukraine

might shift or ultimately whether Russia

will actually pick up on the deal that

is being offered to them at this point.

Right.

Just to check your thoughts on another

important point related to this newly

Trump administration era, the United

States and Ukraine plan to sign a

minerals deal, which has seen much

controversy.

According to the deal, Ukraine will

contribute 50 percent of future proceeds

from state owned mineral resources, oil

and gas to an investment fund, which will

then invest to promote the safety,

security and prosperity of Ukraine.

This deal appears to imply that private

companies will need to get involved in

the mining process within the vague

information that we have been receiving

about this deal.

Do you believe, given what we know, do

you believe it can be perceived as simply

laying bare the American interest in

exploiting Ukrainian natural resources

for the benefit of the American

capitalist class?

Is there anything in this for working

class Americans?

OK, so let's start with the last part.

Is there something in this for working

class Americans?

I'd say no.

I mean, on the face of it, there

doesn't seem to be much.

I can have some sympathy for the people

who voted for the first Trump term,

right, with a working class background,

expecting to get sort of a better deal

than what was being offered by Hillary

Clinton in 2017.

But at this point, I think with Trump,

you sort of know what you're getting to

an extent.

I'll qualify that a bit further on.

But in terms of what is the American

working class getting out of this deal, I

don't know if this deal is viable at

all.

So sometimes it's hard to take these

announcements on their face.

And usually they create outrage, of

course, because it looks like a shakeup

and it seems to be a shakeup in

exchange for some very dubious security

guarantees.

Now, I'm not an expert in rare earths

or their processing or critical minerals.

So take this with a grain of salt,

pun unintended.

But from what I've read, it seems like

a lot of these rare earths, they come

from old maps from back in the Soviet

Union in the 70s and 80s.

It's not sure whether they can be mined

or they're economically viable as of

today.

A lot of the places that have to

be mined are sort of where the fighting

is taking place.

So none of that was a problem because

you even managed to get a peace deal.

So then presumably you'd get American

companies that go there and invest in the

mining process, right?

Mining is an economic sector that

requires a lot of capital investment,

long time horizons before you can get

credit on your investment and sort of a

very stable judicial and regulatory

framework.

These are not things you're going to be

getting right now in the Donbass region

of Ukraine or even in Ukraine or the

Russian or the full Russian occupied

areas.

So I don't see how this deal amounts

to much other than something that, you

know, Trump can announce and feel happy

about.

And I think here the experience of his

first term in office is instructive,

right?

We saw a lot of this during the

first Trump term.

So that's my general read on the deal.

So then it seems like it doesn't make

much sense.

But one of the interpretations I've heard

of this deal was that rather than coming

from the White House, it was something

that the Ukrainians and Zelensky pitched

to Donald Trump.

Again, if that is the case, that seems

to me a sort of genius move to

present him with a deal that he likes

and that is going to, you know, create

some shock and some stupor, but that

there's very little workable substance

behind it.

But ultimately, we'll have to wait and

see.

But I don't think this deal as of

now leading anywhere.

Yeah, I mean, I don't know.

I just personally felt like this was

just, you know, something it's like,

well, we should have known if the U

.S. is after anything or the EU.

Now we're going to get to that.

But if it's after anything would end up

be exploiting natural resources like I

think if we look at the history of

wars and the wars, especially that the U

.S. has enjoyed joining and pushing for.

I mean, I don't know.

I just I was quite shocked that anyone

would be shocked at the U.S. kind

of pursuing that kind of interest.

I mean, I was also shocked because this

was nowhere on the cards during the

campaign.

Right.

Yeah.

I'm not so much mistaken.

I don't remember hearing about this at

all throughout the past year.

Maybe I'm wrong, but I'm getting the

sense, you know, and this is something

that I think it's worth keeping in mind

because the pace of announcements from

this administration in the first month

and a half has been so overwhelming.

Sometimes it's just almost unavoidable

that you feel sort of demoralised and

overwhelmed and like you don't even have

a grip on what is happening.

And I think at points like that, it's

worth keeping in mind that these guys,

they won an election for a variety of

reasons.

But an important one was that there was

a critical mass of Americans who thought

that prices were too high and X were

too expensive.

Right.

So, you can say these were like economic

anxiety voters who voted because they

thought they were getting a lousy deal

with Biden.

And the Trump campaign did make a lot

of emphasis on prices being too high

throughout the campaign.

So those people voted with that in their

mind.

And what they got is mineral steel

invading the Panama Canal.

