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Trump, Ukraine and the Myth of a Democratic EU | Jorge Tamames Interview

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    [Tiare] Hello and welcome
    to the channel of DiEM25.
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    Today we are joined by
    Jorge Tamames.
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    He has a PhD from
    University College Dublin
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    and currently teaches European
    Political Economy
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    at the University Carlos III of Madrid.
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    Jorge, thank you so much
    for joining us today.
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    How are you doing?
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    [Jorge] My pleasure,
    Thanks for having me.
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    All is good here.
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    Rainy day in Madrid.
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    Rainy month, actually.
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    [Tiare] Yeah, we're both
    from Madrid, actually,
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    so we've had two madrileños in a row.
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    I want to start talking about the
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    joint press conference with
    President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
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    and President Donald Trump
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    that we recently saw
    because what we want to
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    touch upon today mainly is the
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    geopolitical tensions that
    are currently happening
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    especially within Europe and
    in relation to Ukraine.
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    And obviously we
    need to talk about
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    this joint press conference.
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    This event saw the
    Ukrainian and American
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    leaders confront each other
    in a blow-up
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    that ushers in a new phase of the
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    war in Ukraine, one under
    a Trump presidency.
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    And I was wondering,
    what do you make
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    of the apparent antagonism
    between the two leaders?
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    [Jorge] Well, the first thing
    that I'll say is
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    that I had to watch the clip several
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    times and this is not
    something that I usually do.
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    My background is
    in foreign affairs.
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    I studied international relations.
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    I worked at a foreign policy journal
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    in a think tank for a while,
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    so this is sort of my
    bread and butter.
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    And I had never seen an
    exchange on that level.
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    Just the humiliation
    of a guest who is
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    also a head of state
    in the White House
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    in front of the press,
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    with the press
    participating in it.
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    I was shocked
    and I am not usually
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    one to be sort of shocked.
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    Trump has always
    generated this sort of
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    sometimes a bit prudish reaction
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    regarding: oh, he doesn't respect norms.
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    He doesn't respect due process.
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    He's like this vulgar guy.
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    And I usually don't have
    much patience for that,
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    but I was surprised.
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    I think on a formal level,
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    it was just something
    very different to watch.
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    I guess it goes to
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    the differences between his first
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    administration and the second one.
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    This is the kind of thing
    you would have not seen
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    in the first
    Trump White House
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    because at the end of the day,
    he had to rely on a lot of
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    people who were
    not Trump world
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    characters like he has
    around him now, right?
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    These were more standard
    Republican operators.
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    Rex Tillerson, the guy
    who first ran his
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    department of state,
    was a guy who came
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    from the big oil industry.
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    So the more standard profiles you
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    would see in a normal
    Republican administration.
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    So in a way, I had this feeling
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    that this was new ground.
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    This entire concern
    with Trump in the way
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    that he doesn't respect the
    way things are usually done
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    and so forth,
    I found myself
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    taking it a bit more seriously in
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    the last two months
    than I did in the past.
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    Now, the question,
    what do I think
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    it represented in terms
    of the substance?
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    I'm not sure to what extent
    this style is going to work
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    for this administration
    or not.
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    And what I mean by that is
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    I think it was very counterproductive
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    in terms of, Trump has been
    extraordinarily successful in
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    galvanising the EU to become
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    independent or become
    more autonomous
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    from the U.S. with events
    like this one
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    or like J.D. Vance's visit in
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    the Munich Security Conference,
    right.
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    This is something that was not on
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    the menu two months ago.
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    So the future German Chancellor Merz,
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    when he was running
    for office,
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    his whole deal was:
    Oh no, we're going to get
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    along pretty well with Trump.
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    We'll be able to
    reach some deals.
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    He's not our favourite guy,
    but we can
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    actually live with this guy.
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    We'll be pragmatic.
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    And on election night, he said:
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    My first concern is to become
    independent from the US.
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    So I think this has been
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    the first effect of this
    change in forms
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    rather than substance,
    because in terms
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    of the substance, this is
    the stuff he ran on.
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    Well, the UK stuff,
    not other stuff that
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    he's actually pushing
    and we can talk about it.
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    But yeah, that's my reading of
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    the whole scene.
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    At first I was shocked.
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    And then looking at the reaction
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    I think, maybe they're
    not reading the room correctly.
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    I don't mean the room of the
    meeting in which it took place,
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    but the broader room of
    the way Europeans are
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    going to react,
    public opinion in Ukraine
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    might shift or not.
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    Ultimately whether Russia
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    will actually pick up on the deal
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    that is being offered to
    them at this point.
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    [Tiare] Right, just to check your
    thoughts on another
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    important point related to this newly
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    Trump administration era
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    the United States and Ukraine
    plan to sign a minerals deal,
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    which has seen much controversy.
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    According to the deal, Ukraine will
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    contribute 50% of future proceeds
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    from state owned mineral resources,
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    oil and gas to an investment fund,
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    which will then invest
    to promote the safety,
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    security and prosperity of Ukraine.
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    This deal appears to imply that private
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    companies will need
    to get involved in
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    the mining process within the vague
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    information that we have been
    receiving about this deal.
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    Do you believe,
    given what we know
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    do you believe it can
    be perceived as simply
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    laying bare the
    American interest in
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    exploiting Ukrainian
    natural resources
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    for the benefit of the
    American capitalist class?
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    Is there anything in this for
    working class Americans?
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    [Jorge] OK, so let's start
    with the last part.
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    Is there something in this for
    working class Americans?
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    I'd say no.
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    On the face of it, there
    doesn't seem to be much.
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    I can have some sympathy
    for the people
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    who voted for the first
    Trump term, right,
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    with a working class background,
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    expecting to get sort of a better deal
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    than what was being offered
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    by Hillary Clinton in 2017.
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    But at this point,
    I think with Trump,
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    you sort of know what you're
    getting to an extent.
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    I'll qualify that a bit further on.
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    But in terms of what is the
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    American working class
    getting out of this deal
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    I don't know if this deal
    is viable at all.
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    So sometimes it's
    hard to take these
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    announcements on their face.
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    And usually they create outrage
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    of course, because it
    looks like a shakeup
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    and it seems to be a shakeup in
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    exchange for some very
    dubious security guarantees.
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    Now, I'm not an expert in rare earth
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    or their processing
    or critical minerals.
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    So take this with a grain of salt,
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    pun unintended.
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    But from what I've read,
    it seems like
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    a lot of these rare earths
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    come from old maps
    from back in the
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    Soviet Union in the
    70s and 80s.
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    It's not sure whether
    they can be mined
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    or they're economically
    viable as of today.
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    A lot of the places that have to
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    be mined are where the fighting
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    is taking place.
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    So none of that was
    a problem because
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    you even managed
    to get a peace deal.
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    So then presumably
    you'd get American
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    companies that go there and
    invest in the mining process, right?
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    Mining is an economic sector that
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    requires a lot of
    capital investment,
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    long time horizons
    before you can get
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    credit on your investment
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    and a very stable, judicial
    and regulatory framework.
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    These are not things
    you're going to
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    be getting right now
    in the Donbass region
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    of Ukraine or even in Ukraine
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    or the full Russian occupied areas.
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    So I don't see how this deal amounts
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    to much other than
    something that
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    Trump can announce
    and feel happy about.
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    I think here the
    experience of his
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    first term in office
    is instructive.
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    We saw a lot of this during
    the first Trump term.
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    So that's my general
    read on the deal.
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    So then it seems like it
    doesn't make much sense.
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    But one of the
    interpretations I've heard
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    was that rather than coming
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    from the White House,
    it was something
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    that the Ukrainians and Zelensky
    pitched to Donald Trump.
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    Again, if that is the case,
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    that seems to me a
    sort of genius move
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    to present him with
    a deal that he likes
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    and that is going to create some
    shock and some support,
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    but there's very little
    workable substance behind it.
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    But ultimately,
    we'll have to wait and see.
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    But I don't think this deal as
    of now leading anywhere.
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    [Tiare] Yeah,
    I don't know.
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    I just personally felt like this was
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    just something, it's like:
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    Well, we should have known
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    if the U.S. is after anything or the EU.
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    Now we're going to get to that.
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    But if after anything would end up
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    be exploiting natural resources.
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    I think if we look at the history of
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    the wars, especially that the U.S
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    has enjoyed joining and pushing for.
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    I mean, I don't know.
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    I just I was quite
    shocked that anyone
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    would be shocked at the U.S.
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    pursuing that kind of interest.
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    [Jorge] I was also
    shocked because this
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    was nowhere on the cards
    during the campaign. right?
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    [Tiare] Yeah.
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    [Jorge] Unless I'm much mistaken.
