China’s domestic transformation and global security impact by 2025 | Feng Zhu | TEDxKFAS

International relations expert Dr. Zhu Feng sheds light on the future of China, underlining that China will remain a “transformative power” in the next ten years. He stresses that there will be no dramatic change in China’s political system while it struggles for domestic security and continues to expand its international influence.

Dr. Zhu Feng suggests that Beijing’s security implications to the world and the region will be complicated and multifaceted. He predicts that China-US relations will be cooperative and competitive at the same time. Pointing to China’s sequential efforts to embark on regional economic and trade integration process, Dr. Zhu Feng asserts that a more decisive impact of China will come from its economy.

This talk was given at a TEDx event using the TED conference format but independently organized by a local community.
Learn more at http://ted.com/tedx

Dr. Zhu Feng is currently Executive Director of China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, Nanjing University. He is also a senior research fellow at the China Center for Peace and Development, and a professor at Peking University's School of International Studies. He writes extensively on regional security in East Asia, the nuclear issue in North Korea, and China-US military and diplomatic relations. He sits on the editorial boards of several scholarly journals, consults independently for the Chinese government and the private sector, and comments frequently on TV, radio, and print media on Chinese foreign affairs and security policy. Professor Zhu began his undergraduate studies at the Department of International Politics at Peking University in 1981, and received his Ph.D. from Peking University in 1991.

This talk was given at a TEDx event using the TED conference format but independently organized by a local community. Learn more at http://ted.com/tedx

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

It’s a great pleasure for me to come here,

joining KFAS and the
distinguished colleagues here,

and sharing my observation
of my country by 2025.

I’m a little bit pressured because it is
a big audience, a lot of celebrities.

Particularly I’d like
to thank the moderator

for his very positive description
of what China will be by the year 2025.

But I have to say,
his observation is too much rosy.

From the Chinese perspective,
by 2025 what will China be like?

We are still very worried.

I don’t think such a rosy prospect
is completely assured.

So I'm very happy to share my thoughts
with everybody here

about China’s global
security impact by 2025.

First of all, let me begin with what
China will look like 10 years later on.

Yes, it’s quite likely that, in economic
terms, China’s GDP will surpass the US.

But I don’t think it’s completely possible

because China’s economy now
is truly hitting some snap.

For example, China's economic growth
is really slowing down,

most Chinese feel a little bit nervous
about the future economic growth rate.

China could just repeat
the very marvelous, high growth rate

of the past three decades.

I have to say China’s response
is very complicated.

On the one hand, we’d like to see
China’s economy be healthy,

but on the other hand,
we’d like what?

We'd like fresh air, secure food,

we’d also like a declining gap
of economic inequality.

So if China’s economic growth
is losing dynamics

as we did in the past two decades,
I have to tell you,

it may be good news for my country.

Because we recognize
that economic growth rate

means income rising,

but it doesn’t mean
that our life quality is getting better.

So China’s development has never been

a more attractive story
in the global context.

In the coming decade,
one of the leading task force

for China’s government to work on

is not just crazily working
on China’s economic marvelous story.

Most important thing is how economy
can be well balanced in some way,

to continue to develop.

GDP is one of the indicators -

yes, it’s possible
that China will surpass US.

But GDP is just one of the indicators

by which we can measure
China’s power and strength.

On the other hand,
GDP indicator doesn’t mean anything.

For example, if China’s growth rate
declines to an annual base of 5%,

then we’ll see such surpassing
will be delayed.

What really matters is,

does surpassing US
in GDP terms mean everything?

No, I don’t think
it’s a very amazing story

that China’s economy
could be stronger than that of the US.

Most important thing is,
we have to create more jobs.

We have to innovate China’s technology.

We have to update China’s economic
competence in the world community.

So these things will be
more important, more significant.

So don’t always over-believe

that GDP-driven China’s
strength enhancement

will mean everything for my country.

We’re very cautiously looking

at such a power transition
simply in terms of GDP.

From my perspective, GDP is only
one indicator that is not so significant.

If we turn to security realm,

we would see a more complicated story.

This is a cartoon from New York Times.

It tells us how confrontational China
and the US will be in the coming years.

Because China's navy is getting bigger.

China is a little bit overstretching
in the Western Pacific Rim.

