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Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration

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    Narrator: As we'll see in this video
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    and in others, the roots
    of a lot of the current
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    disagreements in the Middle East
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    and a lot of the conflict
    in the Middle East
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    can actually be traced
    back to World War I.
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    I realize this is an
    incredibly touchy subject
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    that there are people who
    have very strong feelings
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    on either side of it and
    my goal here is to really
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    give my best attempt at
    what really happened.
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    I encourage you to doubt any of this
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    and look it up yourself and come, frankly,
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    to your own conclusions.
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    Let's rewind back to October of 1915,
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    or 1915 in particular.
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    The British were already
    at war with the Ottoman's.
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    Just as a reminder of
    some of what happened
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    in 1915, the Gallipoli campaign,
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    by the end of 1915 it was pretty clear
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    that this was a disaster for the allies.
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    The Ottoman's were able
    to fend off the allies,
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    they were in retreat.
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    The British were able to
    fend off the Ottoman's
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    when they tried to attack
    the Suez canal in 1915.
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    This is the background,
    you can imagine the British
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    are eager to get any other allies they can
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    in their battle against the Ottoman's.
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    In particular, they are
    eager to get the help
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    of the Arab's who have been under the rule
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    of the Ottoman's for hundreds of years.
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    That's the backdrop where you have
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    this correspondence between
    the high commissioner
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    in Egypt, the British high commissioner,
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    Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca,
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    Hussein bin ʿAli, who
    had his own aspirations
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    to essentially be the
    king of an independent
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    Arab state.
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    They kept going back
    and forth from mid 1915
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    to early 1916 talking about
    what the state could be.
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    Obviously the British want his support,
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    wants him to lead a revolt
    against the Ottoman's.
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    He's already articulated the boundaries
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    for a state that he would like to see.
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    So, that gives us a context
    for this correspondence
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    in October of 1915.
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    This is from Sir Henry McMahon to Hussein.
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    "... it is with great pleasure
    that I communicate to you
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    "on their behalf," the
    British government's behalf,
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    "the following statement,
    which I am confident
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    "you will receive with satisfaction.
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    "The two districts of
    Mersina and Alexandretta
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    "and portions of Syria lying to the west
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    "of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama,
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    "and Aleppo cannot be
    said to be purely Arab,
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    "and should be excluded
    from the limits demanded."
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    This is referring to the limits that
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    Hussein bin Ali had demanded
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    in previous correspondence.
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    "With the above modifications,"
    so just that region
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    right over there, this right over here is
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    Mersina, Alexandretta, this is Hama,
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    Homs, Damascus, so really
    what he's referring to
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    is this region, the west,
    the west of those cities
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    right over here.
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    He's saying look, you
    can't really consider
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    this to be purely Arab,
    I'm going to exclude
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    this out of the boundaries
    of this potential
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    independent Arab state.
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    "With the above modification,
    and without prejudice
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    "to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs
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    "we accept those limits,"
    we accept those limits.
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    "As for those regions lying
    within those frontiers
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    "wherein Great Britain is free to act
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    "without determinant to
    the interest of her ally,
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    "France," so as long as
    I'm not getting in trouble
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    with France, "I'm empowered in the name of
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    "the Government of Great
    Britain to give the following
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    "assurances and make the following reply
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    "to your letter; Subject to
    the above modifications,"
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    so taking this part out,
    "Great Britain is prepared
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    "to recognize and support the independence
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    "of the Arabs in all the
    regions within the limits
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    "demanded by the Sharif of Mecca."
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    So, essentially it
    included all of this region
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    and actually much beyond
    what I'm showing here,
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    kind of present day Syria, Jordan, Iraq,
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    parts of present day Saudi Arabia.
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    All of that is essentially,
    the British are saying,
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    yeah we're going to
    allow you to have that,
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    an independent state there.
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    "Great Britain will
    guarantee the Holy Places
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    "against all external aggression
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    "and will recognize their inviolability.
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    "... I am convinced that
    this declaration will assure
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    "you beyond all possible doubt,"
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    beyond all possible
    doubt, "of the sympathy
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    "of Great Britain towards
    the aspiration of her friends
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    "the Arabs, and will result in a firm
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    "and lasting alliance,
    the immediate results
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    "of which will be the
    expulsion of the Turks
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    "from the Arab countries and the freeing
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    "of the Arab peoples
    from the Turkish yoke,
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    "which for so many years
    has pressed heavily
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    "upon them."