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    I don't remember hearing
    about this at all
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    throughout the past year.
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    Maybe I'm wrong, but I'm getting the
    sense and this is something
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    I think is worth keeping in mind
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    because the pace
    of announcements from
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    this administration in
    the first month and a half
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    has been so overwhelming.
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    Sometimes it's just
    almost unavoidable
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    that you feel sort of demoralised
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    and overwhelmed and you don't even
    have a grip on what is happening.
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    I think at points like that,
    it's worth keeping in mind
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    these guys won an election
    for a variety of reasons
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    But an important one
    was that there was
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    a critical mass of
    Americans who thought
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    that prices were too high
    and eggs were too expensive.
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    So, you can say these were
    like 'economic anxiety' voters.
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    who voted because they
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    thought they were getting
    a lousy deal with Biden.
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    And the Trump campaign
    did make a lot
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    of emphasis on prices being
    too high throughout the campaign.
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    So those people voted
    with that in their mind.
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    And what they got is a minerals deal
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    invading the Panama Canal.
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    Canada should be the 51st state
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    and we should also own
    Greenland.
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    I don't see how that is working very
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    well for your working class
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    economic anxiety Trump voter
    in the long term.
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    I don't think it's working for
    the stock market either.
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    Your traditional Republican
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    who's just hoping
    to get a good return
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    on his investments from
    the Trump presidency
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    like happened last time
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    when the stock market
    was booming.
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    So I don't want to
    be too mechanistic and say:
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    Oh, the economy doesn't work
    so he'll run into trouble.
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    But it's worth keeping in
    mind that we're getting
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    announcements of
    different deals every day,
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    but he's not delivering on the
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    basic deal that won
    the election for him.
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    Honestly, like I don't think a Trump
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    presidency works for anyone,
    obviously
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    not the working class,
    but also the vast
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    parts of the capitalist class.
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    I don't think or especially the
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    professional managerial class.
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    I don't think they're
    excited to have him.
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    Hence Trump derangement
    syndrome.
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    Like I believe that is
    absolutely a thing.
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    I wanted to ask you at the beginning
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    of this month of March,
    Trump halted
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    military aid to Ukraine,
    a cut that then
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    expanded to include
    all military intelligence
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    while acknowledging Russia's
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    guilt in illegally invading
    a sovereign country..
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    We will probably agree that finding
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    a diplomatic solution that seeks to
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    de-escalate the military
    conflict should be prioritised.
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    Do you believe these
    steps taken by
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    President Trump bear any
    positive aspects at all
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    or are they counterproductive
    to the sense?
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    Well, I'm going to give you my easy
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    answer, sort of a cop out.
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    But I do think it's too soon to tell
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    because we don't know if this deal
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    at this stage, this compromise
    has buy in from the Russians.
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    What we know is
    that the Ukrainian side
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    has sort of been strong armed
    to the negotiating table.
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    Now, I think if you look at this war
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    none of the sides were going to
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    get what they wanted originally.
  • 11:13 - 11:15
    So Russia wanted to
    topple the entirety
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    of the Ukrainian government,
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    to march to Kiev, to install
    a puppet regime,
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    and to annex the four regions
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    that it proclaimed
    are part of new Russia.
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    This is a term they used
    to refer to them.
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    And then on the Ukrainian
    side, at one point
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    there was even talk of launching
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    an offensive and being
    able to retake Crimea.
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    This was really always,
    always a far-fetched idea.
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    So neither side got what it
    originally wanted from this war.
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    And so sooner or later,
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    you're going to have
    a negotiation, right?
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    Now, the question is,
    what does that
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    negotiation actually look like?
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    If you had a peace settlement now,
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    where Ukraine was forced to
    make a lot of concessions
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    and really, the underlying
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    issue was never resolved
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    and there's hostility
    between Ukraine and Russia,
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    you'd basically have a rerun of the
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    Minsk 1 and 2 accords after 2014, right?
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    So I think you could envision a scenario
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    in which you say:
    Oh, well, you know,
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    you reach some sort
    of deal that at this point,
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    t,it seems like will please the
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    Russian side much more so
    than the Ukrainian one.
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    Although it is worth
    keeping in mind two things
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    one that a couple months ago
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    if you looked at polling,
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    public opinion polling in Ukraine,
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    there was a plurality or a slim majority
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    of people who said:
    yeah, we want a deal,
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    we hope we can get on with Trump.
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    That has changed slightly, I think,
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    because of the systematic humiliations
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    that Trump has visited upon
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    Ukraine's leadership
    and Ukrainians in general.
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    And I think now that
    their resolve is hardening.
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    So again, that's another example of this
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    administration being very
    counterproductive.
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    But if you assume that there's
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    the space for making a deal, fine.
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    The question is, what happens
    the day after that?
  • 12:55 - 13:00
    If we have the precedent
    of 2014 leading to 2022,
  • 13:00 - 13:03
    then how do you avoid having
  • 13:03 - 13:07
    a deal reached today leading to another conflict
  • 13:07 - 13:10
    five years down the line or
    seven years down the line, right?
  • 13:10 - 13:12
    So I think that's the big question that
  • 13:12 - 13:13
    we really should be thinking about
  • 13:13 - 13:15
    what's going to happen after that deal.
  • 13:16 - 13:18
    I do want to ask you about
  • 13:18 - 13:19
    what you think would be
  • 13:19 - 13:23
    the best case scenario,
    the best solution, if you will.
  • 13:23 - 13:27
    But first, I want to discuss
    the European side of this.
  • 13:27 - 13:30
    This month has also seen
    Ursula von der Leyen
  • 13:30 - 13:32
    unveil a plan to rearm Europe,
  • 13:32 - 13:37
    announcing we are in
    an era of rearmament.
  • 13:37 - 13:39
    This includes defence investment loans
  • 13:39 - 13:42
    to member states, use of the EU budget
  • 13:42 - 13:45
    to direct more funds
    towards defence related
  • 13:45 - 13:48
    investments and deploying
    private capital.
  • 13:48 - 13:48
    .
  • 13:48 - 13:51
    How do you regard this initiative?
  • 13:52 - 13:56
    I'll say a couple of things
    about it that
  • 13:56 - 13:57
    I think are good, because then
  • 13:57 - 13:59
    I have several misgivings
  • 13:59 - 14:00
    that I want to explore it at night.
  • 14:00 - 14:02
    I think to some extent, it is better than
  • 14:02 - 14:04
    the alternative of what Trump was
  • 14:04 - 14:06
    proposing, right, which was that each
  • 14:06 - 14:09
    European state raise defence
    spending to 5% of GDP.
  • 14:09 - 14:12
    And it's good in that it takes the
  • 14:12 - 14:15
    EU as the political subject that needs
  • 14:15 - 14:16
    to make these decisions.
  • 14:16 - 14:18
    So it's not NATO, which at this point iz
  • 14:19 - 14:20
    becoming more and more
  • 14:20 - 14:22
    dysfunctional with each passing day, right?
  • 14:22 - 14:24
    So it's the EU that needs to take
  • 14:24 - 14:26
    its own defence seriously and become
  • 14:26 - 14:28
    autonomous at a time when it's being
  • 14:28 - 14:31
    threatened by both
    Trump and Putin, right?
  • 14:31 - 14:34
    So that's what I think is good about the deal.
  • 14:34 - 14:35
    And the fact that is
  • 14:36 - 14:38
    the approach is sort of ambition when you
  • 14:38 - 14:41
    look at, well, not exactly the scale of
  • 14:41 - 14:42
    billions that is mobilised, because here
  • 14:42 - 14:44
    there's always a bit of creative accounting
  • 14:44 - 14:46
    that we're used to see
    from Brussels, right?
  • 14:46 - 14:49
    So I think if you compare it to
    next generation EU,
  • 14:49 - 14:50
    it's lacking in that respect.
  • 14:50 - 14:52
    But when you take into
  • 14:52 - 14:53
    consideration the fact that it's
  • 14:53 - 14:56
    happening at the same
    time as Germany,
  • 14:56 - 14:58
    for example, reforms its debt rate,
  • 14:58 - 14:59
    right, the constitutional amendment,
  • 14:59 - 15:01
    and makes it more flexible,
  • 15:01 - 15:03
    that just happened today,
    then you get a sense
  • 15:03 - 15:06
    that there's an ambition to match
  • 15:06 - 15:08
    what otherwise would be
    just like lofty declarations.
  • 15:08 - 15:10
    So what I think is more problematic about
  • 15:10 - 15:15
    it is that it basically thinks
    about European defence.
  • 15:15 - 15:16
    And what they do is like you start
  • 15:16 - 15:18
    with what you have, and you work
    towards the number, right?
  • 15:18 - 15:21
    This is the way that all
    these discussions unfold.