So in coming days, there will be
a new Cold War between the US and China,

or US and China could get along well
where they should.

It has never been more tricky.

So there is a lot of complaints
that we can adequately hear

from the American community,
the politics and academic community.

They always say probably
China will be getting more aggressive.

So in 10 years, the China-US relationship

will be more confrontational,
or it will stay the same.

That means we’re competitors
but at the same time we're cooperators.

Foretelling the future
of China’s global security

should start off by a cool-headed
analysis of the China-US relations.

Then, the South China Sea issue -
it’s one of the leading spots.

Some say that the South China Sea's
friction attention now is sitting

at the centerpiece
of international security

because it is the only source
of our future’s great power tension.

So then how will the South China Sea
affect the China-US relations?

It will lead bilateral relations

to growing, escalating military tension,

then the South China Sea
will cause a geopolitical split.

It's some sort of foretelling story
about power relations trajectory

So I think it’s a key concern.

Another thing we also have to have in mind
is about economic and security crash.

Yes, in economic terms,
China will get bigger and stronger.

But it does not mean China will be

a leading driver
of regional security in East Asia.

The reason is very simple: as I mentioned,
China’s economic clout

will not be automatically translated
into geopolitical gains.

So America-centered ally system
is unbelievably stable.

On the other hand,

the US is also reaping bonus

from China’s rise

because most of the regional members

feel a little bit worried
about China’s future.

So now it’s decisively
leaning toward the US.

In the coming one decade,
will such things dramatically change?

No.

So the future China’s
global security impact

should be very adequately based
on this assumption.

China’s rise will not stir up

realignment and realliance in the region.

So security order is stable,
power relations

in terms of basic contour
remain very expected.

So I don’t think in the coming 10 years

the China-US relations
will significantly change.

Yes, we can be a little bit worried

about what kind of nature
the US-China relations will be.

Will it be significantly changed?

Will it be getting more confrontational?

No, I think so far there is no sign

that it will stay on the line
of a pessimistic expectation.

Yes, from the American
perspective, look at this,

the Pacific Chief Commander,

Admiral Harry Harris,

in comment about China’s
land reclamation in South China Sea,

pointedly said that what China is doing,
with the land reclamation,

is China is attempting
to build a Great Wall at the sea.

So maybe 10 years later,
we will see China’s Great Wall

extending to the Western Pacific,

but I don’t think this
is a truly adequate assessment.

Yes, China wants to build an island,
to expand maritime presence,

but one of the reasons is,
Beijing believes we're a latecomer.

Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia,
including Taiwan, one after the other,

they have airstrips,
have military hubs at the South China Sea.

But Beijing hasn’t got anything like this.

So now China is getting bigger,

we should be
at a little bit better position

to safeguard China’s interest
at the South China Sea.

So we’re little bit stretched out
but it doesn’t mean land reclamation

will be automatically leading to a
militarization of South China Sea.

The reason is very simple.

I think the leading constraint to China’s
foreign policy and security strategy

will be very similar
to the kind of challenges

facing today’s China.

It will not be easy
to overcome for Beijing.

I think that leading constraint is that
China is by nature a transformative power.

Even by 2025,

that nature will not
overwhelmingly change.

On the other hand,

it is still a formidable task to decide
what kind of China we could be.

So what makes the difference
between the US and China?

I don’t think it is military strength,

I don’t think it's technology innovation,
or soft power attraction.

I think in a way it goes deeper,
into some sort of variations,

which is now really really deciding

differentiation between the two powers.

The US has a great political, economic,
and social system, but China hasn’t yet.

I think it’s a leading panic for
my generation of Chinese intellectuals.

I think it’s also a big challenge
for today’s China

when we’d like to embrace Chinese dream.

So in the next decade,
Beijing will continue

to struggle for transformation,
for transition.

That kind of thing will decide the future
of China’s international behavior.

Yes, we have a contending theory
to explain some sorts of domestic factors

and how it will implicate
China’s foreign policy.

Some people say that will drive China over
to a more assertive policy

because China has to add
a domestic legitimacy

by [adopting] a risk-taking
policy internationally.

But I have to say
such assumption is really groundless

because China is huge,
it is most populated,

and Chinese people
have never been more mobilized.