And it should be the first 50 per

state.

And we should also own Greenland.

I don't see how that is working very

well for your sort of working class

economic anxiety Trump voter in the long

term.

I don't think it's working for the stock

market either.

So you're like traditional Republican

who's just hoping to get a good return

on his investments from the Trump

presidency like happened last time when

the stock market was booming.

So I don't want to be too mechanistic

and say, oh, the economy doesn't work.

So he'll have like he'll run into

trouble.

But it's worth keeping in mind that we're

getting announcements of different deals

every day, but he's not delivering on the

basic deal that won the election for him.

Honestly, like I don't think a Trump

presidency works for anyone, obviously

not the working class, but also the vast

parts of the capitalist class.

I don't think or especially the

professional managerial class.

I don't think they're excited to have

him.

Hence Trump derangement syndrome.

Like I believe that is absolutely a

thing.

I wanted to ask you at the beginning

of this month of March, Trump halted

military aid to Ukraine, a cut that then

expanded to include all military

intelligence while acknowledging Russia's

guilt in illegally invading a sovereign

country.

We will probably agree that finding a

diplomatic solution that seeks to de

-escalate the military conflict should be

prioritised.

Do you believe these steps taken by

President Trump bear any positive aspects

at all, or are they counterproductive to

the sense?

Well, I'm going to give you my easy

answer, sort of a cop out.

But I do think it's too soon to

tell, because we don't know if this deal

at this stage, this compromise has buy in

from the Russians.

What we know is that the Ukrainian side

has sort of been strong armed to the

negotiating table.

Now, I think if you look at this

war, none of the sides were going to

get what they wanted originally.

So Russia wanted to topple the entirety

of the Ukrainian government, to march to

Kiev, to instal a puppet regime, and to

annex the four regions that it proclaimed

are part of new Russia.

This is a term they used to refer

to them.

And then on the Ukrainian side, at one

point, there was even talk of launching

an offensive and being able to retake

Crimea.

This was really always, always a far

-fetched idea.

So neither side got what it would

originally want from this war.

And so sooner or later, you're going to

have a negotiation, right?

Now, the question is, what does that

negotiation actually look like?

If you had a peace settlement now, where

Ukraine was forced to make a lot of

concessions, and really, the underlying

issue was never resolved, and there's

hostility between Ukraine and Russia,

you'd basically have a rerun of the Minsk

one and two accords after 2014, right?

So I think you could envision a scenario

in which you say, oh, well, you know,

you reach some sort of deal that at

this point, it seems like will please the

Russian side much more so than the

Ukrainian one.

Although it is worth keeping in mind two

things, one that like, you know, a couple

months ago, if you looked at polling,

public opinion polling in Ukraine, there

was a plurality or a slim majority of

people who said, yeah, we want a deal,

we hope we can get on with Trump.

That has changed slightly, I think,

because of the systematic humiliations

that Trump has visited upon, you know,

Ukraine's leadership and Ukrainians in

general.

And I think now that their resolve is

sort of hardening.

So again, that's another example of this

administration being very

counterproductive.

But if you assume that there's like, you

know, the space for making a deal, fine.

I think, you know, the question is, what

happens the day after that?

If we have the precedent of 2014 leading

to 2022, then how do you avoid having

a deal reached today leading to another

conflict five years down the line or

seven years down the line?

Right.

So I think that's the big question that

we really should be thinking about what's

going to happen after that deal.

Right.

And, you know, I do want to ask

you about what you think would be the

best case scenario, the best solution, if

you will.

But first, I want to also discuss the

European side of this.

So this month has also seen Ursula von

der Leyen unveil a plan to rearm Europe,

announcing we are in an era of

rearmament.

This includes defence investment loans to

member states, use of the EU budget to

direct more funds towards defence related

investments and deploying private

capital.

How do you regard this initiative?

Um, okay, I'll say a couple of things

about it that I think are good, because

then I have several misgivings that I

want to explore it at night.

I think to some extent, it is better

than the alternative of what Trump was

proposing, right, which was that each

European state raise defence spending to

5% of GDP.

And it's good in that it takes the

EU as the political subject that needs to

make these decisions.

So it's not NATO, which at this point

is, I think, you know, becoming more and

more dysfunctional with each passing day,

right?

So it's the EU that needs to take

its own defence seriously and become

autonomous at a time when it's being

threatened by both Trump and Putin,

right?

So that's what I think is good about

the deal.