  • 15:21 - 15:22
    So what do you have is, European
  • 15:22 - 15:24
    defence, when you look at overall
  • 15:24 - 15:27
    spending numbers, it's not
    actually a small number.
  • 15:27 - 15:30
    we're used to thinking that
    Europe doesn't spend, that
  • 15:30 - 15:31
    the EU doesn't spend
    enough on defence.
  • 15:31 - 15:33
    And when you look at the aggregate numbers
  • 15:33 - 15:34
    depending on the metrics you use
  • 15:34 - 15:36
    but we do spend several times more
  • 15:36 - 15:37
    than Russia does.
  • 15:37 - 15:39
    And if you also take the UK into
  • 15:39 - 15:40
    consideration, right, sort of these
  • 15:40 - 15:43
    like minded allies, then you have almost
  • 15:43 - 15:45
    twice the defence budget of China.
  • 15:45 - 15:47
    So that's not an insignificant
    number by any means.
  • 15:47 - 15:50
    The problem is, and you know, this is
  • 15:50 - 15:52
    sort of well known by now that it's
  • 15:52 - 15:53
    extraordinarily inefficient,
  • 15:53 - 15:56
    because it's fragmented
    and 27 different armies.
  • 15:56 - 15:58
    And so you don't generate
    economies of scale.
  • 15:58 - 16:00
    You don't generate the investment
  • 16:00 - 16:03
    you would need to have a
  • 16:03 - 16:04
    competitive defence industry that spans
  • 16:04 - 16:06
    the entire union and so forth.
  • 16:06 - 16:07
    So the problem that I see is what
  • 16:07 - 16:10
    this programme does is mainly it focusses on
  • 16:10 - 16:11
    national defence budgets and says:
  • 16:11 - 16:14
    yeah, you can raise them,
    we expect to get 650
  • 16:14 - 16:17
    I think it's 600, 650 billion
    euros out of that.
  • 16:17 - 16:19
    And we will loosen the fiscal rules so
  • 16:19 - 16:21
    that this doesn't immediately fall into
  • 16:21 - 16:23
    the excessive deficit procedure, right,
  • 16:23 - 16:25
    for countries like Spain, for example, or
  • 16:25 - 16:26
    for most European countries who have to
  • 16:26 - 16:28
    undergo this investment.
  • 16:28 - 16:29
    Now, how long would that last for?
  • 16:29 - 16:31
    Is that the way to like build a
  • 16:31 - 16:32
    European defence capability?
  • 16:32 - 16:34
    I'm very sceptical of it, right?
  • 16:34 - 16:37
    The way I would go about it is
    slightly different.
  • 16:37 - 16:39
    I would think: okay, so we're in
  • 16:39 - 16:42
    one of those rare moments of crisis in
  • 16:42 - 16:45
    the EU right now, similar
    to the COVID crisis
  • 16:45 - 16:47
    where the more ambitious
  • 16:47 - 16:49
    solutions are also the
    more pragmatic, right?
  • 16:49 - 16:50
    Usually it's the opposite, right?
  • 16:50 - 16:52
    It's like, oh, you know, we're
    asking for a pie in the sky.
  • 16:52 - 16:54
    So I think you should start with
  • 16:54 - 16:56
    the most ambitious proposal you can
  • 16:56 - 16:59
    consider and then work with that towards,
  • 16:59 - 17:03
    landing that on the framework
    that you can work with.
  • 17:04 - 17:06
    And so what would that look like?
  • 17:06 - 17:08
    I think it would entail acknowledging
  • 17:08 - 17:10
    that yes, there is a security threat,
  • 17:11 - 17:13
    even if the Ukraine situation is solved
  • 17:13 - 17:14
    immediately, right?
  • 17:14 - 17:16
    You need to have the deterrence
  • 17:16 - 17:20
    capability to avoid a scenario like 2014
  • 17:20 - 17:23
    to 2022, like what we
    were talking about before.
  • 17:23 - 17:25
    But then it should be the EU that
  • 17:25 - 17:26
    provides that, not NATO.
  • 17:26 - 17:27
    You should not rely
    on the United States.
  • 17:27 - 17:29
    The United States is not an ally in
  • 17:29 - 17:31
    any sense of the word anymore.
  • 17:31 - 17:33
    So you need to do this on your own.
  • 17:33 - 17:37
    And you also need to define
    security very broadly
  • 17:37 - 17:39
    I think, for this to work.
  • 17:39 - 17:40
    So yes, a part of it has to
  • 17:40 - 17:41
    do with like defence, right?
  • 17:41 - 17:42
    And what we were just talking about.
  • 17:42 - 17:44
    And this is what usually all the
  • 17:44 - 17:45
    conversation focusses on.
  • 17:45 - 17:47
    And that's part of the deal.
  • 17:47 - 17:49
    But there's other stuff that the EU needs
  • 17:49 - 17:53
    to do to actually establish a
    security worthy of that name.
  • 17:53 - 17:56
    So at least three other
    areas besides defence.
  • 17:56 - 17:58
    One would be climate security.
  • 17:58 - 18:00
    You know, you need to
    become energy independent
  • 18:00 - 18:01
    not just from Russia and oil and gas
  • 18:01 - 18:04
    but from the United States
    or the Gulf states.
  • 18:04 - 18:06
    And that involves being very ambitious
  • 18:06 - 18:08
    with the ongoing green transition.
  • 18:08 - 18:10
    So you need to double down on that,
  • 18:10 - 18:11
    not cut your resources to focus
  • 18:11 - 18:13
    exclusively on defence.
  • 18:13 - 18:15
    If you adopt a broad
    conception of security
  • 18:15 - 18:17
    that is also something that you
  • 18:17 - 18:18
    need to take into consideration.
  • 18:18 - 18:20
    You can't just leave it in the back
  • 18:20 - 18:23
    burner and expect things to
    get better in the future.
  • 18:23 - 18:25
    You also need to think of economic
  • 18:25 - 18:26
    security, right?
  • 18:26 - 18:27
    In terms of having a financial
  • 18:27 - 18:29
    architecture that does not depend on the
  • 18:29 - 18:31
    dollar system or US
    payment platforms, right?
  • 18:31 - 18:33
    That involves anything from having a more
  • 18:33 - 18:34
    internationalised euro to having
  • 18:34 - 18:37
    a digital euro as a tool for payments, right?
  • 18:37 - 18:39
    You can get really down to the
  • 18:39 - 18:40
    weeds of like the policies
    that you need for this.
  • 18:40 - 18:42
    But there's a big plank that has to
  • 18:42 - 18:45
    do with your economic model, the fiscal rules
  • 18:45 - 18:46
    that are extremely outdated,
  • 18:46 - 18:48
    even after this programme, right?
  • 18:48 - 18:49
    They should be completely overhauled if
  • 18:49 - 18:50
    you really want to meet the challenge
  • 18:50 - 18:52
    that you face right now.
  • 18:52 - 18:54
    Fourth area, and final one, would be
  • 18:55 - 18:56
    security from a social standpoint.
  • 18:56 - 18:58
    If you do all these things and at
  • 18:58 - 18:59
    the same time, you have to do austerity
  • 18:59 - 19:01
    because you have to balance a budget,
  • 19:01 - 19:03
    then that defeats the
    purpose of any of this.
  • 19:03 - 19:04
    Especially keeping in mind that we
  • 19:04 - 19:06
    know by now and there's considerable
  • 19:06 - 19:07
    evidence that doing austerity,
  • 19:07 - 19:10
    doing budgetary cuts,
    trimming down the welfare state
  • 19:10 - 19:11
    actually empowers the very friends
  • 19:11 - 19:13
    of Trump and Putin that are already
  • 19:13 - 19:15
    reasonably strong in a
    lot of European states.
  • 19:15 - 19:17
    So if you want to stop the far Right
  • 19:17 - 19:19
    and if there's anything in the EU
  • 19:19 - 19:20
    that is worth fighting for, it's probably
  • 19:20 - 19:22
    a socioeconomic model that
  • 19:22 - 19:24
    provides social security in the form of
  • 19:24 - 19:26
    the welfare state, public health care,
  • 19:26 - 19:27
    public education, pensions, you name it.
  • 19:27 - 19:29
    So that has to be a big part of it.
  • 19:29 - 19:30
    And so you get these four things and
  • 19:30 - 19:32
    then you think, okay, how are we going
  • 19:32 - 19:32
    to pay for them?
  • 19:32 - 19:35
    And then I think, a mixture
  • 19:35 - 19:38
    of having more mutualised European debt,
  • 19:38 - 19:40
    like next generation, and having its own,
  • 19:41 - 19:43
    fiscal capacity in terms of,
  • 19:43 - 19:45
    I don't know, I would consider not just
  • 19:45 - 19:48
    punishing Russian oligarchs, but taxing
  • 19:48 - 19:50
    the activity of American tech oligarchs
  • 19:50 - 19:52
    for the EU to generate its own resources.