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    This actually does help
    to convince the Arab's
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    to rise up against the Turks,
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    against the Ottoman Empire,
    they play a significant
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    role in the Palestine Campaign,
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    they rise up in June of 1916.
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    Now, the video that I did
    on the Palestine Campaign,
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    I got several comments
    of people being cynical
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    about Britain's intentions
    and it does look like
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    the British were, indeed, cynical.
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    T.E. Lawrence famous
    for Lawrence of Arabia
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    was often depicted as
    this mystical fellow,
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    this guy who had this
    kinship with the Arab's.
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    His actual correspondence with the
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    British government actually
    do show that he did have
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    a kind of ... he was doing, I guess,
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    in the words of George
    W. Bush, a little bit of
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    strategery, he had a more cynical view
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    of this relationship with the Arab's.
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    This is some correspondence that he wrote
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    in early 1916, so right
    about the same time
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    that all of this was going on.
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    This says he's referring
    to a possible Arab revolt,
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    or Hussein's activity.
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    "Hussein's activity
    seems beneficial to us,
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    "because it matches
    with our immediate aims,
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    "the break-up of the Islamic 'bloc'
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    "and the defeat and disruption of the
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    "Ottoman Empire."
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    Assuming he didn't really talk about this,
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    this being one of the
    ... the British didn't
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    talk about that when they
    were talking to Hussein.
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    "If we can arrange that
    this political change
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    "shall be a violent one,
    we will have abolished
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    "the threat of Islam, by
    dividing it against itself,
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    "in its very heart."
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    "There will then be a Khalifa,"
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    kind of a seat of Islam, "in Turkey
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    "and a Khalifa in Arabia,
    in theological warfare."
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    This is T.E. Lawrence, I got this from
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    The Golden Warrior: The Life and Legend
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    of Lawrence of Arabia.
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    Even this, somewhat
    portrayed as a heroic figure,
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    was doing things in very strategic,
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    strategic terms.
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    To make things worse for the Arab's,
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    while the British were
    trying to convince them
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    to revolt, they were also
    in secret negotiations
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    with the French on how they would divide
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    the Middle East if they were able
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    to beat the Ottoman's.
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    At this point in the war
    the British were already
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    making some progress in Mesopotamia,
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    but they really hadn't really started
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    on the Palestine Campaign right here.
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    So, this was all conjecture.
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    The British representatives was Sykes,
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    the French representative was Picot,
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    this was done with the
    consent of the Russian's.
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    You didn't have a revolution in Russia
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    as of now, so in early
    1916, in May this agreement
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    was concluded, this secret agreement.
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    You have the Sykes-Picot Agreement,
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    it's secret.
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    Let me write that, it
    is a secret agreement
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    between Britain and France
    and essentially they are
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    carving up the entire
    Middle East between them.
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    This blue area right here,
    this would be occupied
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    by the French, part of eastern Turkey
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    or modern day eastern
    Turkey would be given
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    to the Russian's.
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    The British would be able to occupy,
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    would occupy southern Mesopotamia
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    essentially insuring protection of the oil
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    that is coming out of Persia.
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    Oil is becoming more
    and more of a relevant
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    factor in kind of global power.
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    Then you have these two protectorates
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    right over here, which in theory could be
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    independent or an independent Arab state,
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    or two independent Arab
    states under the protection.
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    Let me put that in quotes,
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    because "protectorate"
    is always not as nice
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    as it sounds, under the
    protection of the French
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    or the British which means,
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    "Hey you're an independent
    state, but we will
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    "protect you in case
    anyone wants to invade."
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    The reality of protectorate
    is that it usually involves
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    the people doing the protecting have all
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    the real power and all the real influence.
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    The Sykes-Picot Agreement
    also give this little
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    carve out to Britain so
    they would have access
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    to the Mediterranean.
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    Palestine, or the Roman Kingdom of Judea,
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    this is carved out as a
    separate international property
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    something that would be
    administered by multiple
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    states and I guess the argument would be,
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    this is where the Holy Land's are,
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    multiple religions have
    some of their holiest sites
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    within here and so they
    carved it out like this.
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    Once again, this is all in secret,
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    they obviously don't want
    the Arab's to find out
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    because they're about
    to convince the Arab's
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    to join in a revolt against the Ottoman's.
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    Now, to make things ... once
    again, this was all secret
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    up to this point in 1916
    when it was all agreed on.
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    Then you forward to 1917 where we have
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    the famous Balfour Declaration.
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    This right over here is
    the Balfour Declaration
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    and it was essentially a letter from
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    the Foreign Secretary
    of the U.K., Balfour,
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    to Lord Rothschild who was
    a leading [Briticizen] ,
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    a leading member of the Jewish community.