And the fact that is like, you know,

the approach is sort of ambition when you

look at, well, not exactly the scale of

billions that is mobilised, because here

there's always a bit of creative

accounting that we're used to see from

Brussels, right?

So I think if you compare it to

next generation EU, it's lacking in that

respect.

But when you when you take into

consideration the fact that it's

happening at the same time as Germany,

for example, reforms its debt rate,

right, the constitutional amendment, and,

you know, makes it more flexible, that

just happened today, then you get a sense

that there's sort of ambition to match

what otherwise would be just like lofty

declarations.

So what I think is more problematic about

it is that it basically thinks about

European defence.

And what they do is like you start

with what you have, and you work towards

the number, right?

This is the way that all these

discussions unfold.

So what do you have is like, European

defence, when you look at overall

spending numbers, it's not actually a

small number, you know, we're used to

thinking that Europe doesn't spend, that

the EU doesn't spend enough on defence.

And when you look at the aggregate

numbers, depending on the metrics you

use, but we do spend several times more

than Russia does.

And if you also take the UK into

consideration, right, sort of these like,

like minded allies, then you have almost

twice the defence budget of China.

So that's not an insignificant number by

any means.

The problem is, and you know, this is

sort of well known by now that it's

extraordinarily inefficient, because it's

fragmented and sort of 27 different

armies.

And so you don't generate economies of

scale, you don't generate the sort of

investment you would need to have a

competitive defence industry that spans

the entire union and so forth.

So the problem that I see is what

this programme does is mainly it focusses on

national defence budgets and says, yeah,

you can raise them, we expect to get

650, I think it's 600, 650 billion euros

out of that.

And we will loosen the fiscal rules so

that this doesn't immediately fall into

the excessive deficit procedure, right,

for countries like Spain, for example, or

for most European countries who have to

undergo this investment.

Now, how long would that last for?

Is that the way to like build a

European defence capability?

I'm very sceptical of it, right?

The way I would go about it is

slightly different.

I would think like, okay, so we're in

one of those rare moments of crisis in

the EU right now, similar to the COVID

crisis, where the more ambitious

solutions are also the more pragmatic,

right?

Usually it's the opposite, right?

It's like, oh, you know, we're asking for

a pie in the sky.

So I think you should start with like

the most ambitious proposal you can

consider and then work with that towards,

you know, landing that on like the

framework that you can work with.

And so what would that look like?

I think it would entail acknowledging

that yes, there is a security threat,

even if the Ukraine situation is solved

immediately, right?

You need to have the deterrence

capability to avoid a scenario like 2014

to 2022, like what we were talking about

before.

But then it should be the EU that

provides that, not NATO.

You should not rely on the United States.

The United States is not an ally in

any sense of the word anymore.

So you need to do this on your

own.

And you also need to define security very

broadly, I think, for this to work.

So yes, a part of it has to

do with like defence, right?

And what we were just talking about.

And this is what usually all the

conversation focusses on.

And that's part of the deal.

But there's other stuff that the EU needs

to do to actually establish a security

worthy of that name.

So at least three other areas besides

defence.

One would be climate security.

You know, you need to become energy

independent, not just from Russia and oil

and gas, but from the United States or

the Gulf states.

And that involves being very ambitious

with the ongoing green transition.

So you need to double down on that,

not cut your resources to focus

exclusively on defence.

If you adopt a broad conception of

security, that is also something that you

need to take into consideration.

You can't just leave it in the back

burner and expect things to get better in

the future.

You also need to think of economic

security, right?

In terms of having a financial

architecture that does not depend on the

dollar system or US payment platforms,

right?

That involves anything from having a more

internationalised euro to having a

digital euro as a tool for payments,

right?

Like you can get really down to the

weeds of like the policies that you need

for this.

But there's a big plank that has to

do with your economic model, the fiscal

rules that are extremely outdated, even

after this programme, right?

They should be completely overhauled if

you really want to meet the challenge

that you face right now.

Fourth area, and final one, would be sort

of security from a social standpoint.

If you do all these things and at

the same time you have to do austerity

because you have to balance a budget,

then that sort of defeats the purpose of

any of this.

Especially keeping in mind that we sort

of know by now and there's considerable

evidence that doing austerity, doing

budgetary cuts, trimming down the welfare

state, actually empowers the very friends

of Trump and Putin that are already

reasonably strong in a lot of European

states.

So if you want to stop the far

right, and if there's anything in the EU

that is worth fighting for, it's probably

a socioeconomic model that, you know,

provides social security in the form of

the welfare state, public health care,

public education, pensions, you name it.