  • 19:52 - 19:53
    And there are ways to do that, right?
  • 19:53 - 19:55
    And you can talk about Russian stranded
  • 19:55 - 19:57
    assets and a number of other sources of
  • 19:57 - 19:59
    revenue that you can tax.
  • 19:59 - 20:00
    So you'd have to be much more broad
  • 20:00 - 20:02
    in your conception of security and not
  • 20:02 - 20:04
    just focus on the defence industry
  • 20:04 - 20:06
    and defence spending from
    a national perspective.
  • 20:06 - 20:09
    Because ultimately, I mean,
    I hope this doesn't happen.
  • 20:09 - 20:10
    And there's still ongoing discussion.
  • 20:10 - 20:13
    But if this ends up being an excuse
  • 20:13 - 20:15
    for member states to spend more money
  • 20:15 - 20:17
    without clear strategic goals, and that
  • 20:17 - 20:19
    ends up being, well, I don't know, buying
  • 20:19 - 20:21
    American equipment, and increasing a
  • 20:21 - 20:22
    security dependence that is already
  • 20:22 - 20:26
    there, then you've doubled
    down on a problem, right?
  • 20:26 - 20:28
    So, you know, I think there's
    some good elements to it.
  • 20:28 - 20:29
    But I think it could be much improved
  • 20:29 - 20:32
    and still needs a broader definition
  • 20:32 - 20:34
    of security and much more fiscal ambition.
  • 20:34 - 20:37
    So basically, are you saying you think it
  • 20:37 - 20:42
    would be preferable for member states to
  • 20:42 - 20:45
    make less of a decision here and for
  • 20:45 - 20:49
    the EU to have a more
    coordinated plan?
  • 20:49 - 20:53
    And I'm just wondering, do you think the
  • 20:53 - 20:54
    European Union, and I'm not talking
  • 20:54 - 20:56
    Europe, I'm talking the European Union,
  • 20:56 - 21:01
    would ever take that
    non-aligned perspective?
  • 21:01 - 21:03
    Do you think that's plausible?
  • 21:03 - 21:06
    Don't you feel like maybe European
  • 21:06 - 21:08
    nations themselves would be more likely
  • 21:08 - 21:12
    to, if they were democratic enough to not
  • 21:12 - 21:15
    be that constrained by the
  • 21:15 - 21:16
    European Union.
  • 21:16 - 21:19
    Don't you feel like they would
    try to be non-aligned?
  • 21:19 - 21:21
    Obviously, I'm kind of generalising here.
  • 21:21 - 21:23
    But I don't know, I'm just wondering, do
  • 21:23 - 21:26
    you have hopes in the EU?
  • 21:26 - 21:28
    Or do you have hopes in Europe?
  • 21:28 - 21:30
    And yeah, what do you think is more
  • 21:30 - 21:32
    likely like for the EU to actually take
  • 21:32 - 21:35
    a non-aligned stance or
    for European countries?
  • 21:35 - 21:37
    Because I don't know, I just struggle to
  • 21:37 - 21:39
    believe that the EU would ever do that.
  • 21:39 - 21:41
    So I kind of have the opposite reaction
  • 21:41 - 21:43
    in that I would have more hope in
  • 21:43 - 21:45
    European nations individually
  • 21:45 - 21:48
    taking that sort of stance and
  • 21:48 - 21:52
    making the right investments, or Europe
  • 21:52 - 21:54
    as a sort of region rather than the
  • 21:54 - 21:56
    EU specifically.
  • 21:56 - 21:59
    But let me know your thoughts about this.
  • 21:59 - 22:01
    So I think there's one thing that is:
  • 22:01 - 22:04
    okay, should the EU pull
    its capacities together?
  • 22:04 - 22:05
    That's one thing, right?
  • 22:05 - 22:07
    And have like a more federated approach
  • 22:07 - 22:09
    to these threats that it faces now, and
  • 22:09 - 22:11
    these challenges in the form of Russia,
  • 22:11 - 22:12
    of the United States,
  • 22:12 - 22:15
    of having to develop its own autonomy.
  • 22:15 - 22:16
    And then the other question is about
  • 22:16 - 22:17
    Europe's alignment, right?
  • 22:18 - 22:20
    I'm going to try
    and parse them out
  • 22:20 - 22:21
    because I think
    they're slightly distinct.
  • 22:21 - 22:22
    So the question, the way this is always
  • 22:22 - 22:24
    posed is this question:
  • 22:24 - 22:26
    oh, should you have a
    European army, right?
  • 22:26 - 22:28
    And usually this is something
  • 22:28 - 22:30
    that doesn't get discussed a lot
  • 22:30 - 22:32
    beyond the theoretical level, right?
  • 22:32 - 22:34
    Because there are like many operational
  • 22:34 - 22:36
    and political hurdles along the way
  • 22:36 - 22:38
    but, mostly it's a question
    of political will, right?
  • 22:38 - 22:40
    That European states are reticent to
  • 22:40 - 22:42
    share that degree of sovereignty.
  • 22:42 - 22:44
    Now, I just think if you really are
  • 22:44 - 22:47
    serious about having deterrence
  • 22:47 - 22:49
    capability against Russia, which I think
  • 22:49 - 22:50
    is very different from sort of getting
  • 22:50 - 22:52
    involved in warmongering, right?
  • 22:52 - 22:53
    After all, like Russia is the country
  • 22:53 - 22:55
    that has the largest nuclear
    stockpile in the world.
  • 22:55 - 22:57
    So I think anyone who was actively
  • 22:57 - 22:59
    engaging in pushing them towards a war
  • 22:59 - 23:01
    would be an idiot to do so.
  • 23:01 - 23:03
    But I do think you need to develop
  • 23:03 - 23:04
    deterrent capability.
  • 23:04 - 23:05
    It makes much more sense to do that
  • 23:05 - 23:07
    on an EU level than for each European
  • 23:07 - 23:08
    state on its own.
  • 23:08 - 23:10
    Unless you're willing to sustain, I don't
  • 23:10 - 23:12
    know, five, six percent of the GDP of
  • 23:12 - 23:14
    every European state spent, or in my
  • 23:14 - 23:17
    view, wasted on defence, right?
  • 23:17 - 23:19
    So it's an idea, I mean, whose time
  • 23:19 - 23:21
    has come in the sense that it's the
  • 23:21 - 23:23
    easiest way out of this problem.
  • 23:23 - 23:24
    Now, then the question, of course, is
  • 23:24 - 23:31
    like, what does a more united EU in
  • 23:31 - 23:33
    the realms of foreign policy and defence
  • 23:33 - 23:35
    policy stand for in the world, right?
  • 23:35 - 23:38
    That question: Oh, can Europe
    be non-aligned?
  • 23:38 - 23:41
    I would say Europe today
    is disaligned, right?
  • 23:41 - 23:43
    Because correct me if I'm wrong, but the
  • 23:43 - 23:45
    way you would have posed this question
  • 23:45 - 23:47
    two months ago is that the EU is
  • 23:47 - 23:49
    overly aligned with the United States and
  • 23:49 - 23:51
    just following the
    United States' initiative.
  • 23:51 - 23:53
    Overnight, that has changed very
    dramatically.
  • 23:54 - 23:57
    And so the EU already de facto finds
  • 23:57 - 23:59
    itself in a place where it's having to
  • 23:59 - 24:02
    come up with its own autonomous posture
  • 24:02 - 24:04
    in regards, for example, to what happened
  • 24:04 - 24:05
    in Ukraine, right?
  • 24:05 - 24:07
    Now, that position is the one it was
  • 24:07 - 24:09
    holding before the United States
    changed gears.
  • 24:09 - 24:10
    But I think it's an interesting process.
  • 24:10 - 24:12
    Now, I will say about that, that hasn't
  • 24:12 - 24:15
    come to fruition because European leaders
  • 24:15 - 24:16
    suddenly took that decision.
  • 24:16 - 24:19
    It's because Trump snubbed them and then
  • 24:19 - 24:22
    humiliated a few of them and has done
  • 24:22 - 24:24
    everything within his power to make that
  • 24:24 - 24:25
    outcome possible.
  • 24:25 - 24:27
    So I would think the challenge is not
  • 24:27 - 24:29
    for the EU to strike its own path
  • 24:29 - 24:30
    away from Trump now.
  • 24:30 - 24:33
    The question is maintaining this after
  • 24:33 - 24:34
    Trump is gone.
  • 24:34 - 24:36
    And I'm sort of looking
    too far into the future.