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    In it he writes, "Dear Lord Rothschild,
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    "I have much pleasure in conveying to you,
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    "on behalf of His Majesty's Government,
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    "the following declaration of sympathy
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    "with Jewish Zionist
    aspirations which has been
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    "submitted to, and
    approved by, the Cabinet.
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    "His Majesty's Government view with favor
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    "the establishment in
    Palestine of a national home,"
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    of a national home,
    "for the Jewish people,
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    "and will use their best
    endeavors to facilitate
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    "the achievement of this objective.
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    "It being clearly understood
    that nothing shall be done
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    "which may prejudice the
    civil and religious rights
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    "of existing non-Jewish
    communities in Palestine,
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    "or the rights and political
    status enjoyed by Jews
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    "in any other country.
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    "I should be grateful if you would bring
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    "this declaration to the knowledge of the
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    "Zionist Federation."
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    Signed Artur Balfour.
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    In here, he's not explicitly saying ...
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    and they're being very careful here,
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    he's not saying we're supporting a state
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    for the Jewish people, but he's saying
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    he is supporting the
    return of national home
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    for the Jewish people,
    but at the same time,
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    he's saying that it
    being clearly understood
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    that nothing shall be
    done which may prejudice
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    the civil and religious
    rights of the existing
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    non-Jewish communities in Palestine.
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    Needless to say, you
    can imagine that this is
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    making the Arab's fairly uncomfortable.
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    On one side it seems, based on some of the
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    McMahon-Hussein
    correspondences that were ...
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    especially in 1915, that
    they were being promised
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    an independent Arab state which included
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    much of this territory,
    but at the same time,
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    in the Balfour Declaration
    the British were promising
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    to, kind of the Jewish diaspora,
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    that they could have a homeland there
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    and it might one day, who
    knows, it might one day
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    turn in to some type of a state.
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    To make the Arab's even
    more uncomfortable,
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    this was in November 2, 1917.
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    By the end of November,
    you have to remember
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    that 1917 you first had a revolution,
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    in Russia the Czar was
    overthrown in February
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    and in March of 1917, and October
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    the Bolshevik's take over.
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    They want to get out of the war,
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    they don't like all these secret deals,
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    not clear that they
    would even get what they
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    were entitled to these secret deals,
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    so they actually release
    all the entire text
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    of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
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    They released this, so in the same month
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    you have the Arab's and the Ottoman's
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    and the Ottoman's were
    very happy to see this
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    because it would undermine
    the Arab's belief
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    in maybe supporting the allies,
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    but in one month you have
    the Arab's finding out
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    about the Balfour Declaration,
    which was a pulbic
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    declaration and then later that month
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    because of the Russian release of it,
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    the formally secret Sykes-Picot Agreement,
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    so it makes them very,
    or at least a little bit
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    more suspicious.
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    So you can imagine the British Empire
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    trying to have it both
    ways, to kind of have
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    support from the Jewish Diaspora
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    while at the same time have
    support from the Arab's
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    in their revolt against the Ottoman's
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    would lead to very significant conflicts
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    over the decades to come.
  • 11:46 - 11:48
    Regardless of which side
    of the issue you fall on,
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    a lot of the seed is
    happening right around now,
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    right around World War I.
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    This has been admitted by
    the British government.
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    This is right here, this was the then
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    Secretary, or Foreign
    Secretary Jack Straw,
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    U.K Foreign Secretary in 2002.
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    This is a statement he made to the
  • 12:04 - 12:07
    News Statesman Magazine in 2002.
  • 12:07 - 12:10
    "A lot of the problems we
    are having to deal with now,
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    "I have to deal with now,"
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    he's the Foreign Secretary,
    "are a consequence
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    "of our colonial past ..."
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    Consequence of our colonial past.
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    "The Balfour Declaration
    and the contradictory
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    assurances," "and the
    contradictory assurances
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    "which were being given to Palestinian's
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    "in private at the same time as they were
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    "being given to the Israelis ...
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    "again, an interesting history for us,
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    "but not an honorable one."
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    This is really just the beginning
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    as we'll see in future
    videos as we go to the
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    Interwar period, the British
    kind of go back and forth
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    on this issue over, over, and over again,
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    but needless to say,
    it's lead to a very messy
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    situation in the modern Middle East.
Title:
Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration
Description:

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Video Language:
English
Team:
Khan Academy
Duration:
12:52

English subtitles

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