So that has to be like a big

part of it.

And so you get these four things and

then you think, okay, how are we going

to pay for them?

And then I think, you know, a mixture

of having more mutualised European debt,

like next generation, and having its own,

you know, fiscal capacity in terms of, I

don't know, I would consider not just

punishing Russian oligarchs, but taxing

the activity of American tech oligarchs

for the EU to generate its own resources.

And there are ways to do that, right?

And you can talk about Russian stranded

assets and a number of other sources of

revenue that you can tax.

So you'd have to be much more broad

in your conception of security and not

just focus on the defence industry and

defence spending from a national

perspective.

Because ultimately, I mean, I hope this

doesn't happen.

And there's still ongoing discussion.

But if this ends up being an excuse

for member states to spend more money

without clear strategic goals, and that

ends up being, well, I don't know, buying

American equipment, and increasing a

security dependence that is already

there, then you've doubled down on a

problem, right?

So, you know, I think there's some good

elements to it.

But I think it could be much improved

and still needs a broader definition of

security and much more fiscal ambition.

So basically, are you saying you think it

would be preferable for member states to

make less of a decision here and for

the EU to have a more sort of

coordinated plan?

And I'm just wondering, do you think the

European Union, and I'm not talking

Europe, I'm talking the European Union,

would ever take that non-aligned

perspective?

Do you think that's plausible?

Don't you feel like maybe European

nations themselves would be more likely

to, if they were democratic enough to not

be sort of that constrained by the

European Union, like, don't you feel like

they would try to be non-aligned?

Obviously, I'm kind of generalising here.

But I don't know, I'm just wondering, do

you have hopes in the EU?

Or do you have hopes in Europe?

And yeah, what do you think is more

likely like for the EU to actually take

a non-aligned stance or for European

countries?

Because I don't know, I just struggle to

believe that the EU would ever do that.

So I kind of have the opposite reaction

in that I would have more hope in

European nations individually kind of

taking that sort of stance and kind of

making the right investments, or Europe

as a sort of region rather than the

EU specifically.

But let me know your thoughts about this.

So I think there's one thing that is

like, okay, should the EU pull its

capacities together?

That's one thing, right?

And have like a more federated approach

to these threats that it faces now, and

these challenges in the form of Russia,

of the United States, of, you know,

having to develop its own autonomy.

And then the other question is like about

Europe's alignment, right?

These are like, I'm kind of going to

try and parse them out because I think

they're slightly distinct.

So the question, the way this is always

posed is this question of, oh, should you

have a European army, right?

And usually this is sort of like

something that doesn't get discussed a

lot beyond the theoretical level, right?

Because there are like many operational

and political hurdles along the way, but

mostly it's a question of political will,

right?

That European states are reticent to

share that degree of sovereignty.

Now, I just think if you really are

serious about having deterrence

capability against Russia, which I think

is very different from sort of getting

involved in warmongering, right?

After all, like Russia is the country

that has the largest nuclear stockpile in

the world.

So I think anyone who was actively

engaging in pushing them towards a war

would be an idiot to do so.

But I do think you need to develop

deterrent capability.

It makes much more sense to do that

on an EU level than for each European

state on its own.

Unless you're willing to sustain, I don't

know, five, six percent of the GDP of

every European state spent, or in my

view, wasted on defence, right?

So it's an idea, I mean, whose time

has come in the sense that it's the

easiest way out of this problem.

Now, then the question, of course, is

like, what does a more united EU in

the realms of foreign policy and defence

policy stand for in the world, right?

That question of like, oh, can Europe be

non-aligned?

I would say Europe today is sort of

disaligned, right?

Because correct me if I'm wrong, but the

way you would have posed this question

two months ago is that the EU is

overly aligned with the United States and

just following the United States

initiative.

Overnight, that has changed very

dramatically.

And so the EU already de facto finds

itself in a place where it's having to

come up with its own autonomous posture

in regards, for example, to what happened

in Ukraine, right?

Now, that position is the one it was

holding before the United States changed

gears.

But I think it's an interesting process.

Now, I will say about that, that hasn't

come to fruition because European leaders

suddenly took that decision.

It's because Trump snubbed them and then

humiliated a few of them and has done

everything within his power to make that

outcome possible.

So I would think the challenge is not

for the EU to strike its own path

away from Trump now.

The question is maintaining this after

Trump is gone.