  • 24:36 - 24:37
    But if you think of, you know, what
  • 24:37 - 24:39
    happened during the Biden presidency,
  • 24:39 - 24:41
    or even if you want to go further back
  • 24:41 - 24:42
    in time after the Iraq war, when there
  • 24:42 - 24:44
    was also talk of the need of becoming
  • 24:44 - 24:46
    more detached in foreign policy positions
  • 24:46 - 24:48
    from the United States, what do you see
  • 24:48 - 24:50
    is that when the good times come back,
  • 24:50 - 24:51
    and that usually means when there's a
  • 24:51 - 24:53
    Democrat in the White House, Europeans
  • 24:53 - 24:54
    become complacent.
  • 24:54 - 24:56
    So this is an effort that you really
  • 24:56 - 24:57
    need to sustain in time.
  • 24:57 - 25:00
    Now, finally, and this is the hardest
  • 25:00 - 25:02
    question to which I don't have an answer
  • 25:02 - 25:03
    other than to say that the EU is,
  • 25:03 - 25:05
    in spite of like making progress on all
  • 25:05 - 25:06
    these areas, and I think a lot of
  • 25:06 - 25:08
    this is actually interesting and
  • 25:08 - 25:11
    worthwhile, but it has some huge flaws in
  • 25:11 - 25:13
    regards to how it aligns
    in the world, right?
  • 25:13 - 25:17
    Just consider the now ongoing
    genocide in Gaza, right?
  • 25:17 - 25:19
    We learned today that Israel resumed
  • 25:19 - 25:22
    operations and killed between three and
  • 25:22 - 25:24
    400 Palestinians in one night.
  • 25:24 - 25:26
    And the EU has been shamefully muted on
  • 25:26 - 25:28
    this issue, except for
    a few voices, right?
  • 25:28 - 25:31
    And for the most part, has acquiesced to
  • 25:31 - 25:34
    what is basically a genocide
    on its doorstep.
  • 25:34 - 25:38
    So I think striking a sort of, you
  • 25:38 - 25:40
    know, assertive position in defence of
  • 25:40 - 25:44
    Ukraine's right to defend itself from
  • 25:44 - 25:46
    annihilation, in the face of an
  • 25:46 - 25:49
    imperialist neighbour,
    it's all very well and good.
  • 25:49 - 25:51
    Like, I'm all for that position.
  • 25:51 - 25:52
    I just think there should be coherence.
  • 25:52 - 25:54
    It should also be held in Gaza, right?
  • 25:54 - 25:56
    Like, you know, the EU should be much
  • 25:56 - 25:58
    firmer in its condemnation of Israel.
  • 25:58 - 26:00
    So that's one thing where its present
  • 26:00 - 26:03
    disposition, its present alignment is
  • 26:03 - 26:05
    very much lacking and very disappointing.
  • 26:05 - 26:07
    The same is true of
    migration policy, right?
  • 26:07 - 26:10
    I mean, we like to act scandalised at
  • 26:10 - 26:12
    the policies that the Trump
  • 26:12 - 26:14
    administration applies, but they're not
  • 26:14 - 26:15
    that different.
  • 26:15 - 26:16
    And in fact, many of them are directly
  • 26:16 - 26:18
    inspired in what we do
    in our own borders.
  • 26:20 - 26:21
    I do think the EU
  • 26:21 - 26:23
    is taking several steps to become more
  • 26:23 - 26:24
    autonomous from the US.
  • 26:24 - 26:27
    I am sceptical that the way it is
  • 26:27 - 26:29
    doing so is the best, the most useful,
  • 26:29 - 26:31
    and that it's not, that it doesn't have
  • 26:31 - 26:32
    several aspects of it that can be
  • 26:32 - 26:33
    counterproductive.
  • 26:33 - 26:36
    But I realise that there are some areas
  • 26:36 - 26:38
    where the state of affairs
    right now is pretty awful.
  • 26:38 - 26:40
    It certainly is.
  • 26:40 - 26:43
    And I want to dive a little deeper
  • 26:43 - 26:45
    into this topic of non-alignment.
  • 26:45 - 26:49
    I think the EU, yes, it's not complacent
  • 26:49 - 26:51
    to the Trump presidency.
  • 26:51 - 26:55
    But I mean, I think it still is
  • 26:55 - 26:58
    to the sort of what they understand as
  • 26:58 - 27:03
    the default US, right, which is Democrats
  • 27:03 - 27:07
    or, you know, never Trump Republicans
  • 27:07 - 27:10
    and a politics of the sort.
  • 27:10 - 27:14
    And meanwhile, at DiEM25, we aim for a
  • 27:14 - 27:18
    non-aligned, which doesn't
    mean neutral Europe.
  • 27:18 - 27:18
    .
  • 27:18 - 27:22
    Do you believe this is
    currently a possibility?
  • 27:22 - 27:24
    And how do you believe it would impact
  • 27:24 - 27:26
    the potential for more democratic
  • 27:26 - 27:30
    European nations if we
    move in this direction?
  • 27:30 - 27:32
    Yeah, I mean, I think it's tied to
  • 27:32 - 27:33
    what I was saying before.
  • 27:33 - 27:35
    But so let me reframe it in a
  • 27:35 - 27:36
    more accurate way.
  • 27:36 - 27:39
    I think the EU, again, not by its
  • 27:39 - 27:42
    own merits, but because of the effects of
  • 27:42 - 27:43
    what Trump has done in two months,
  • 27:43 - 27:47
    has become sort of disaligned
    from the US, right?
  • 27:48 - 27:50
    And I am a bit, yeah, I will
  • 27:50 - 27:53
    say I am hopeful that this is not
  • 27:53 - 27:57
    just a passing sort of fleeting sentiment
  • 27:57 - 27:59
    of like, oh, you know, Trump is horrible.
  • 27:59 - 28:00
    Then we'll go back to business.
  • 28:00 - 28:02
    I want to think that there is a
  • 28:02 - 28:04
    learning process going on, especially in
  • 28:04 - 28:06
    the way that we had, you know, Biden
  • 28:06 - 28:07
    between these two Trump terms.
  • 28:07 - 28:09
    I mean, the way that events have unfolded
  • 28:09 - 28:11
    would mean that Europeans would be, you
  • 28:11 - 28:14
    know, profoundly obtuse not to continue
  • 28:14 - 28:16
    investing in becoming independent from
  • 28:16 - 28:18
    the United States after Trump is gone.
  • 28:18 - 28:22
    And who knows what will happen in four years.
  • 28:22 - 28:25
    So on that regard, I'm, let's say, mildly
  • 28:25 - 28:26
    hopeful, or at least I've been surprised
  • 28:26 - 28:28
    by the degree of result I've seen from
  • 28:28 - 28:30
    key European figures.
  • 28:30 - 28:32
    So I would not have expected to see
  • 28:32 - 28:35
    a centre-right German politician say, my
  • 28:35 - 28:36
    first concern is becoming independent
  • 28:36 - 28:38
    from the United States, right?
  • 28:38 - 28:39
    I have to acknowledge that if I would
  • 28:39 - 28:41
    have been told, will you see this in
  • 28:41 - 28:43
    the next year, a couple months ago,
  • 28:43 - 28:45
    I'd have said: no, absolutely not.
  • 28:45 - 28:46
    I think Europeans will try and
  • 28:46 - 28:48
    paper over their differences with Trump,
  • 28:48 - 28:52
    but fundamentally not change or, within
  • 28:52 - 28:56
    So in that regard, yeah, but another,
  • 28:56 - 28:58
    but as I was saying before,
  • 28:58 - 28:59
    if you look at other issues,
  • 28:59 - 29:01
    so if you look at the
    Palestinian question, right,
  • 29:01 - 29:04
    if you look at migration policy, these are areas
  • 29:04 - 29:06
    that where there's no change and where
  • 29:06 - 29:08
    the current alignment or the current,
  • 29:08 - 29:11
    posture to the extent that you has
  • 29:11 - 29:13
    a coherent posture, or the sum of the
  • 29:13 - 29:15
    different member states;
    postures is awful.
  • 29:15 - 29:17
    Now, there are a couple other instances,
  • 29:17 - 29:19
    which are a bit more, I guess,
  • 29:20 - 29:22
    we still need to wait and see what happens.
  • 29:22 - 29:24
    But so, for example, I would say,
  • 29:24 - 29:25
    I'm interested to see what happens within
  • 29:25 - 29:26
    relations with China.
  • 29:26 - 29:30
    I think if you want to become autonomous
  • 29:30 - 29:32
    from the US and, you know, secure from
  • 29:32 - 29:33
    Russia, and at the same time,
  • 29:33 - 29:36
    you take fighting climate change seriously,
  • 29:36 - 29:39
    you cannot afford to follow the US into a
  • 29:39 - 29:42
    confrontation with China
    into the Indo -Pacific.