If such risk-taking policy really failed,

what will happen to my country?

China probably will be fragmented.

That’s a real nightmare;

I think, the mainstream the Chinese
would like to stay away from,

would like to avoid.

So whatever Xi Jinping administration's
foreign policy is controversial,

because a lot of China watchers believe

that Xi Jinping’s policy has said bye bye
to Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile approach,

that China switched the course,

and turned to a more aggressive
international behavior.

But I have to say partly it is.

But partly it is completely not.

So if China couldn’t successfully
and also very organizedly

get through domestic transition,

I have to tell you China will remain
a vulnerable power by nature.

2025's prospect doesn't mean
it's a breaking point

for China’s historical trajectory.

We should put hope on Beijing
still being cool-headed.

We recognize
what's the leading threat to China.

So then China will be

a reluctant cooperator with the US.

For example, John Kerry yesterday,

at the ARF ministerial meeting,

strongly urged China to stop all

island construction,
land reclamation and facilities

building up at the China’s artificial land
at South China Sea.

I don’t think his suggestion
will be well-echoed in Beijing

because we consider
such an island construction

really serves China’s interest;
it is legitimate and it is reasonable.

This constructed island can also be used

as common good for the region

to endorse the South China Sea -

rescuing and incident-searching.

But the problem is, if the US is trying
to force China to pull back,

I don’t think China
will respond positively.

Yes, there will be some big barriers

for the US and China
to discuss future bargaining,

how our regional security hot points
could be well-approached,

with the shared responsibility
of two great powers.

But on the other hand, there is no way.

South -China-Sea-driven friction
will be out of control.

OK.

I think another very leading indicator

to measure China’s security impact

is, in one way, that the continuity

of China’s regional diplomatic,
economic activism could be lasting.

In the past 10 years China
did a lot, China initiated a lot.

From Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, Six Party Talks,

China-ASEAN, China-Korea FTA over to AIIB,

and One Belt One Road initiative.

That kind of China’s regional engagement
proved to be positive,

but it doesn’t mean
China will continue to do that

because whatever China is initiating,
and whatever China now is embarking on,

it always allows a lot of controversy.
So, I think it is regional challenges.

In the next 10 years, how can we maintain

such a great diplomatic momentum,

to drive China more positively
and more broadly

to engage in regional common goods?

It’s not completely assured,
but on the other hand,

there is a bigger concern:
What is China’s real intention?

This is also a source
of bigger speculation.

My American colleague, Michael Pillsbury,
just published a very good book.

This book's topic is
The Hundred-Year Marathon.

It describes China’s very deeply hidden

and history-alluded strategic intention.

Beijing sooner or later
will squeeze the US out of Asian Pacific.

I have to say it’s an exaggeration.

The US as a regional member,

there always is some sort of misperception

probably the future security interaction

would be a little bit flimsy and stuck.

But the problem is we also have
another very alarming thought.

My colleague at Princeton
University, Tom Christensen,

he just published a book,
The China Challenge.

He strongly says
that, in the coming years,

China’s leading work for Beijing
finds no way to disload.

It is still domestic transition.

So China’s foreign policy

will be risk-averse
rather than risk-taking.

Okay.

Let me quickly get to my conclusion.

First of all, I don’t think by 2025

China’s security role will
be historically changed.

China’s power projection capability
will remain very limited.

For Beijing, the leading fear and worry

sweeping through
the domestic policy agenda

remains domestic and internal,
rather than external.

But anyway, China's
security role will be dual.

On the one hand,
China’s diplomatic activism

will be a very important source
for the region to thrive,

for the region to be better connected,

and overcome challenges,
in a collective and regionalized way.

On the other hand,

China is doomed to be
the source of instability in the region

because China is big
and it wants to stretch out,

China also would like
to go after China’s interes

in a more Chinese way.

So what will be exactly

forecasted by 2025?

China’s security impact will
be still controversial.

I hope Beijing could take
a good look at such a big controversy,

and on the one hand make China
still positively engaged in the region

and contributing in shared
prosperity and development.

On the other hand, Beijing
should also pay more attention

to undercut the China stir

caused by a rising China.

If we can very conceivably
foresee it that way,

then my country will be getting better,

stronger, and more amicable.

Thanks.

(Applause)