And I'm sort of looking too far into

the future.

But if you think of, you know, what

happened during the Biden presidency, or

even if you want to go further back

in time after the Iraq war, when there

was also talk of the need of becoming

more detached in foreign policy positions

from the United States, what do you see

is that when the good times come back,

and that usually means when there's a

Democrat in the White House, Europeans

become complacent.

So this is an effort that you really

need to sustain in time.

Now, finally, and this is the hardest

question to which I don't have an answer

other than to say that the EU is,

in spite of like making progress on all

these areas, and I think a lot of

this is actually interesting and

worthwhile, but it has some huge flaws in

regards to how it aligns in the world,

right?

Just consider the now ongoing genocide in

Gaza, right?

We learned today that Israel resumed

operations and killed between three and

400 Palestinians in one night.

And the EU has been shamefully muted on

this issue, except for a few voices,

right?

And for the most part, has acquiesced to

what is basically a genocide on its

doorstep.

So I think striking a sort of, you

know, assertive position in defence of

Ukraine's right to defend itself from

annihilation, in the face of an

imperialist neighbour, it's all very well

and good.

Like, I'm all for that position.

I just think there should be coherence.

It should also be held in Gaza, right?

Like, you know, the EU should be much

firmer in its condemnation of Israel.

So that's one thing where its present

disposition, its present alignment is

very much lacking and very disappointing.

The same is true of migration policy,

right?

I mean, we like to act scandalised at

the policies that the Trump

administration applies, but they're not

that different.

And in fact, many of them are directly

inspired in what we do in our own

borders.

So, you know, I do think the EU

is taking several steps to become more

autonomous from the US.

I am sceptical that the way it is

doing so is the best, the most useful,

and that it's not, that it doesn't have

several aspects of it that can be

counterproductive.

But I realise that there are some areas

where the state of affairs right now is

pretty awful.

It certainly is.

And I want to dive a little deeper

into this topic of non-alignment.

I think the EU, yes, it's not complacent

to the Trump presidency.

But I mean, I think it still is

to the sort of what they understand as

the default US, right, which is Democrats

or, you know, never Trump Republicans and

a politics of the sort.

And meanwhile, at DiEM25, we aim for a

non-aligned, which doesn't mean neutral

Europe.

Do you believe this is currently a

possibility?

And how do you believe it would impact

the potential for more democratic

European nations if we move in this

direction?

Yeah, I mean, I think it's tied to

what I was saying before.

But so let me reframe it in a

more accurate way.

I think the EU, again, not by its

own merits, but because of the effects of

what Trump has done in two months, has

become sort of disaligned from the US,

right?

And I am a bit, yeah, I will

say I am hopeful that this is not

just a passing sort of fleeting sentiment

of like, oh, you know, Trump is horrible.

Then we'll go back to business.

I want to think that there is a

learning process going on, especially in

the way that we had, you know, Biden

between these two Trump terms.

I mean, the way that events have unfolded

would mean that Europeans would be, you

know, profoundly obtuse not to continue

investing in becoming independent from

the United States after Trump is gone.

And who knows what will happen in four

years.

So on that regard, I'm, let's say, mildly

hopeful, or at least I've been surprised

by the degree of result I've seen from

key European figures.

So I would not have expected to see

a centre-right German politician say, my

first concern is becoming independent

from the United States, right?

I have to acknowledge that if I would

have been told, will you see this in

the next year, a couple months ago, I'd

have said, no, absolutely not.

You know, I think Europeans will try and

paper over their differences with Trump,

but fundamentally not change or, you

know, within.

So in that regard, yeah, but another, but

as I was saying before, if you look

at other issues, so if you look at

the Palestinian question, right, if you

look at migration policy, these are areas

that where there's no change and where

the current alignment or the current, you

know, posture to the extent that you has

a coherent posture, or the sum of the

different member states postures is

awful.

Now, there are a couple other instances,

which are a bit more, I guess, we

still need to wait and see what happens.

But so, for example, I would say, I'm

interested to see what happens within

relations with China.

I think if you want to become autonomous

from the US and, you know, secure from

Russia, and at the same time, you take

fighting climate change seriously, you

cannot afford to follow the US into a

confrontation with China into the Indo

-Pacific.

You just can't.

You need to find a better way to

engage with China, right?

So the EU famously has this plan, or

this platform where it views China as a

sort of, let me see if I get

this correctly, as the ones, it is a

partner, it is a competitor, and it is

a rival, and different, and depending on

what policies you look at.