  • 29:42 - 29:42
    You just can't.
  • 29:42 - 29:44
    You need to find a better way to
  • 29:44 - 29:45
    engage with China, right?
  • 29:45 - 29:47
    So the EU famously has this plan,
  • 29:47 - 29:51
    or this platform where it views China as a
  • 29:51 - 29:52
    sort of, let me see if I get
  • 29:52 - 29:54
    this correctly, as the ones, it is a
  • 29:54 - 29:56
    partner, it is a competitor,
    and it is a rival,
  • 29:56 - 29:58
    and different, and depending on
  • 29:58 - 29:59
    what policies you look at.
    30 minutes
  • 29:59 - 30:03
    So I would say find more areas of
    partnership and less for rivalry
  • 30:03 - 30:04
    in the coming years
  • 30:04 - 30:07
    because you cannot afford
    more antagonism
  • 30:07 - 30:10
    and more broadly
    because I think that China
  • 30:10 - 30:15
    whatever the issues that we
    might have with different policies
  • 30:15 - 30:18
    that they apply and there are several.
  • 30:18 - 30:22
    But ultimately, it is not destabilizing
    force in international affairs
  • 30:22 - 30:25
    the way the US and Russia are, right?
  • 30:25 - 30:27
    So yeah, I think that's...
  • 30:29 - 30:30
    We'll see what happens right?
  • 30:30 - 30:35
    Really, that's another area where if
    we are going to take European autonomy
  • 30:35 - 30:41
    seriously, we need certain changes to
    take place or otherwise we'll get stuck
  • 30:41 - 30:42
    back where we were now.
  • 30:42 - 30:46
    Another region that is interesting
    in terms of partnerships
  • 30:46 - 30:47
    is Latin America right?
  • 30:47 - 30:52
    This EU-Mexico deal again,
    some of the aspects of it:
  • 30:52 - 30:53
    It's a free trade deal.
  • 30:53 - 30:55
    It was agreed by governments
    on both sides
  • 30:55 - 30:58
    but it is problematic,
    it has redistributionary effects
  • 30:58 - 31:00
    like most trade deals.
  • 31:00 - 31:01
    So here you can see how reaching out
  • 31:01 - 31:04
    to other regions of the world
    is interesting.
  • 31:04 - 31:07
    I think there are many governments
    In Latin America that will come
  • 31:07 - 31:09
    as natural partners for
    the EU right now, right.
  • 31:09 - 31:12
    I'm obviously thinking
    of Brazil not Argentina,
  • 31:12 - 31:16
    But again, there are also
    trade-offs to these deals,
  • 31:16 - 31:18
    But I think if the EU really wants to
  • 31:18 - 31:20
    take this question of
    becoming autonomous seriously,
  • 31:20 - 31:23
    that it needs to reach out to
    these partners.
  • 31:23 - 31:26
    You need to developing a more
    constructive relationship with China,
  • 31:26 - 31:30
    You need to develop a strong
    partnership with countries like Brazil.
  • 31:30 - 31:33
    I think in those cases, is where
    we're truly going to see if this is
  • 31:33 - 31:36
    something worth taking seriously
    or if it's back to the mean
  • 31:36 - 31:39
    once we get past this
    current crisis.
  • 31:39 - 31:43
    [Tiare] We are going to move on
    to a slightly different topic,
  • 31:43 - 31:44
    though not unrelated.
  • 31:44 - 31:49
    You have expertise in the
    concept of populism
  • 31:49 - 31:53
    We're going to leave links down
    in the description so people can
  • 31:53 - 31:55
    check out your work on the topic.
  • 31:58 - 32:01
    We've mentioned Trump
    derangement syndrome.
  • 32:01 - 32:07
    Basically, in all of this geopolitical
    scenario, what do you believe is the role
  • 32:07 - 32:13
    of populism and has its relationships
    with the States contributed to
  • 32:13 - 32:15
    taking us where we are now.
  • 32:15 - 32:19
    [Jorge] Most people say there
    are two kinds of populism, right,
  • 32:19 - 32:22
    populism of the Left and
    of the radical Right.
  • 32:22 - 32:25
    At this point, I think talking about
    Right-wing populism is sort of inaccurate.
  • 32:25 - 32:27
    It's just basically an
    extreme Right Movement.
  • 32:27 - 32:30
    I wrote a book a few years back and it
    focused on Left wing populism.
  • 32:30 - 32:35
    I was very hopeful for its prospects
    when I began writing the book.
  • 32:35 - 32:40
    Unfortunately, I finished writing it
    as the second Bernie Sanders campaign
  • 32:40 - 32:41
    came to a halt and was defeated,
  • 32:41 - 32:45
    which was really depressing
    for me because I lived in the States
  • 32:45 - 32:48
    in 2016 and participated in the
    the first one was very hopeful
  • 32:48 - 32:50
    that he would win the
    Democratic nomination.
  • 32:50 - 32:51
    That did not happen.
  • 32:51 - 32:56
    in Spain too, Podemos and then
    Sumar stagnated electorally.
  • 32:56 - 33:00
    They are junior partner
    to the traditional Center Left.
  • 33:00 - 33:02
    I think overall Left populists are just...
  • 33:02 - 33:04
    Or Left wing movements
    In general,
  • 33:04 - 33:08
    parties and movements to the
    Left of traditional social democracy
  • 33:08 - 33:11
    are uncomfortable with this juncture, right.
  • 33:11 - 33:16
    Because, well, defense is not
    traditionally the things that
  • 33:16 - 33:19
    we would like to talk about, right,
    and defense policy and so forth.
  • 33:19 - 33:23
    So it' a juncture that we are
    inherently uncomfortable with.
  • 33:23 - 33:27
    Now what I will say is that
    and I think this is testimony
  • 33:27 - 33:29
    to the progress that was made
  • 33:29 - 33:32
    by a lot of these movements
    in the past decade.
  • 33:32 - 33:36
    We should never let our guard down
    and think that austerity
  • 33:36 - 33:37
    is never coming back to the EU.
  • 33:37 - 33:42
    It could, the new fiscal rules are better
    than the old ones, but they're still
  • 33:42 - 33:44
    leaving much to be desired.
  • 33:44 - 33:47
    Right now as of today and
    especially for all this decade
  • 33:47 - 33:50
    austerity has not been on the menu
    in the EU in the way that it was
  • 33:50 - 33:52
    after the 2008 crisis, right?
  • 33:52 - 33:55
    I think that it's been assumed
    that this is a loosing proposal
  • 33:57 - 34:00
    the degree of social and political
    dislocation that will generate
  • 34:00 - 34:04
    makes it just unaffordable as
    an economic policy, right,
  • 34:04 - 34:05
    and absolutely counterproductive.
  • 34:05 - 34:09
    So I think that's something that
    was gained by a lot of the advances
  • 34:09 - 34:10
    that these movements made.
  • 34:10 - 34:12
    So I will say that and, you know,
    even if they don't have the presence
  • 34:12 - 34:15
    that they had 10 years ago,
    I think that is a lasting legacy
  • 34:15 - 34:17
    and, you know,
    we should be mindful of that.
  • 34:18 - 34:21
    In terms of the right-wing, you know,
    right-wing populists or more like
  • 34:21 - 34:24
    the extreme right in general,
    I'm really interested to see
  • 34:24 - 34:27
    whether Trump is good
    for their electoral business or not.
  • 34:27 - 34:30
    I am getting the sensation
    that he can become
  • 34:30 - 34:35
    a huge albatross for extreme right parties
    and movements in Europe, right?
  • 34:35 - 34:40
    Meaning if you look at, well, Canada is
    sort of a more prescient example, right?
  • 34:40 - 34:44
    The sort of subtly Trumpified,
    right-wing party is down in the polls
  • 34:44 - 34:47
    and the Liberals are the ones
    who are benefiting most from that
  • 34:47 - 34:50
    but, I think you might start
    seeing similar movements in the UK
  • 34:50 - 34:52
    and other European countries, right?
  • 34:52 - 34:56
    I mean, I think it's worth keeping in mind
    that, overnight, these parties have gone
  • 34:56 - 34:59
    from, not that they ever were,
    but pretending to be
  • 34:59 - 35:03
    the voice of the downtrodden
    or being a sort of anti-system option,
  • 35:03 - 35:06
    to being the favorite choice
    of the president of the United States
  • 35:06 - 35:08
    and the world's richest man
    who was boosting them all the time,
  • 35:08 - 35:12
    so it's just very hard to maintain
    an anti-system appeal.
  • 35:12 - 35:14
    Not that they ever had
    a genuine one, right?
  • 35:14 - 35:16
    It was always a facade,
    but at this point,
  • 35:16 - 35:20
    I think it's very hard
    to keep that reputation up.
  • 35:20 - 35:23
    So I think in the long,
    or even in the medium term,
  • 35:23 - 35:26
    this is going to present
    a series of very hard trade-offs for them.
  • 35:26 - 35:28
    I mean, and I don't want
    to be overly optimistic,
  • 35:28 - 35:30
    because I know every now and then,
    people say:
  • 35:30 - 35:32
    Oh, this is the end of the far right.
  • 35:32 - 35:34
    I remember people said it
    with covid, right?
  • 35:34 - 35:37
    Because science is now very important
    and, of course, that never happened,
  • 35:37 - 35:43
    they backfired, so need to keep
    a cool head about this
  • 35:43 - 35:46
    and not make premature judgments,
    but I think Trump and the United States
  • 35:46 - 35:48
    is going to pose a series
    of problems for them.
  • 35:48 - 35:53
    And it'll be interesting to see
    if and whether they can solve them.
  • 35:53 - 36:01
    [Tiare] I wonder what you think
    of populism as an antipolitics form
  • 36:01 - 36:09
    of politics which can be embodied
    by both the sort of leftwing populists
  • 36:09 - 36:17
    that have ended up either being made by
    and for the professional managerial class
  • 36:17 - 36:24
    but also the, you know,
    sort of more Trump himself
  • 36:24 - 36:34
    or the Trump-aligned parties in Europe
    as well, which ... what I see is that
  • 36:34 - 36:41
    they are the ones who still seem
    to hold this position of the outsider,
  • 36:41 - 36:46
    that seems to be something that
    they have managed to keep.
  • 36:46 - 36:50
    I don't know, I'm wondering
    how you regard this difference
  • 36:50 - 36:54
    and does it have to do perhaps with ...
    I'm just going to give you an example,
  • 36:54 - 36:57
    I just want to know, yeah,
    your thoughts on these developments
  • 36:57 - 37:01
    of the last few years, basically,
    while Podemos got,
  • 37:01 - 37:04
    and then Sumar
    got in government with PSOE,
  • 37:04 - 37:07
    so populist-left with center-left.
  • 37:08 - 37:17
    Giorgia Meloni or Trump, you know,
    definitely never appeared to sort of
  • 37:17 - 37:25
    make concessions to the parties
    that within their nations were regarded
  • 37:25 - 37:31
    as default government parties
    that had been there
  • 37:31 - 37:37
    for a really long time, you know,
    the so-called swamp, maybe,
  • 37:37 - 37:39
    that had to be drained.
  • 37:40 - 37:48
    And therefore they kind of managed
    to be seen, still, as outsiders,
  • 37:48 - 37:52
    even though, obviously, Giorgia Meloni
    is great friends with the US,
  • 37:52 - 37:53
    great friends with the EU, apparently.
  • 37:53 - 37:58
    So, you know, not like
    there is that much there, in a way,
  • 37:58 - 38:02
    and then, obviously,
    things can change,
  • 38:02 - 38:08
    but to an extent, yeah,
    it seems like there is
  • 38:08 - 38:13
    more complacency, perhaps,
    on the side of the left-populists
  • 38:13 - 38:18
    to sort of join,
    even in France, the center
  • 38:18 - 38:25
    and prioritize being anti-far-right
    over perhaps saying:
  • 38:25 - 38:32
    You know what, let's just do a more
    universalist, long-term project
  • 38:32 - 38:39
    and prioritize that even if it means
    risking more far-right victories
  • 38:39 - 38:44
    because we refuse to work
    with centre-left parties
  • 38:44 - 38:48
    which working-class people
    are just so done with,
  • 38:48 - 38:51
    perhaps less so in Spain, I will say,
  • 38:51 - 38:57
    but how would you basically update,
    perhaps, your views on populism
  • 38:57 - 39:01
    that you had in the more
    sort of Bernie Sanders era
  • 39:01 - 39:07
    to nowadays that we have seen
    more developments in the story?
  • 39:07 - 39:13
    [Jorge] Yeah, we could have
    another entire session on this subject
  • 39:13 - 39:17
    because first of all you'd have to
    sort of come up with a good definition
  • 39:17 - 39:20
    of populism which is
    extraordinarily frustrating, right?
  • 39:20 - 39:24
    So what I would say is like, okay,
    populism, a general definition is that
  • 39:24 - 39:27
    you're going to be talking about
    the people versus elites,
  • 39:27 - 39:29
    and in doing so you have a discourse
  • 39:29 - 39:32
    that accepts that there is
    antagonism within society.
  • 39:33 - 39:36
    So democracy is not just about consensus,
  • 39:36 - 39:39
    and reaching deals
    like-minded legislators,
  • 39:39 - 39:41
    that is a part of it,
    but it's also about conflict.
  • 39:41 - 39:43
    And so you work with that.
  • 39:43 - 39:45
    And that already
    is very different from the style
  • 39:45 - 39:49
    of sort of more established
    centre-Left or centre-Right politicians,
  • 39:49 - 39:51
    So that's one thing.
  • 39:51 - 39:53
    Then there's the question of yeah,
  • 39:53 - 39:57
    you're posing a question on this
    idea of normalization right,
  • 39:57 - 40:00
    or losing your anti-system edge.
  • 40:00 - 40:04
    I don't think there is a strategic
    road map that just works well
  • 40:04 - 40:05
    in every single case.
  • 40:05 - 40:09
    So, for example, Polemos did try in Spain
    to overtake the centre Left,
  • 40:09 - 40:12
    even if that meant that
    the Right would govern
  • 40:12 - 40:15
    and what happened is that It just
    failed to overtake the center Left.
  • 40:16 - 40:19
    One of the things that I've learned
    is that it's good to have
  • 40:19 - 40:21
    a discourse that is antagonistic,
  • 40:21 - 40:26
    it's good like to mobilize people's
    righteous anger with a way
  • 40:26 - 40:30
    that the economy doesn't work for
    them or that they're giving a lousy deal
  • 40:30 - 40:32
    and that's not something
    to be criticized.
  • 40:32 - 40:34
    I just got really frustrated
    in the United States
  • 40:34 - 40:36
    when people compare
    Bernie Sanders
  • 40:36 - 40:42
    having a angry rhetoric with Trump
    scapegoating vulnerable communities
  • 40:42 - 40:45
    for the sort of things that were
    mostly made up, right.
  • 40:45 - 40:48
    I think there's a big distinction in
    how you use that antagonism.
  • 40:48 - 40:52
    But ultimately, I don't think
    there's one clear path to victory
  • 40:52 - 40:54
    and what I do think is that
  • 40:54 - 40:59
    older established parties have a
    institutional grounding
  • 40:59 - 41:03
    that helps them out compete
    populist insurgencies
  • 41:03 - 41:04
    in the long run. right?
  • 41:06 - 41:08
    My takeaway was a slightly boring
  • 41:08 - 41:12
    institutional story right, that
    building organizational strength
  • 41:12 - 41:14
    building lasting institutions,
  • 41:14 - 41:16
    all of that is really important
  • 41:16 - 41:20
    if you want to have a
    successful candidacy
  • 41:20 - 41:22
    against the more established parties,
    right?
  • 41:22 - 41:25
    Where that runs a bit against
    the populist logic,
  • 41:25 - 41:27
    is in this idea of the populist leader. right?
  • 41:27 - 41:32
    Which is usually highly charismatic and
    organizationally, sadly, it is never subject
  • 41:32 - 41:36
    to very strong counterweights
    within the party's movement, right?
  • 41:37 - 41:39
    In the long term, this poses
    a lot of problems,
  • 41:39 - 41:42
    Now, are they insurmountable?
  • 41:42 - 41:43
    No, I don't think so.
  • 41:43 - 41:46
    Of course, if you look at the trajectory
    of a lot of these movements
  • 41:46 - 41:48
    well, it seems like that,
    it seems a big problem right,
  • 41:48 - 41:53
    but I don't think that this approach
    is not very useful in many contexts,
  • 41:53 - 41:56
    I don't think the Right necessarily
    done a better job of this.
  • 41:56 - 41:59
    If you look at Meloni has been
    very successful electorally,
  • 41:59 - 42:01
    but what she has done
    since she got the ballot
  • 42:01 - 42:03
    at least from where I'm standing,
  • 42:03 - 42:06
    it seems like a process of
    normalization right?
  • 42:06 - 42:12
    she has tried to be or seem like
    a responsible European player
  • 42:12 - 42:15
    trying to make the hard Right fit in
    with the centere Right at the EU level.
  • 42:15 - 42:17
    It;s very different from for example,
  • 42:17 - 42:20
    Matteo Salvini who was a hooligan
    in his first term in office
  • 42:20 - 42:24
    and then now, he's sort of a marginal
    player in relation to Meloni.
  • 42:24 - 42:25
    I don't know, I say this because
  • 42:25 - 42:28
    I don't think there is a correct
    path that you must take.
  • 42:28 - 42:31
    I don't think necessarily toning down
  • 42:31 - 42:32
    your messaging at one point
  • 42:32 - 42:34
    and this could be a tactical choice
  • 42:34 - 42:37
    it doesn't really mean that you should
    sell your essence or so forth.
  • 42:38 - 42:42
    This is all to say, I don't have a
    specific answer on this
  • 42:42 - 42:44
    other than to say that I do think
    it is important
  • 42:44 - 42:48
    that Left wing parties and movements
    become able again like they were
  • 42:48 - 42:52
    during the last decade of
    mobilizing people's anger. Right.
  • 42:52 - 42:54
    People who are angry
    at the way things work,
  • 42:54 - 42:56
    people's legitimate outrage.
  • 42:56 - 42:58
    it should not be the case that
  • 42:58 - 43:01
    the far Right is the only
    option out there
  • 43:01 - 43:04
    that is mobilizing people who are
    angry at the way things work
  • 43:04 - 43:08
    because even if they make up scape goats
    and have a hateful rhetoric,
  • 43:08 - 43:11
    there are things to be legitimately
    angry about in our societies
  • 43:11 - 43:12
    and our economies.
  • 43:12 - 43:17
    These should not be left for
    demagogues to exploit.
  • 43:17 - 43:22
    [Tiare] Within those parties,
    why do you think we failed?
  • 43:22 - 43:25
    Basically, what you think
    is the the main reason
  • 43:25 - 43:30
    at the core, what would you think is
    the main thing we need to change.
  • 43:30 - 43:37
    What was the biggest failure of the
    populist Left in the last 10 years?
  • 43:37 - 43:43
    [Jorge] Man, if I could
    answer your question quickly
  • 43:43 - 43:46
    I would not have written a really
    long and boring book about it.
  • 43:46 - 43:48
    That's what I'll say,
  • 43:48 - 43:53
    A lot of it depends on
    the more structural
  • 43:53 - 43:55
    background conditions that
    I was telling you about, right?
  • 43:55 - 44:00
    As you move and successfully
    become a party
  • 44:00 - 44:02
    where you can do things like
    changing leadership
  • 44:02 - 44:04
    without having everyone
    fall into infighting
  • 44:04 - 44:09
    or have a scenario where your
    immediate goals are not attained
  • 44:09 - 44:11
    and you don't collapse because
    you're blaming each other
  • 44:11 - 44:14
    which is largely what
    happened with Podemos.
  • 44:14 - 44:18
    They did a very bad job of managing
    internal party tension right?
  • 44:18 - 44:20
    That had to do with
    institutional choices
  • 44:20 - 44:23
    that they made on how
    to manage the party.
  • 44:23 - 44:27
    Then on the more immediate level
  • 44:27 - 44:28
    on the more tactical level
  • 44:28 - 44:29
    there is this question:
  • 44:30 - 44:33
    should you be an outsider,
    even if it means the Right governs
  • 44:33 - 44:36
    or should you be joining
    forces with XXX?
  • 44:39 - 44:40
    Then again, this all depends on whether
  • 44:40 - 44:42
    you're the main actor in
    the coalition government
  • 44:42 - 44:44
    or if they're the
    secondary actor, right?
  • 44:44 - 44:47
    I think Sumar actually had
    a good electoral result
  • 44:47 - 44:49
    considering the
    junior partner in a
  • 44:49 - 44:51
    coalition government.
  • 44:51 - 44:54
    If you look at almost every single
    political scientist will tell you
  • 44:54 - 44:57
    that these parties should
    have a horrible electoral result
  • 44:57 - 44:59
    when they come back to the polls right,
    after a coalition government
  • 44:59 - 45:00
    and they held their own.
  • 45:00 - 45:02
    But that remains to be seen
    in the next elections.
  • 45:02 - 45:05
    It seems they'll have a much harder
    time replicating that success,
  • 45:06 - 45:09
    It takes time and then,
    at different junctures,
  • 45:09 - 45:11
    I don't think there is a correct way.
  • 45:12 - 45:19
    So what happens if you try
    and be an outsider all the time,
  • 45:20 - 45:23
    and you're Identifying the
    centre Left as your enemy,
  • 45:23 - 45:26
    a lot of the people who vote for
    the centre Left
  • 45:26 - 45:27
    whom you need
    arithmetically
  • 45:27 - 45:29
    to eventually vote for you,
  • 45:29 - 45:32
    if you want to get the majority,
    it will allow you to govern
  • 45:32 - 45:34
    without the the centre Left,
    will not vote for you
  • 45:34 - 45:36
    because it will perceive
    you as a threat
  • 45:36 - 45:38
    rather than as a
    potential partner, right?
  • 45:38 - 45:41
    So these are the
    electoral dilemmas
  • 45:41 - 45:44
    of Left populism, which are not
    very different from those
  • 45:44 - 45:47
    of other electoral families,
    but they're there.
  • 45:47 - 45:50
    For the far Right,
    I think it's slightly different.
  • 45:50 - 45:51
    Of course, it depends
    on the country.
  • 45:51 - 45:52
    If you look at Trump's success,
  • 45:52 - 45:54
    you need to keep
    in mind that the US
  • 45:54 - 45:56
    is a presidentialist. system.
  • 45:56 - 45:58
    So that makes it very different.
  • 45:58 - 46:01
    I think Bernie Sanders could have
    realistically won in 2016
  • 46:01 - 46:03
    against Donald Trump.
  • 46:03 - 46:06
    I don't think it's overly
    optimistic to say that.
  • 46:06 - 46:09
    I think he would have
    easily won, right?
  • 46:09 - 46:11
    Then we would have had a very
    distinct last eight years.
  • 46:11 - 46:14
    He would have been
    leading the presidency now.
  • 46:14 - 46:15
    Instead of having this
    doom and gloom
  • 46:15 - 46:17
    conversation about the far Right,
  • 46:17 - 46:18
    we'll be talking about how
  • 46:20 - 46:22
    populism and social democracy
  • 46:22 - 46:24
    go hand in hand and whatnot.
  • 46:25 - 46:27
    So it's worth keeping
    that in in mind,
  • 46:27 - 46:30
    the degree of contingency
    in modern politics.
  • 46:30 - 46:34
    We really don't have any sort of
    master key that will unlock us.
  • 46:34 - 46:35
    Anything can happen.
  • 46:36 - 46:39
    Even the most Informed analysts
    are surprised by all the time.
  • 46:40 - 46:42
    Myself, I've learned to
    live with this uncertainty
  • 46:42 - 46:45
    and be a bit more
    humble about my
  • 46:45 - 46:47
    priors about what might happen
    at a given point in time,.
  • 46:47 - 46:48
    [Tiare] Yeah,
  • 46:49 - 46:53
    the end of history is certainly over
  • 46:53 - 46:56
    and it's just a matter of
  • 46:56 - 46:59
    what we do with the wreckage
    basically that is left.
  • 47:02 - 47:05
    These were all our questions.
  • 47:05 - 47:08
    Clearly the conclusion is
    we are not very sure,
  • 47:08 - 47:14
    But it was still clarifying to hear
    about the geo-political tensions
  • 47:14 - 47:20
    and how to understand
    them right now.
  • 47:20 - 47:23
    [Jorge] Yeah, my pleasure.
  • 47:23 - 47:27
    [Tiare] Thank you so, Jorge, Gracias.
  • 47:27 - 47:29
    We're really happy to
    have you here.
  • 47:29 - 47:34
    Where people can find you,
    what do you suggest they read?
  • 47:34 - 47:35
    [Jorge] I'm not on Twitter anymore.
  • 47:35 - 47:38
    I'm on Blue Sky with
    my name and surname.
  • 47:38 - 47:39
    I write every now and then.
  • 47:39 - 47:41
    That's where I share
    most of my work,
  • 47:41 - 47:42
    so that's where people
    can find me.
  • 47:43 - 47:47
    Great, we will leave
    the link down below.
  • 47:47 - 47:48
    Thank you so much again
  • 47:48 - 47:51
    And thanks everyone
    for joining us today,
  • 47:51 - 47:54
    [Jorge] Of course, have a good one!
Title:
Trump, Ukraine and the Myth of a Democratic EU | Jorge Tamames Interview
Description:

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Video Language:
English, British
Duration:
47:55

English, British subtitles

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